Wichelman v. Messner

• Decision Date: 18 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. 81,No. 36745,81,36745
• Citation: 83 N.W.2d 800,250 Minn. 88
• Parties: , 71 A.L.R.2d 816 Melvin WICHELMAN, Respondent, v. Fred MESSNER and Independent Consolidated School Districtof Sibley County, Minn., Appellants, John Glaeser and Victor Glaeser, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 800

83 N.W.2d 800

250 Minn. 88, 71 A.L.R.2d 816

Melvin WICHELMAN, Respondent, v. Fred MESSNER and Independent Consolidated School District No. 81 of Sibley County, Minn., Appellants John Glaeser and Victor Glaeser, Respondents.

No. 36745.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 18, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In construing a statute, the court is required by M.S.A. § 645.16 to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature and to consider the occasion and necessity for the law; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the object to be attained by it; and the consequences of a particular interpretation. The court is required by § 645.17 to keep in mind that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable; that the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of Minnesota; and that it intends to favor public interest as against any private interest.

2. In construing § 541.023, the so-called Marketable Title Act, the court is required to consider the express policy of the legislature that 'ancient records shall not fetter the marketability of real estate,' which expressed policy should not only be construed and applied liberally but should be accepted as a new point of departure for the process of judicial reasoning.

3. In construing § 541.023, the Marketable Title Act, the court may consider its relation to kindred statutes governing the subject of estates in land.

4. By enacting the Marketable Title Act, the legislature intended to relieve a title from the servitude of provisions contained in ancient records which 'fetter the marketability of real estate.' It also intended the provisions to benefit a title so as to relieve it from the restriction of 'vested or contingent rights' derived from events or documents granting a 'condition subsequent or restriction' which occurred more than 40 years prior to the time of the commencement of the action.

5. By construing the phrase used in § 541.023, 'a claim of title based upon a source of title,' in relation to § 500.02, which defines every estate of inheritance as 'a fee simple, or fee; and every such estate, when not defeasible or conditional, shall be a fee simple absolute or an absolute fee,' it is apparent that the legislature intended such phrase to include a fee simple estate.

6. As used in § 541.023, subd. 1, the word 'title' includes not only the fee simple absolute but also the defeasible fees as defined by §§ 500.02 and 500.07.

7. It is manifest from the express policy stated, that 'ancient records shall not fetter the marketability of real estate,' that the legislature, by specific reference to conditions subsequent or restrictions, whether mature or immature, intended to bar these lesser interests which conflict with the fee, it being the express intention of the legislature that those interests which have substantial value may be preserved by recordation.

8. A fee simple title includes an estate in fee simple defeasible which is 'subject to special limitations, conditions subsequent, an executory limitation, or a combination of such restrictions.'

9. The Marketable Title Act is limited in its application to cases in which the proper showing is or can be made, and its application to each particular state of facts is to be determined as those facts arise.

10. The Marketable Title Act does not operate to bar lessors, remaindermen, and owners of defeasible fees by the owners of lesser interests who would lack the fee simple title necessary to invoke the act.

11. Construing the language of the Marketable Title Act as a whole in the light of the object and purpose which the legislature intended to accomplish, the term 'source of title' must refer to fee simple ownership, an estate which, under § 500.02, may be 'defeasible or conditional.'

12. The Marketable Title Act is a comprehensive plan for reform in conveyancing procedure and encompasses within its provisions the collective sanctions of (a) a curative act, (b) a recording act, and (c) a statute of limitations.

13. Curative acts operate to complete a transaction which the parties intended to accomplish but carried out imperfectly. They do not impair the obligation of contract. Retrospective legislation in general, however, will not be allowed to impair rights which are vested and which constitute property rights.

14. Vested rights may be barred by statutes of limitation which are based on the theory that it is reasonable to require that stale demands be asserted within a reasonable time after a cause of action has accrued. Such a statute will bar any right, however high the source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is given to enforce the right.

15. What may be a reasonable time to enforce a right barred by the statute of limitations depends upon the sound discretion of the legislature in the light of the nature of the subject and purpose of the enactment, and courts will not inquire into the wisdom of the exercise of this discretion unless the time allowed is manifestly so short as to amount to a practical denial of justice.

16. The recordation provisions of the Marketable Title Act are not unconstitutional. The legislature did not intend to arbitrarily wipe out old claims and interests without affording a means of preserving them and giving a reasonable period of time within which to take the necessary steps to accomplish that purpose. The act provides for a simple and easy method by which the owner of an existing old interest may preserve his right by recordation.

17. The Marketable Title Act was originally enacted as a 50-year statute of limitations in 1943, was later amended in 1945, and again amended to its present form in 1947. It represents a comprehensive reform relating to title examinations, and the Bar of Minnesota was fully aware of its history and enactment. A period of nine months was provided for owners of interests affected to file the required notice. The court cannot overrule the decision of the legislature as to the time permitted to file such notice unless the term provided is so short that it amounts to a practical denial of the right itself.

18. A statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where its meaning may be implied or where it has an unmistakable significance in connection with its relation to other statutes. An act will not be declared void unless it is so imperfect and so deficient in its detail as to render it impossible of execution and enforcement and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. Rather than pronounce the statute unconstitutional, the court will draw inferences from the evident intent of the legislature. Extreme caution should be exercised before declaring a statute void, and it should be upheld unless it is so uncertain and indefinite that, after exhausting all rules of construction, it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.

19. Applying the expressly stated policy of the legislature that ancient records shall not fetter the marketability of real estate in determining the kind of 'title' whose marketability the legislature desired to promote, the term 'claim of title based upon a source of title,' the marketability of which might be impaired by a condition subsequent or restriction, is construed to be a recorded fee simple title which may be a defeasible or conditional estate as defined by § 500.02.

20. The Marketable Title Act, § 541.023, does not lend itself to an interpretation to the effect that it might operate to provide a new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or interloping conveyance. Its object is to provide, for the recorded fee simple ownership, an exemption from the burdens of old conditions and restrictions which at each transfer of the property interfere with its marketability.

21. For the Marketable Title Act to operate in a particular case to extinguish any interest, two basic requirements are necessary: (1) The party desiring to invoke the statute for his own benefit must have a requisite 'claim of title based upon a source of title, which source has then been of record at least 40 years'; and (2) the person against whom the act is invoked is one who is 'conclusively presumed to have abandoned all right, claim, interest' in the property. There are three classes of persons against whom no one can invoke the act. They are (1) those persons who seek to enforce any right, claim, interest, encumbrance, or lien founded upon any instrument, event, or transaction which was executed or which occurred Within 40 years prior to the commencement of the action; (2) those persons who seek to enforce a claim founded on any such instrument or event which was executed or which occurred over 40 years prior to the commencement of the action, who have filed proper notice within 40 years of the execution or occurrence of the instrument, event, or transaction upon which it is founded; and (3) those excepted by § 541.023, subd. 6, which includes persons in possession.

22. By enacting the Marketable Title Act we may assume that the legislature adopted the view that restrictions and conditions on the fee in old documents are probably so scattered among numerous heirs and assignees that it is almost impossible to locate them. The construction contended for by plaintiff, on rehearing, that the 40-year period would never begin to run in favor of a determinable fee or a fee subject to a condition subsequent until a breach of the restriction occurred would nullify the effect of the act and completely frustrate the purpose of the policy of the legislature in preventing ancient records from fettering the marketability of the fee.

23. The contention of the plaintiff that the act may be invoked only by one who owns a separate complete source of title which has been of record at least 40 years and for that period not...