Whitlock v. State, 80-1904
| Decision Date | 06 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1904,80-1904 |
| Citation | 404 So.2d 795 |
| Parties | Johnny Leon WHITLOCK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John Lipinski, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Paul Mendelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HUBBART, C. J., and BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
This appeal challenges the imposition of mandatory three year prison terms on a youthful offender pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1979). We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Appellant Whitlock entered guilty pleas to charges of robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. Appellant qualifies for the more lenient sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act, Chapter 958, Florida Statutes (1979). Notwithstanding appellant's status as a youthful offender, prior to sentencing the trial judge stated that he was obligated to impose a mandatory three year minimum term of imprisonment for each charge in accordance with section 775.087(2) because appellant carried a firearm during the robbery. Consequently, appellant was sentenced to two concurrent three year minimum terms.
Appellant submits that his status as a youthful offender under Chapter 958 precluded the minimum three year sentences imposed under section 775.087. The state, in turn, argues that appellant should not have been classified as a youthful offender because section 958.04(1)(c) 1 excludes persons found guilty of a capital or life felony from the sentencing provisions of the Act. The fallacy in this argument is that armed robbery, although a felony of the first degree, is not a capital or life felony. See sections 812.13(2)(a); and 775.081. Thus, while appellant's first degree felony plea precluded mandatory classification as a youthful offender pursuant to section 958.04(2)(b), the trial judge still had the discretion to classify the appellant as a youthful offender under subsection (1), which he so exercised. State v. Goodson, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla.1981) (). See also Barnhill v. State, 393 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Killian v. State, 387 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Accordingly, we find that appellant was properly classified as a youthful offender.
Section 958.05 of the Act expressly provides that youthful offenders be sentenced "in lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law," and enumerates three alternative sanctions which may be levied on such offenders. This section plainly circumscribes the penalties for youthful offenders and forbids the imposition of sanctions other than those provided therein. We find support for this conclusion in the legislative intent behind enactment of the statute. As stated in section 958.021, the legislature's goal was to improve the chances of correction and successful return to the community of youthful offenders sentenced to imprisonment by preventing their association with older and more experienced criminals during the terms of their confinement. Clearly, this objective would be defeated if youthful offenders were sentenced to mandatory terms of imprisonment under section 775.087(2). 2 Moreover, the Act itself provides for mandatory one year sentences for particularly serious crimes or dangerous offenders; a provision plainly substituting for the minimum three year sentence for adult offenders under section 775.087.
We hold that the sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act are the exclusive sanctions for defendants who meet its criteria. We also agree with appellant that the imposition of a mandatory minimum three year sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm was erroneous for the additional reason that this crime...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Des Marets
...406 U.S. 962, 92 S.Ct. 2070, 2073, 32 L.Ed.2d 350 (1972); United States v. Colamarco, 320 F.Supp. 616 (E.D.N.Y.1970); Whitlock v. State, 404 So.2d 795 (Fla.App.1981); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 372 Mass. 505, 362 N.E.2d 905 (Mass.1977). As noted, special sentencing provisions for young adult of......
-
State v. Ribbecke
...den. 406 U.S. 962, 92 S.Ct. 2070, 32 L.Ed.2d 350 (1972); United States v. Colamarco, 320 F.Supp. 616 (E.D.N.Y.1970); Whitlock v. State, 404 So.2d 795 (Fla.Ct.App.1981); Trent v. State, 403 So.2d 1131 (Fla.Ct.App.1981); cf. People v. Davis, 29 Cal.3d 814, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186 For ......
-
Cooper v. State, 84-844
...(Fla.1981); Kirkwood v. State, 426 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Nairn v. State, 417 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Whitlock v. State, 404 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Owens, 395 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Postell v. State, 383 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and Skinner v. St......
-
Wilson v. State, AO-145
...mandatory sentence under § 775.087(2) because of the provisions in § 958.021 and § 958.05, Florida Statutes (1981). Whitlock v. State, 404 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Patterson v. State, 408 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Cochran v. State, 410 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA For the foregoing reaso......