Whitewater Hill, LLC v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State
Decision Date | 29 January 2015 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 14CA0889 |
Citation | 2015 COA 5,345 P.3d 984 |
Parties | WHITEWATER HILL, LLC, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO; and Division of Unemployment Insurance Employer Services—Integrity Employer Audits, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John Behrs, as Authorized Representative of Whitewater Hill, LLC.
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, John August Lizza, First Assistant Attorney General, Sophia Lenz, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
No Appearance for Respondent Division of Unemployment Insurance Employer Services – Integrity Employer Audits.
*
¶ 1 This case raises the issue of whether certain agricultural work constituted “employment” under the Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA). The dispute centers around the interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a), C.R.S. 2014, a CESA provision that defines when agricultural labor is deemed statutory employment.
¶ 2 A hearing officer and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) reached differing and conflicting interpretations of this statute which, in turn, resulted in conflicting conclusions as to whether the work was covered employment.
¶ 3 We conclude that the hearing officer's interpretation of the statute was correct and that the work performed was not employment as defined under CESA. Consequently, we set aside the Panel's order and remand with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer's decision.
¶ 4 Petitioner, Whitewater Hill, LLC (Whitewater), operates a small vineyard and winery. Following an audit, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (Department) issued a liability determination concluding that agricultural work performed by certain individuals (the workers) for Whitewater amounted to covered employment and that Whitewater must pay taxes on amounts it paid the workers.
¶ 5 Whitewater appealed the liability determination arguing, as pertinent here, that the services were “agricultural labor” and therefore fell outside CESA's definition of employment. Following an administrative hearing, the hearing officer made findings concerning the number of workers Whitewater had employed. Based on those findings and her interpretation of section 8–70120(1)(a), the hearing officer concluded that the workers' services were not employment, but rather exempt agricultural labor. Consequently, the hearing officer concluded that Whitewater was not required to pay taxes on the amounts it paid the workers.1
¶ 6 On review, the Panel disagreed with the hearing officer's interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a) and set forth its own differing interpretation of the statute. The Panel set aside the hearing officer's decision and remanded for additional factual findings.
¶ 7 On remand, the hearing officer made supplemental findings as instructed but adhered to her original interpretation of section 870–120(1)(a). Based on that interpretation, the hearing officer again concluded that the workers' services constituted exempt agricultural labor.
¶ 8 Whitewater appealed a second time. On review, the Panel applied its previous interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a) to the hearing officer's new findings and concluded that the workers' services constituted covered employment. Whitewater now seeks judicial review of the Panel's order.
¶ 9 Whitewater contends that the workers' services were exempt agricultural labor under CESA and that the Panel misinterpreted section 8–70–120(1)(a). We agree.
¶ 10 We may set aside the Panel's decision if it is erroneous as a matter of law. See § 8–74–107(6)(d), C.R.S. 2014. We are bound by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact, which are not in dispute here, if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Harbert v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2012 COA 23, ¶ 7, 272 P.3d 1190. However, we review de novo an agency's legal conclusions, including its interpretation of statutes. Commc'ns Workers of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2012 COA 148, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 1127 ; see Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Servs., Inc., 2014 CO 30, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 560 ().
¶ 11 Section 8–70–109, C.R.S. 2014, defines certain work activities that constitute “agricultural labor.” The parties do not dispute that the workers' services in this case fall within this definition.
¶ 12 Section 8–70–126, C.R.S.2014, provides that covered employment “does not include services performed by an individual in agricultural labor ... except as provided in section 8–70–120.” See also § 8–70–113(1)(d), C.R.S. 2014 ( ).
¶ 13 Section 8–70–120, in turn, describes the limited circumstances in which agricultural labor may be treated as covered employment subject to taxation. In this appeal, the parties dispute the meaning of section 8–70–120(1)(a). That subsection provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
¶ 14 Whitewater and the hearing officer interpret section 8–70120(1)(a) to require that, during the current or preceding year, a putative employer employed ten or more agricultural workers within each of twenty different weeks. More simply stated by the hearing officer, the statute requires “[twenty] weeks with ten [or more] agricultural workers each.” Because Whitewater had employed ten or more agricultural workers in only four different weeks from 2011 through the first quarter of 2013, the hearing officer concluded that the workers' services were not “employment” under section 8–70120(1)(a).
¶ 15 In contrast, the Panel interprets section 8–70–120(1)(a) to require merely that a putative employer hired ten or more agricultural workers within a year and employed at least one agricultural worker in twenty different weeks. Because Whitewater employed more than ten total agricultural workers during 2011 and 2012 and employed at least one such worker in more than twenty weeks during both years, the Panel concluded that the workers' services constituted employment.
¶ 16 We agree with the hearing officer's and Whitewater's interpretation of the statute.
¶ 17 Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124, ¶ 14, 310 P.3d 288. We first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words the General Assembly chose to utilize. Accord Human Res., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 275 P.3d 697, 700 (Colo. App. 2010), aff'd, 2012 CO 15, 270 P.3d 985. We give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of the statute, and we seek to avoid an interpretation that would render any statutory language meaningless. Yotes, ¶ 14. We also must “not ascribe a meaning that would lead to an illogical or absurd result.” Id.
¶ 18 In our view, the Panel's interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a) ignores the statute's express requirement that a putative employer have employed ten or more workers in each of twenty different calendar weeks. The word “each” is a “ ‘distributive adjective pronoun, which denotes or refers to every one of the persons or things mentioned.’ ” Hayes v. Ottke, 2013 CO 1, ¶ 20, 293 P.3d 551 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 507 (6th ed. 1991)); see Mut. Sav. & Bldg. Ass'n v. Canon Block Inv. Co., 67 Colo. 75, 79, 185 P. 649, 650 (1919) ( ).
¶ 19 The Panel argues that interpreting the statute to require the hiring of ten or more workers in each of twenty different weeks renders meaningless the phrase “regardless of whether they were employed at the same moment of time.” We disagree. That phrase simply means that all individuals who worked on a given day must be counted toward the total, regardless of whether they worked at the same time during that day. This interpretation allows us to give effect to both this phrase and to the “in each” language appearing earlier in the same sentence.
¶ 20 Our interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a) also comports with the General Assembly's intent that CESA provisions be construed to conform with federal authorities. See § 8–70–108, C.R.S. 2014 ( ); see also Indus. Comm'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 690 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1984).
¶ 22 This federal provision plainly requires that, to be deemed an employer, the putative employer must have hired at least ten agricultural workers in each of twenty different weeks. Our interpretation of section 8–70–120(1)(a) is consistent with this federal counterpart.
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