Whitfield v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 8:07-CV-1823-T-30MAP |
| Parties | ERNEST WHITFIELD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, Ernest Whitfield (hereinafter "Petitioner"), petitions this Court for the writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1).
Petitioner was convicted of armed burglary, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder charge (Resp. Ex. A-13 at pp. 2033-34). Petitioner appealed, and on September 11, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. See Whitfield v. State, 706 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1997).
On May 6, 2002, Petitioner filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. C-2 at record pp. 267-322). On March 17, 2004, the circuit court denied Petitioner's amended Rule 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. C-5 at record pp. 826-883). On November 3, 2005, the FloridaSupreme Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's amended Rule 3.850 motion. See Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2005).
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on October 5, 2007 (Dkt. 1). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred (Dkt. 13). Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 20), and Respondent filed a reply (Dkt. 22). On September 18, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of whether Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period (Dkt. 31). On September 24, 2008, the Court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition as time-barred (Dkt. 33).1
Petitioner appealed the order dismissing the petition. Both this Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability (Dkts. 40, 48). Subsequently, however, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to this Court for fact finding and further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010) (Dkt. 49).
After further briefing by both parties on the issue of equitable tolling, this Court entered an order vacating the original order dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition as time-barred, and directed Respondent to respond to the petition (Dkt. 59). Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 64), and Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt. 78).
Upon consideration of Petitioner's claims, the Court has determined that none has merit and that Petitioner's request for federal habeas relief must be denied.
In early June 1995, Whitfield went to the home of Claretha Reynolds. He asked Reynolds, Willie Mae Brooks, and Estella Pierre for money. Pierre was Whitfield's former girlfriend. When none of them would give him any money, he tried to snatch Pierre's purse. Reynolds grabbed Whitfield in a headlock and forcibly ejected him from her home. Whitfield told them as he left: "I'm going to kill all three of you bitches."
Several weeks later, in the early morning hours of June 19, 1995, Whitfield attempted to get Willie Mae Brooks to let him in Reynolds' house. Brooks refused and went back to sleep in the bed she shared with her one-year-old child. Whitfield subsequently unlawfully entered Reynolds' home. Armed with an eight-inch knife, he entered the bedroom in which Brooks was sleeping and raped Brooks, indicating that he would stab her and her child if she screamed. Whitfield then went into a different room where Reynolds and her five children were located. About ten minutes later, Reynolds stumbled into Brooks's room and asked her to lock the door. She was bleeding profusely from her wounds and told Brooks that she was dying and that Ernest had stabbed her. Brooks and one of Reynolds' children, a twelve-year-old, climbed out the window and ran to a neighbor's house to call police. Whitfield fled the scene. Reynolds died shortly after police arrived.
After he was apprehended, Whitfield admitted stabbing Reynolds and led police to the murder weapon.
The medical examiner testified that Reynolds was stabbed twenty-one times; seven of the wounds were potentially lethal and many of the wounds were seven inches deep. He further stated that, after Reynolds was stabbed, she was still fully conscious and aware that she was dying.
Whitfield's defense was based on voluntary intoxication by cocaine. A clinical psychologist, Dr. Regnier, testified regarding Whitfield's cocaine abuse and his 1991 Baker Act hospitalization. He stated that Whitfield exhibited symptoms consistent with the classic pattern of cocaine abuse. He further testified that there was no reason to believe that Whitfield was not under the influence of cocaine during the incident and that there was reasonable doubt about premeditation.
The State's psychiatrist, Dr. Sprehe, testified in rebuttal that Whitfield was able to form a specific intent to commit murder, pointing out that Whitfield was arrested within two hours of the incident and was not considered to be intoxicated at that time. Further, he stated that Whitfield's actions during the course of the crimes showed planning ability: he entered the house, obtained a kitchen knife, used the knife to rape Brooks, threatened Brooks not to make noise, entered another room to kill Reynolds, left the house, and disposed of the knife. Dr. Sprehe also stated that cocaine psychosis resulting from long-term use of cocaine does not go away in a matter of hours.
Whitfield was convicted of armed burglary, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and first-degree murder. During the penalty phase, evidence was admitted regarding Whitfield's prior aggravated battery convictions. Testimony was presented that during both of the prior aggravated batteries Whitfield threatened to kill the victims if they called police. Whitfield presented evidence to show that he had recently been shot and severely wounded but that he forgave his assailant; that he was chronically dependent on drugs; that he suffers from major depression; that he suffered from a deprived childhood; that he was mentally ill and under the influence of crack cocaine when he entered Reynolds' home; and that he was not in complete control of his emotions at the time of the murder.
The jury recommended death by a seven-to-five vote. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation. He found three factors in aggravation: 1) prior violent felonies (two prior aggravated batteries and contemporaneous sexual battery of another victim in this case); 2) the murder was committed in the course of a burglary; and 3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. He found no statutory mitigating circumstances, but he found the following nonstatutory circumstances: cooperation with authorities (little or no weight); impoverished background (considerable weight); crack cocaine addiction (substantial weight); Whitfield's abandonment by his father and his mother's alcoholism (some weight); and that Whitfield was the victim of a near fatal shooting but forgave his assailant (little or no weight).
Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Maharaj v. Sec'y of Dept. of Corrections, 304 F.3d 1345, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The ultimate issue with respect to each claim is whether the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2002); Van Poyck v. Florida Department of Corrections, 290 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002). The standard Petitioner must meet could not be higher; it is not enough that the state court "got it wrong." Petitioner must show that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, supra).
No evidentiary hearing is required because none of Petitioner's claims turn on any unresolved issue of fact. All involve issues of law argued on the basis of the existing record.3
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, a Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component. Id. at 697.
A § 2254 petition cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . . ." 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.1998). In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir.2003) (); Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.2001); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) (...
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