Whitman v. Kiger
Decision Date | 18 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. COA99-993.,COA99-993. |
Citation | 139 NC App. 44,533 S.E.2d 807 |
Parties | Phillip WHITMAN and wife, Eva Whitman, Plaintiffs, v. William "Sonny" KIGER and wife, Beverly Kiger, Defendants. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Larry L. Eubanks, Esq. and Jerry D. Jordan, Esq., Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellants.
Morrow, Alexander, Tash, Long and Kurtz, by John F. Morrow, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellees.
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. We reverse.
Pertinent facts and procedural history include the following: Plaintiffs are the parents of Beth Whitman (Whitman), an unemancipated minor born 25 March 1982, and defendants are the parents of Chad Elliott Kiger (Kiger), an unemancipated minor born 22 August 1982. Whitman and Kiger are the biological parents of an infant (the infant) born 27 March 1998. The infant resides with Whitman and plaintiffs, and Whitman works to support the infant. Neither Kiger nor defendants have contributed to the support of the infant.
On 23 April 1999, plaintiffs instituted this action pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4 (1995), seeking retroactive and prospective child support from Kiger and defendants. On 5 May 1999, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1999) (Rule 12(b)(6)), alleging plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. Defendants also filed an Answer denying any responsibility for the infant's support, alleging they "never stood in loco parentis of [the infant] ... [and] never assumed the obligation [to] support said child in writing or otherwise." Following a 7 July 1999 stipulation that defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion be heard as a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court entered an order 12 July 1999 granting summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)(1999). The movants can meet this burden in one of two ways:
(1) by showing that an essential element of the opposing party's claim is nonexistent; or (2) demonstrating that the opposing party cannot produce evidence sufficient to support an essential element of the claim or overcome an affirmative defense which would work to bar his claim.
Wilhelm v. City of Fayetteville, 121 N.C.App. 87, 89, 464 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1995)(citing Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1992)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants. James v. Clark, 118 N.C.App. 178, 181, 454 S.E.2d 826, 828, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 187 (1995).
In the case sub judice, the propriety of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants is controlled by this Court's interpretation of G.S. § 50-13.4(b). Construction of this section must be resolved by reference to well settled canons of statutory interpretation.
The principal goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 123 N.C.App. 720, 723, 475 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1996), aff'd, 347 N.C. 342, 493 S.E.2d 416 (1997). "The will of the legislature `must be found from the [plain] language of the act, its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its adoption which throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied.'" State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 212, 470 S.E.2d 16, 22 (1996)(quoting State ex rel. N.C. Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967)). "If the language of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms." Roberts v. Young, 120 N.C.App. 720, 724, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1995).
Section 50-13.4, allowing actions for the support of a child, provides in pertinent part:
G.S. § 50-13.4(a) & (b)(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs argue the defendants are primarily responsible for their infant grandchild because Kiger, their unemancipated minor child, is unable or unwilling to accept primary liability for the support of the infant. We agree.
The plain meaning of the above statutory language, coupled with the legislative intent, imposes primary responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors on the minors' parents (the infant's grandparents). A different construction would be contrary to the context and purpose of the statute.
G.S. § 50-13.4(b) reiterates the well established principle that parents carry primary responsibility for their minor children, regardless of whether they stand in loco parentis or decide not to accept a parental role in the child's life. See G.S. § 50-13.4(b)("the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of a minor child"), and Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C.App. 657, 659-60, 310 S.E.2d 51, 53 (1983)("both parents have equal support duties" under G.S. § 50-13.4), rev'd in part on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).
G.S. § 50-13.4(b) further provides that the "parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent ... until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated." G.S. § 50-13.4(b)(emphasis added). This sharing of primary responsibility between the unemancipated minor and that minor's parents, reflects the general principle that an unemancipated minor continues to be the responsibility of his or her own parents until emancipated or reaching the age of majority. See generally Alamance County Hosp., Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 365, 338 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1986)
("a father has a duty to support his unemancipated minor children"), and N.C.G.S. § 35A-1201(a)(6)(1999)() . See also In re Jurga, 123 N.C.App. 91, 94, 472 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1996). Accordingly, "[i]f both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated." G.S. § 50-13.4(b)(emphasis added).
Additionally, while "the title of an act, although some evidence of legislative intent where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, cannot override, or otherwise limit, unambiguous language," Bethania Town Lot Committee v. City of Winston-Salem, 126 N.C.App. 783, 787, 486 S.E.2d 729, 732-33 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998), we hold the title given to G.S. § 50-13.4(b), "An Act To Require The Parents Of A Dependent Child Who Is The Parent Of A Dependent Child To Contribute To The Support Of Their Grandchild," 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 518, § 1, reflects the plain meaning and overall purpose of the statute.
Notwithstanding the plain meaning of the first portion of subsection (b) establishing primary...
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