Robinette v. Price
| Decision Date | 26 March 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 33368.,33368. |
| Citation | 8 N.W.2d 800,214 Minn. 521 |
| Parties | ROBINETTE v. PRICE, Sheriff, et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Aitkin County; D. H. Fullerton, Judge.
Action by James B. Robinette against Ned Price, Sheriff of Aitkin County, and others, for damages for having allegedly wrongfully and forcibly removed plaintiff and his family as paupers from Aitkin County to the City of Minneapolis, Hennepin County. From a judgment upon the pleadings for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, In re Robinette, 211 Minn. 223, 300 N.W. 798.
Arthur LeSueur, of Minneapolis, for appellant.
John T. Galarneault, of Aitkin, for respondents.
Plaintiff sues defendants to recover damages for having without legal cause or excuse wrongfully and forcibly removed him and his family as paupers from Aitkin county to the city of Minneapolis, Hennepin county.
The complaint alleges that prior to May 16, 1940, plaintiff lived in Minneapolis, where he owned his own home and had his settlement for purposes of poor relief; that he sold his home in Minneapolis; that on the date mentioned he acquired the ownership in fee simple of an 80-acre farm in Aitkin county, on which there were a house and some other buildings; and that during May 1940 he moved with his family and commenced to reside on the farm. He worked and improved the land. He had two cows, 50 chickens, and some farm tools and equipment.
It is further alleged that the defendant Price is the sheriff of Aitkin County; that the defendants Yetter and Youngberg are members of the county welfare board of that county; that the sheriff "under the orders" of the other two defendants without legal cause or excuse wrongfully and forcibly removed plaintiff and his family from Aitkin county to the city of Minneapolis and that such removal was "in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into and carried out by said three defendants to compel the removal of said plaintiff from Aitkin county."
The answers admit the removal, but justify it under an order of the county welfare board and an order of the district court for such removal. Plaintiff applied for relief in Aitkin county in October, 1940. On November 6, 1940, the county welfare board issued an order warning plaintiff as a pauper to depart from Aitkin county to his place of settlement. The proof of service shows that it was served only on plaintiff's wife. On November 29, 1940, the board made an order reciting that plaintiff had been previously warned to depart and directing the sheriff to remove him.
On January 10, 1941, in a proceeding entitled, "In the Matter of the Dispute between Aitkin County * * * and the City of Minneapolis" as to the place of settlement of plaintiff and all the members of his family, naming them, the judge of the district court determined that plaintiff and the members of his family were poor persons; that their poor settlement was in the city of Minneapolis; and that they be removed to their place of settlement. The order recites due proof of service of notice of hearing upon plaintiff and all the members of his family and upon the political subdivisions concerned and the fact that plaintiff and the members of his family did not appear.
The replies allege that the order of the district court and of the county welfare board were void upon the ground that the court and the board were without jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the person.
Upon defendants' motion the court granted judgment in their favor upon the pleadings.
While the pleadings do not refer to it, our decision in In Re Robinette, 211 Minn. 223, 300 N.W. 798, reversing the order of the district court determining plaintiff's place of settlement and providing for his removal was the basis for claims asserted by the parties. In that case the appeal was taken on April 16, 1941, approximately two and one-half months after the sheriff had executed the court's order for the removal of plaintiff and his family. Our decision did not hold that the court's determination of plaintiff's place of settlement and for his removal was erroneous or void. We simply held that, since the city of Minneapolis at all times admitted the facts adjudged, there was no necessity for a judicial determination, as against it, of those questions. We did not decide anything as between the county of Aitkin and this plaintiff.
In this court plaintiff contends: (1) That the order for judgment on the pleadings is erroneous in form for the alleged reason that in the order the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as a basis for its decision instead of disposing of the matter by a simple order; (2) that the order fails to mention the defendants Yetter and Youngberg; and (3) where he says that he has grouped "practically" "all the real issues," that plaintiff's removal by defendants was wrongful upon the grounds: (a) that the order of the district court was held to be void and reversed by this court in Re Robinette, 211 Minn. 223, 300 N.W. 798; and (b) that the orders of the district court and of the county welfare board were void for entire lack of jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the person.
1. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be decided by order without findings and conclusions. Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Birkholz, 172 Minn. 231, 215 N.W. 223. That is precisely what was done in the instant case. Plaintiff's claim that findings and conclusions were made is without basis, as the order plainly shows. There is no merit to his contention.
2. While the memorandum attached to the order confines the discussion of the court's reasons for its decision to the case against the sheriff, the order on its face shows that judgment was ordered in favor of the other defendants as well as against the sheriff.
3. The rules governing a sheriff's liability for executing the process and orders of a court of general jurisdiction arise from the nature of his duty in that connection. It is the imperative duty of a sheriff to execute the process and orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. Minn. St.1941, § 387.03, Mason St.1927, § 907, provides that the sheriff "shall * * * execute all processes * * * and orders issued or made by lawful authority and to him delivered." Unquestioning obedience, without power or right to review or to revise, being the duty of the officer, he is afforded upon grounds of public policy a commensurate protection against personal liability for acts done in the performance of such duty. A sheriff is protected and justified for acts done in executing the process and orders of a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter when the process is regular on its face. Whitney v. Welnitz, 153 Minn. 162, 190 N.W. 57, 28 A.L.R. 68; Hill v. Rasicot, 34 Minn. 270, 25 N.W. 604; Orr v. Box, 22 Minn. 485.
4. The order for plaintiff's removal was made by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and to determine a cause. State v. Mandehr, 168 Minn. 139, 209 N.W. 750; State ex rel. Zaske v. Matter, 78 Minn. 377, 81 N.W. 9; Montour v. Purdy, 11 Minn. 384, 11 Gil. 278, 88 Am.Dec. 88. Jurisdiction of the subject matter means authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions and the particular questions which the court assumes to decide. Reid v. Independent Union, 200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300, 120 A.L. R. 297; Sache v. Wallace, 101 Minn. 169, 112 N.W. 386, 11 L.R.A.,N.S., 803, 118 Am. St.Rep. 612, 11 Ann.Cas. 348. In the instant case the court's power and authority emanates from the applicable statutes. Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 13, 25 N.W. 457, 30 N.W. 826, 830. The district court is vested by Minn.St.1941, §§ 261.08 and 261.09, Mason St.1940 Supp. §§ 3161-1 and 3161-2, with authority and power, which it is required by mandatory language to exercise, to hear and determine disputes between political subdivisions as to the place of settlement of any poor person; to determine by order in proceedings concerning such disputes the place of settlement of the poor person involved; and to provide in the order for the removal of the poor person to his place of settlement as determined by the order.
A proceeding to determine settlement and removability under the statutes involves the questions decided by the district court. Such a proceeding involves, on the one hand, issues between the political subdivisions concerning their liability for the support of the pauper, which are determined by his place of settlement, to which removability of the pauper is a mere incident; and, on the other hand, issues as between the pauper and the political subdivisions concerning not only his status as a pauper but his removability as well. The question of removability touches the alleged pauper's right to select freely his place of residence without interference by others. Inhabitants of Shirley v. Inhabitants of Lunenburgh, 11 Mass. 379; Hartland v. Pomfret, 11 Vt. 440. See Lucht v. Bell, Minn., 8 N.W.2d 26, filed February 19, 1943.
Plaintiff contends that the statutes for the removal of poor persons have no application to him, because he was a freeholder occupying his freehold. He invokes the rule that statutes providing for the removal of poor persons do not authorize the removal of a person from his freehold estate, even where the freeholder has not acquired a place of settlement in the district seeking his removal. The rule seems to have unanimous support in the authorities. Inhabitants of Somerset v. Inhabitants of Dighton, 12 Mass. 383; Town of Londonderry v. Town of Acton, 3 Vt. 122; Rex v. Matlock, 1 A. & E. 124, 28 E.C.L. 80, 110 Reprint 1155, and numerous other cases cited in note 41; 48 C.J., Paupers, p. 495, § 142. Decision here turns on whether plaintiff's irremovability as a...
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