Whitney v. Welnitz

• Decision Date: 29 September 1922
• Docket Number: No. 22726.,22726.
• Citation: 153 Minn. 162,190 N.W. 57
• Parties: WHITNEY v. WELNITZ et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

153 Minn. 162

190 N.W. 57

WHITNEY

v.WELNITZ et al.

No. 22726.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 29, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Goodhue County.

Action by H. H. Whitney against W. F. Welnitz and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

An automobile is not exempt from levy and sale on execution against the owner under G. S. 1913, § 7951, either as a ‘wagon, cart or dray.’

Its predominating element is that of a pleasure vehicle, and not within the intent or purpose of the exemption statute.

An execution regular and fair on its face constitutes full and complete protection to the officer levying the same on the property of the execution debtor.

A justice court judgment, which recites jurisdictional facts and has remained undisturbed of record for two years or more, is, under G. S. 1913, § 7564, presumptively valid.

The presumption is conclusive as against collateral attack, and the judgment cannot be impeached by an extrinsic showing of lack of jurisdiction. Fraser & Fraser, M. D. Halloran, and Wm. B. Richardson, all of Rochester, for appellants.

Mohn & Mohn, of Red Wing, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

Action in claim and delivery for the possession of an automobile, or its value, in which plaintiff had judgment and defendant appealed.

The material facts are not in dispute. Defendant Welnitz, on December 5, 1918, recovered a judgment against plaintiff before a justice of the peace in the sum of $79.94. Execution was duly issued thereon and delivered to defendant Redmond, a constable, for collection and enforcement. The officer levied upon the automobile in question, and in the due course of procedure sold the same as provided by law in such cases. Plaintiff, the execution debtor, claimed the automobile as exempt under the provisions of G. S. 1913, § 7951, subdivision 6, and before the sale demanded a return thereof to him. The constable refused to recognize the demand, or the exemption right so claimed, and sold the automobile as stated, applying the proceeds on the execution, less costs. The sale occurred on April 8, 1919. The action to recover the automobile was predicated, according to the allegations of the complaint, solely on the claim of exemption. The trial court sustained the claim, expressly finding that the automobile was exempt, and awarded judgment in plaintiff's favor for its value, together with the value of the use thereof subsequent to the execution sale.

In addition to the alleged exemption right, plaintiff at the trial made the further contention that the judgment of the justice on which the execution was issued was void for want of jurisdiction; the precise point being that the summons in the action was not served as required by law. The trial court overruled the point and received the judgment in evidence over the objection of plaintiff.

1. The statute under which plaintiff predicates his claim of exemption, subdivision 6 of section 7951, G. S. 1913, provides, among other things, that one ‘wagon, cart or dray’ shall be exempt from the claims of creditors and not subject to levy and sale on execution against the owner. The statute has been before the court in other litigation, and the word ‘wagon,’ as found in the above-quoted clause, was construed in one case to include a light open buggy, and in another to include a two-seated upholstered carriage, within the meaning and intent of the law. Allen v. Coates, 29 Minn. 46, 11 N. W. 132;Kimball v. Jones, 41 Minn. 318, 43 N. W. 74. It was involved again in Shadewald v. Phillips, 72 Minn. 520, 75 N. W. 717, where the court declined to extend the rule of the previous decisions to include a bicycle, the court remarking, speaking through Mr. Justice Mitchell, that the Allen and Kimball Cases had gone far enough, and the bicycle was held not a wagon within the purpose of the statute. We think, after careful consideration of the question, that the automobile should receive the same treatment.

[2] The original exemption statute on the subject, enacted many years ago, made use of the word ‘vehicle’ in this particular connection. Rev. Stats. 1851, subdivision 9 of section 100, chapter 71. But there was a change in the law by the act of August 12, 1858 (Comp. Stats. 1849-1858, chapter 61, subdivision 6, section 99), and the words ‘wagon, cart or dray’ substitued for the word ‘vehicle.’ As so changed the statute has come down to the present day without other modification. In construing it we have only to inquire as to the legislative intent. In that there seems no particular difficulty. At the time of the enactment of the statute, and when carried into the revision of 1866 in its present form, the automobile was neither known nor even anticipated in the dreams of the layman or most fanciful and resourceful lawmaker. And although statutes couched in general terms, creating rights and liabilities in respect to known and existing facts and conditions, are often construed to apply to and embrace somewhat dissimilar yet analogous facts or conditions subsequently arising and coming into bearing (Johnson v. Starett, 127 Minn. 138, 149 N. W. 6, L. R. A. 1915B, 708;State ex rel. v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N. W. 261,28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298, 120 Am. St. Rep. 581,8 Ann. Cas. 1047), we discover no sufficient basis for the conclusion that the automobile is so related in character and general use to the wagon as to come within the exemption purposes of this statute. The wagon is made use of by the owner in furtherance of his occupation and as a necessary instrumentality or agency in the conduct of the same; the farmer, the drayman, and others engaged in carting and hauling commodities for hire, from which he earns his living and supports those dependent upon him. The automobile is not of that character, nor adapted for purposes of the kind. Its predominating element is that of a pleasure vehicle, not necessarily perhaps a differentiating fact, and is owned and possessed by those who pay their debts as well as by those who do not. Its operation upon the public streets and highways is often of such a character as to endanger the lives and safety of third persons, a situation not found in the use of the wagon or buggy drawn by horses, and a declaration that it is exempt under the statute from levy or sale at the suit of one so injured, or at the suit of general creditors, should come from the Legislature, rather than by judicial construction of a statute enacted in 1858, which such instrumentalities and harmful agencies were wholly unknown. Doherty v. Ayer, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N. E. 677,14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816, 125 Am. St. Rep. 355;Com. v. Goldman, 205 Mass. 400, 91 N. E. 392.

The authorities on the subject are...