Williams v. Mason, 07-58847

• Decision Date: 07 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 07-58847,07-58847
• Citation: 556 So.2d 1045
• Parties: Joe Ann WILLIAMS, Administratrix of Estate of Roosevelt Adams, Deceased v. Frances MASON.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1045

556 So.2d 1045

Joe Ann WILLIAMS, Administratrix of Estate of Roosevelt Adams, Deceased v. Frances MASON.

No. 07-58847.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 7, 1990.

Tyree Irving, Walls & Irving, Greenwood, for appellant.

Kinney M. Swain, Greenville, for appellee.

Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON and PITTMAN, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

In 1962, Roosevelt Adams promised Frances Mason that, if she would live in his home and do his bidding, at his death she would take all of his property. Not a word of this was in writing. In fact, Mason moved into Adams' home and did for well over twenty years as she had agreed. Adams died intestate, and our question is whether, by reason of the agreement or otherwise, Mason holds any enforceable rights against his estate, the principal asset of which is some twenty acres of farm land in Washington County, all of which were acquired during the period of the parties cohabitation.

The Chancery Court held the agreement enforceable and ordered Adams' administratrix to deliver the property to Mason. In this the Court erred and we must reverse. Because Mason holds rights under other law, we remand for further proceedings.

II.

Roosevelt Adams was born on November 24, 1912. He married Della Adams and of that union a son, Roosevelt Adams, Jr., was born in December, 1931. Della Adams is long since deceased.

Adams married Audrey Mae Adams in 1942, but of that union no children were born. At some time thereafter, Adams and Audrey Mae separated and she has lived in Chicago since that time, although the parties have never obtained a divorce.

In 1949, Roosevelt, Jr., then eighteen years of age, left home and never saw his father again.

Frances Mason was born on September 19, 1940. In 1962, under the circumstances described above, Mason moved onto the Adams farm in Washington County, Mississippi, and into Adams' home. At the time Mason was twenty-one years old, while Adams was fifty-two. Mason continues to live on "the place".

Roosevelt Adams never promised to marry Frances Mason, a fact not explained, nor is any reason given why Adams failed to obtain a divorce from his estranged wife in Chicago.

The record is less than clear how much land Adams owned in 1962. It does appear that in 1966 Adams acquired certain interests in the west half of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 19, Township 18, North, Range 6 West, Washington County, Mississippi, from Jasper Adams. Also, in 1966, Audrey Mae Adams transferred all of her rights in Adams' property to him.

On February 4, 1986, Roosevelt Adams died. On September 5, 1986, Joe Ann Williams ¹ filed in the Chancery Court of Washington County, Mississippi, a petition for letters of administration upon the Estate of Roosevelt Adams, deceased. Williams alleged that Adams had died intestate and was survived by Roosevelt Adams, Jr. and Audrey Mae Adams as his sole heirs-at-law. Letters of administration were granted to Williams and notice to creditors was published first on September 11, 1986.

On November 20, 1986, Frances Mason answered the petition and by counter-claim set up her agreement with Adams and claimed his estate. The case went to trial as a contest between Mason and Adams' heirs-at-law. On October 7, 1987, the Court made the following express findings of fact:

That Frances Mason and Roosevelt Adams entered into an oral agreement wherein Frances Mason agreed to take care of Roosevelt Adams until his death, and in consideration for said Agreement, Roosevelt Adams would leave Frances Mason all of his property at his death, and thereafter, Frances Mason lived with him until his death and that during his lifetime, Roosevelt Adams never made a will, and no proof was shown to the contrary in this proceeding and no specific mention of the word "will" was made.

That on March 30, 1981, Roosevelt Adams conveyed the store and residence house where the parties, Roosevelt Adams and Frances Mason, lived to Roosevelt Adams and Frances Mason, as joint tenants with survivorship rights and not as tenants in common, and, prior to his death, established a bank account with the Bank of Hollandale in Greenville, Mississippi, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship corroborating that it was Roosevelt Adams' intention to place all property in Frances Mason at his death.

That a clear, definite and certain agreement existed between Roosevelt Adams and Frances Mason that at his death, Frances Mason would have all of his property. The services that Frances Mason provided Roosevelt Adams during his life, were unique, necessary services and, as a result of that agreement, Frances Mason made substantial changes in her lifestyle.

