Whitney v. Wellesley & B. St. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1908 |
| Citation | 197 Mass. 495,84 N.E. 95 |
| Parties | WHITNEY v. WELLESLEY & BOSTON ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. N. Allin, for plaintiff.
Powers & Hall and Henry W. Dunn, for defendant.
If trial by jury is to retain its efficiency, the presiding judge by means of suitable instructions must enable jurors to see their way clearly to a right verdict. The provisions of Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 80, which first appear in Gen. St. 1860 c. 115, § 5, that 'the courts shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but they may state the testimony and the law,' were not intended to destroy this salutary power. In the construction of the statute it uniformly has been held, that in charging juries, the judge although prohibited from stating his opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, may sum up the testimony according to his recollection, submitting its effect, however, to their consideration, and judgment, while leaving to them for decision, all issues of fact within their province. He may elucidate the proper application of the legal principles involved, by illustrations drawn from common experience, or by reference to cases where similar questions have been decided, and define the degree of weight which the law attaches to a whole class of testimony. In any clear analysis of the evidence, however impartial, the attention of the jury necessarily must be directed to the weight, and importance of particular facts which they may find to have been proved. If an unbiased analytical statement of the testimony, and the law, distinctly indicates the party who is entitled to prevail, this furnishes no just reason for the defeated party to complain, either of the method employed, or of the adverse verdict. Besides, it is not a violation of the constitutional requirement, that judges shall be 'as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit,' if the instructions while judicially fair, are comprehensively strong, rather than hesitatingly barren, or ineffective, and neither the tone of a charge, nor the form of verbal delivery, are of themselves ground of exception, if no error or law appears. In a word, the judge who discharges the functions of his office, is under the statute, as well as at common law, the directing and controlling mind at the trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve order, and lend ceremonial dignity to the proceedings. Instances of the exposition, and practical application of the statute in accordance with these views, may bt found in the following cases among others in which the trial court has been held not to have exceeded its judicial powers. Durant v. Burt, 98 Mass. 161 165; Oakman v. Boyce, 100 Mass. 477, 483, 486; McKean v. Salem, 148 Mass. 109, 19 N.E. 21; Cobb v. Covenant Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 153 Mass. 176 180, 181, 26 N.E. 230, 10 L. R. A. 666, 25 Am. St. Rep. 619; Beal v. Lowell & Dracut St. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 444, 448, 32 N.E. 653; Moseley v. Washburn, 167 Mass....
To continue reading
Request your trial