Whittington's Estate, In re, 38742

Decision Date04 May 1953
Docket NumberNo. 38742,38742
Citation217 Miss. 457,64 So.2d 580
PartiesIn re WHITTINGTON'S ESTATE.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

B. N. Knox, Jr., New Albany, for appellant.

E. J. Stephens, Jr., New Albany, for appellee.

LEE, Justice.

This is an appeal by the executor of the estate of F. E. Whittington, deceased, from a decree of the Chancery Court of Union County, which awarded to Mrs. Mary Whittington $1,070 for services rendered to the decedent in his lifetime.

Mrs. Whittington is the wife of Fred Whittington, a nephew of the decedent. She and her husband moved into their uncle's home at a time when his wife was critically ill, with a distinct understanding that, for her services as housekeeper, etc., she would receive $25 a week. Full payment was made under this contract until the death of decedent's wife on June 27, 1946. Appellee and her husband continued in the home until July 27, 1948, when, as a result of an argument about religion, the decedent called them 'damn fools', and told them, if they did not like what he said, they could leave. They left immediately. After his death on October 13, 1950, she filed her claim for services at the rate of $25 a week for the period June 27, 1946, to July 27, 1948.

According to the evidence for appellee, she and the decedent had an agreement just before the death of decedent's wife, whereby she and her husband were to continue in the home just as they had done under the previous arrangement, except that decedent would not pay her $25 weekly, but he would, at his death, see that she would be well paid for what she had done.

The evidence to establish the contract was adduced from appellee's husband and four other witnesses, and was to this effect: At his death, decedent 'would take care of Mary', he would pay her for her work. If she and her husband stayed with him, the home would be theirs. If she and her husband would stay with him, he would see that they were taken care of at his death, and he would leave them a legacy therefor. After appellee and her husband had left, the decedent told one witness that they had 'acted a fool' in that he meant to leave the home to Mary and the baby, and deed them the little farm south of the concrete road, but, as it was, they would get nothing. To another witness he said, after they had left, that he felt like he ought to pay Mary some money.

The evidence for the defense was directed to showing that the decedent paid most of the bills; that he was good to Mary and her husband; he let them use his car; he furnished money for them to make payments on their home; he advanced considerable sums to Mary's husband; he was scrupulously honest; and, if he had owed anything, he would have paid it.

On the contrary, while admitting that the decedent was good to her and let her use his car at times, the appellee's evidence was to the effect that she and her husband paid their share of the living expense; they repaid the loans which he had advanced as payments on their home; and the sums advanced to Fred were for the purchase of lumber, and were refunded, together with the profits, when the lumber was subsequently sold. The proof failed to show that any gift was made in direct payment of her services.

We deal with the alleged errors wherein appellant contends that the court erred in allowing the bill of complaint to be amended, and in overruling his plea of the statute of limitations; in admitting the testimony of the husband of appellee, and other witnesses, to establish the alleged contract; and that the decree is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

The probate of the account was at great length. It gave a history of the relations between the appellee and the decedent. While alleging an agreement to pay, it did not allege that the value of the services was agreed upon between the parties. The actual statement thereof was as follows: 'For keeping house for F. E. Whittington, doing his personal and household laundry, the cooking, canning, gardening and helping with the milking and feeding from June 29, 1946 to July 27, 1948, a period of One Hundred seven weeks at the rate of $25.00 per week $2,675.00'.

Thereafter, on ...

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14 cases
  • Williams v. Mason, 07-58847
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1990
    ...830-31; Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d at 1132; Collins' Estate v. Dunn, 233 Miss. at 645, 103 So.2d at 430; In re Estate of Whittington, 217 Miss. 457, 463, 64 So.2d 580, 582 (1953); Wells v. Brooks, 199 Miss. at 335-36, 24 So.2d at 536; Stephens v. Duckworth, 188 Miss. at 634, 196 So. at 221......
  • King v. Otasco, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 6, 1988
    ...(Supp.1987).4 Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 15-1-49 (1972).5 Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 928 (Miss.1982); see also In re Whittington's Estate, 217 Miss. 457, 64 So.2d 580 (1953).6 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss.1981).7 Kipnis v. Antoine, 472 F.Supp. 215, 2......
  • Dexter v. United States, EC 684.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • November 25, 1969
    ...So. 4, 6; Ellis v. Berry, supra; Collins' Estate v. Dunn, supra; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525, 193 So. 443; In re Estate of Whittington, Deceased, 217 Miss. 457, 64 So.2d 580. d. § 729, Miss.Code 1942, Annotated, e. Ellis v. Berry, supra; Carter v. Witherspoon, 1930, 156 Miss. 597, 126 ......
  • Liddell v. Jones, 55949
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • January 22, 1986
    ...supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339, 171 So. 4; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525, 193 So. 443; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457, 64 So.2d 580. This Court has said, however, many times, that claims of the character mentioned above, brought up for the first t......
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