That Frances Mason rendered good and valuable services in connection with the agreement between Frances Mason and Roosevelt Adams, and that she cannot be restored to her original status, that Roosevelt Adams accepted these services and these services were rendered to Roosevelt Adams in good faith; that Frances Mason lost over 25 years of her life while providing for Roosevelt Adams and that Frances Mason was the only person present and able to take care of Roosevelt Adams, and therefore, that Frances Mason executed performance of the agreement between Frances Mason and Roosevelt Adams as to Roosevelt Adams' estate and that said contract is enforceable as to Roosevelt Adams' estate.

Following these findings, the Court ordered Joe Ann Williams, Administratrix, to deliver all property of the Estate of Roosevelt Adams to Frances Mason, less and except all properly registered and probated claims and expenses of administration, fees and costs.

From this judgment, the heirs-at-law appeal.

III.

A contract to devise or bequeath property by will is enforceable in this state. Trotter v. Trotter, 490 So.2d 827, 830 (Miss.1986); Estate of McKellar v. Brown, 404 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss.1981). As with other facilities our law affords persons for achieving their wishes, the contract to devise is attended by certain formalities which, if not observed, may result in the contract being legally unenforceable. One of the most important of these formalities is that the contract must be in writing, a function of our statute of frauds. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 15-3-1 (1972); Estate of McKellar v. Brown, 404 So.2d at 553; Collins' Estate v. Dunn, 233 Miss. 636, 644-45, 103 So.2d 425, 430 (1958); Stephens v. Duckworth, 188 Miss. 626, 634, 196 So. 219, 221 (1940). Though a party may satisfy the court of the existence of an unwritten agreement to devise, the statute precludes specific performance as a remedy our courts may decree. Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Miss.1986); Collins' Estate v. Dunn, 233 Miss. at 644-45, 103 So.2d at 430; Ellis v. Berry, 145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211, 213 (1926). This is so even though the promisee has done all he was expected to do under the agreement. Wells v. Brooks, 199 Miss. 327, 332, 24 So.2d 533, 534 (1946). Holmes put the point well a century ago in Bourke v. Callahan, 160 Mass. 195, 35 N.E. 460 (1893):

We are aware that by our construction of Pub.Sts. C. 141, Sec. 1, the statute of frauds may be made an instrument of fraud. But this is always true, whenever the law prescribes a form for an obligation. The very meaning of such a requirement is that a man relies at his peril on what purports to be such an obligation without that form.

Bourke, 160 Mass. at 197, 35 N.E. at 461.

The oft discussed case of Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So.2d 730 (1946) is not to the contrary, for in Johnston the testator had executed a will conforming to his oral agreement and the only question was whether he had the power to revoke that will. In this circumstance, the will was a writing signed by the party to be charged, thus satisfying the statute's evidentiary policy.

When these principles are applied to the facts before us, but one result may follow. Mason's agreement with Adams is formally deficient and is without power to confer upon her an enforceable right to Adams' property. The Chancery Court erred when it held to the contrary. We reverse.

IV.

A.

Notwithstanding these well settled principles, experience has taught that gross unfairness may result where one acts in good faith and lives up to an oral agreement to provide services for another under circumstances such as today's. Our law has seen in such situations a potential for unjust enrichment, if not fraud. See Estate of McKellar v. Brown, 404 So.2d at 553. In recognition of these practical realities, the positive law of this state directs that a person, who provides services to another in good faith and in consequence of an oral agreement to devise property in exchange for the services, is not without enforceable rights. Trotter v. Trotter, 490 So.2d at 830; Voss v. Stewart, 420 So.2d 761, 764-65 (Miss.1982). These rights arise not out of the agreement but the conduct of the parties. Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. at 345; 24 So.2d at 731. The promisee activates the rights the law affords by performing the services in good faith reliance on the promise. Voss v. Stewart, 420 So.2d at 764-65.

When the parties have so acted with respect one to the other, that is, when one has provided services for the other in reasonable reliance upon a promise to give consideration therefor, our cases are legion that, upon the death of the promisor, the promisee may recover of and from the estate on a quantum meruit basis. Trotter v. Trotter, 490 So.2d at 830-31; Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d at 1132; Collins' Estate v. Dunn, 233 Miss. at 645, 103 So.2d at 430; In re Estate of Whittington, 217 Miss. 457, 463, 64 So.2d 580, 582 (1953); Wells v. Brooks, 199 Miss. at 335-36, 24 So.2d at 536; Stephens v. Duckworth, 188 Miss. at 634, 196 So. at 221; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525, 530, 193 So. 443, 444-45 (1940); First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339, 347, 171 So. 4, 6 (1936); Ellis v. Berry, 145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211, 215 (1926)...