Wiggins v. Brightview Landscape Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4D21-1886 |
| Citation | 337 So.3d 793 |
| Parties | Alonzie WIGGINS, Appellant, v. BRIGHTVIEW LANDSCAPE SERVICES, INC., f/k/a ValleyCrest Landscape Maintenance, d/b/a ValleyCrest Tree Care Service, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David H. Charlip of the Charlip Law Group, LC, Miami, for appellant.
David L. Luck and Todd R. Ehrenreich of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Coral Gables, for appellee.
Ciklin, J. Alonzie Wiggins ("Wiggins") sued his former employer, Brightview Landscape Services, Inc. ("Brightview"), for negligence stemming from a 2015 workplace injury. Despite proper service of the complaint, Brightview did not appear in the matter and the clerk entered a clerk's default. The trial court conducted a jury trial on damages and a jury returned a $2.5 million verdict in Wiggins’ favor. Neither Brightview nor its counsel attended the trial. The parties appeal and cross-appeal an order on Brightview's motion for relief from judgment, which order effectively denies Brightview's motion to vacate the default but grants its motion to vacate the final judgment. Because we must find the trial court erred by denying the motion to vacate the default, we reverse and remand for a new trial on both liability and damages.
Background
After Wiggins’ injuries, he sought damages from two companies, Personal Staffing d/b/a Barnett (Barnett) and Brightview. Barnett is a labor staffing company that provided temporary laborers to Brightview pursuant to a service agreement. The agreement required Barnett to maintain workers’ compensation, employer's liability, and general liability insurance coverages and to name Brightview as an additional employer insured under the policies.
Barnett provided Wiggins to Brightview as one such temporary worker. After Wiggins’ injuries, he filed a workers’ compensation claim with Barnett that resolved in 2015. In 2017, Wiggins sued Brightview, alleging that it negligently supervised its temporary laborers and knowingly provided him with malfunctioning equipment that caused his injuries. The default and trial followed.1
Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.440(c) and 1.540(b)(1), Brightview moved for relief from the final judgment, arguing it did not receive proper notice of trial, and for relief from the default, alleging "excusable neglect" for failing to defend the action and asserting a "meritorious defense." Brightview attached a sworn declaration from its claims manager. Brightview explained that no defense was mounted "because of the mistaken, but reasonable belief that this dispute had already been resolved through Plaintiff's workers’ compensation claim" with Barnett, the staffing company.
Brightview explained further that, when its office first received Wiggins’ worker's compensation claim in 2015, an electronic file was both created and coded accordingly. Due to "clerical and systems errors" in the office, Wiggins’ subsequent personal injury action remained coded as the same worker's compensation matter—which at that point had already been marked closed and paid. Consequently, a defense was never permitted or undertaken as to Wiggins’ personal injury lawsuit, and the matter did not come to Brightview's attention until well after the fact when Wiggins sought to collect on the judgment.
Brightview explained that, because all filings were electronic, once the initial electronic coding mistake was made in 2015, Brightview would have had no reason to look at or review any subsequent filings. In other words, no human eyes ever looked at the filings.
The trial court vacated the final judgment, properly concluding that Brightview was not given notice of the trial as required by rule 1.440(c). See Fain v. Spivey , 324 So. 3d 519, 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ; Williams v. Skylink Jets, Inc. , 229 So. 3d 1275, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). We affirm this portion of the order on appeal.
However, the trial court denied the motion insofar as it sought to vacate the earlier default, rejecting Brightview's characterization of its conduct as "excusable neglect," and instead viewing it as "gross negligence" because of Brightview's "intentional act" of not looking at the multiple filings during the duration of the litigation. The trial court noted at least eight instances where a notice or document was sent to Brightview's registered agent before the default and judgment were entered. The court believed that these specific filings should have "raised eyebrows" to take a closer look at the case. It found this case similar to Emerald Coast Utilities Authority v. Bear Marcus Pointe, LLC , 227 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). On this point, we reverse.
Analysis
"In order to set aside a default, a defendant must show that the default [1] resulted from excusable neglect; [2] that the defendant had a meritorious defense; and [3] that the defendant used due diligence in seeking relief from the default." Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Haynie , 320 So. 3d 171, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). This case solely concerns the first of the three factors.
In Emerald Coast , the case upon which the trial court relied for its holding, a law firm moved to vacate and reenter an order to allow its client to appeal, alleging that it did not receive a copy of the order until the time for appeal expired. 227 So. 3d at 753. The First District affirmed the trial court's denial of that motion, pointing to testimony that the firm knew its spam filter was configured in such a way that it could delete legitimate emails as spam without notifying the recipient. Id. at 757. Further testimony supported a conclusion that despite knowing about this configuration, the firm "made a conscious decision to use a defective email system without any safeguards or oversight in order to save money." Id. The appellate court recognized that such a decision cannot constitute excusable neglect because "[t]he law requires certain diligence of those subject to it, and this diligence cannot be lightly excused." Id. at 756 (alteration in original) (quoting John Crescent, Inc. v. Schwartz , 382 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) ); see also Bequer v. Nat'l City Bank , 46 So. 3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ().
We agree with Brightview that the case at bar is more similar to those where excusable neglect arose from the existence of multiple lawsuits, resulting in mis-filings and confusion, such that no "human" saw the filings from 2017-2019. See, e.g. , Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Parker , 755 So. 2d 695, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (); Okeechobee Imps., Inc. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Fla ., 558 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (); Zwickel v. KLC, Inc ., 464 So. 2d 1280, 1280-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) ().
Because of the initial error set in motion by the computer coding error, Brightview did not intentionally ignore subsequent filings. Also, nothing before the trial court indicated this was a recurring problem that Brightview knew or should have known about, unlike in Emerald Coast , and its cited cases, which involved "blind reliance" on computer systems despite known flaws . 227 So. 3d at 757-58.
As we recently explained in Quest Diagnostics , while an appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to vacate under the abuse of discretion standard of review, courts prefer to decide cases on the merits of the claim rather than on a technicality. 320 So. 3d at 174. Further, if there is any reasonable doubt in the matter of vacating a default, it should be resolved in favor of granting the motion. Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
We conclude that Brightview satisfied its burden of demonstrating excusable neglect. Therefore, we reverse the order denying the motion to vacate the default, and we remand for further proceedings on the merits.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
I agree with the majority's affirmance of the trial court's vacation of the final judgment, as it concluded that Brightview was not given notice of trial as required by the rules. I disagree, however, to an outright reversal of the default. I would remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether excusable neglect has been shown.
The majority seems to believe that somehow the summons and subsequent pleadings were received by Brightview and were coded automatically, without human intervention, leading to the conclusion that this amounted to excusable neglect as a matter of law. But the affidavit from the Brightview representative does not state that no human eyes saw these documents. Indeed, some person must have placed the code in the document being received. The representative states:
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