Wiggins v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles

Decision Date31 January 2017
Docket NumberNo. SC14–2195,SC14–2195
Citation209 So.3d 1165
Parties Joseph B. WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

David M. Robbins and Susan Helen Cohen of Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, Florida, for Petitioner

Stephen Decatur Hurm, General Counsel, and Jason Helfant, Senior Assistant General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Lake Worth, Florida, for Respondent

LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court to review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Wiggins , 151 So.3d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Here, the First District certified a question of great public importance, which we rephrase as follows:

WHETHER A CIRCUIT COURT CONDUCTING FIRST–TIER CERTIORARI REVIEW UNDER SECTION 322.2615, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLIES THE CORRECT LAW BY REJECTING OFFICER TESTIMONY AS COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN THAT TESTIMONY IS CONTRARY TO VIDEO EVIDENCE.

This certified question presents a pure question of law and is, therefore, subject to de novo review. See Jackson–Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth. , 8 So.3d 1076, 1084–85 (Fla. 2008). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that in this context of section 322.2615 first-tier review, a circuit court must review and consider video evidence of the events which are of record as part of its competent, substantial evidence analysis. Further, we hold in this limited context that evidence which is totally contradicted and totally negated and refuted by video evidence of record, is not competent, substantial evidence.

Statutory Background

Section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, provides for the suspension of one's driving privilege for driving under the influence (DUI). Specifically, the statute authorizes a law enforcement officer to suspend one's driving privilege when that person is driving or in physical control of a vehicle and has a blood- or breath-alcohol level of .08 or higher. Alternatively, a law enforcement officer may also suspend the driving privilege of one who refuses to submit to a urine, breath, or blood-alcohol test. § 322.2615(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). If the driver refuses to perform a lawfully requested urine, breath, or blood test, the officer must notify the driver that his or her license will be suspended for a year, or eighteen months if the driver has previously had his or her license suspended for failure to submit to such tests. § 322.2615(1)(b) 1.a. Section 322.2615 is to be read in pari materia with section 316.1932, Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez , 74 So.3d 1070, 1076 (Fla. 2011), as revised on denial of rehearing (Nov. 10, 2011), a statute which provides that the requested sobriety tests "must be incidental to a lawful arrest" and that the officer must have "reasonable cause to believe such person was driving or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." § 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2015). Once the license is suspended, the driver may request review by the Department of Motor Safety and Vehicles (Department) through an administrative hearing before the Department within ten days after issuance of the notice of suspension. § 322.2615(1)(b) 3. The statute further provides that the review hearing will essentially function as a trial before the Department:

Such formal review hearing shall be held before a hearing officer designated by the department, and the hearing officer shall be authorized to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, receive relevant evidence, issue subpoenas for the officers and witnesses identified in documents [submitted for review], regulate the course and conduct of the hearing, question witnesses, and make a ruling on the suspension.

§ 322.2615(6)(b).

During a formal review hearing for license suspension, the hearing officer is limited to the following questions, which must be established by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Whether the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the person whose license was suspended was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances.
2. Whether the person whose license was suspended refused to submit to any such test after being requested to do so by a law enforcement officer or correctional officer.
3. Whether the person whose license was suspended was told that if he or she refused to submit to such test his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 months.

§ 322.2615(7)(b). The hearing officer's authorization to determine the "lawfulness of the stop " is built into the provision of the essential element of whether probable cause existed. Schwartz v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles , 920 So.2d 664, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. DeShong , 603 So.2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ). Finally, the hearing officer's decision may be reviewed by an Article V judge or judges in a circuit court by a writ of certiorari. § 322.2615(13).

Facts and Procedural Background

The facts surrounding the case before us concern the stop and arrest of Joseph B. Wiggins for driving under the influence of alcohol. Because there is a conflict between the facts as reported by the arresting officer and the facts as demonstrated by the real-time video evidence of the event, we will present both versions of the facts.

Arrest Report and Testimony

According to the oral testimony of the officer based on his report, on the night of the stop, there was no surrounding traffic. Upon his first observation of Wiggins' truck, Officer Saunders wrote in the arrest report that the vehicle "appeared to swerve from one lane to another." Both Saunders and Wiggins were driving in the same direction, but Wiggins drove in the right lane while Saunders followed in the left lane. Saunders further reported that Wiggins drifted within his lane, traveled thirty miles per hour in a forty-five mile per hour zone, and crossed over the outside lane line—nearly striking a right-side curb before swerving back into his lane. Saunders stated that, as they approached an intersection, Wiggins "braked hard for no apparent reason and then accelerated back to about 30 miles per hour," continued to drift over the line, and nearly hit the curb again. As he entered another intersection, Wiggins reportedly "braked hard again and swerved right" and almost hit the curb. Wiggins then "made a quick lane change into the left lane in front of [Saunders]" and tapped his brakes. The report further states that as they approached another traffic light, Wiggins passed the opening for a left turn lane and then slowly drifted over the line to enter the lane. Wiggins then "made a very wide left turn and had to realign his truck as he straightened out." Believing Wiggins to be impaired, Saunders activated his emergency lights. Wiggins reportedly continued in a straight path and made a sharp right turn into a drug store parking lot. Wiggins then drove through the marked parking spaces and stopped, partially obstructing the travel lane.

Thereafter, Saunders reported that he approached Wiggins, who already had his driver's license and registration in hand, and explained the reason for the stop. Saunders noticed a strong odor of alcohol and observed that Wiggins' eyes were bloodshot and glassy. In addition, Saunders noted that "[h]is movements were slow and deliberate." When asked if he had been drinking any alcoholic beverages, Wiggins reportedly replied that he had consumed a few drinks. Wiggins was then asked to perform field sobriety exercises but refused. Saunders informed Wiggins that his refusal to participate in field sobriety exercises would be used against him in court and asked Wiggins to exit the vehicle. After Wiggins refused, Saunders advised him that he was being arrested for driving under the influence. Eventually, Saunders convinced Wiggins to exit the vehicle. Wiggins was subsequently transported to the Clay County Jail, where Saunders requested a breath test.

After his arrest, Wiggins requested a formal hearing before the Department pursuant to section 322.2615. During the hearing, Saunders acknowledged that it was the sheriff's standing general order to also record contact with a person that an officer believes to be impaired. However, Saunders failed to activate his body camera and microphone during his direct contact with Wiggins. Therefore, the video recording available at the hearing was a real-time video taken from Saunders' dashboard camera with no audio.

Saunders also admitted that there were inconsistencies between his arrest report and the video. Specifically, the report stated that Wiggins quickly changed lanes in front of Saunders, while the video indicated that Saunders was the one who had changed lanes to get behind Wiggins, and Wiggins then changed into the vacant lane. Otherwise, Saunders continued to insist that Wiggins weaved in and out of his lane, almost hit the curb, braked erratically, and made a wide turn.

Actual Video

Due to the dissent's representations, we embed a copy of the actual video in this opinion.1 The dashboard camera on Saunders' vehicle recorded Wiggins' driving pattern from the time Saunders first saw the vehicle to the time Wiggins was stopped. As Saunders trailed Wiggins' vehicle that night, the video showed Wiggins driving totally within the proper lines. Wiggins did not cross any lines, nor did he nearly hit the curb. Wiggins did change lanes only once in an apparent attempt to clear the lane for Saunders, but he utilized his turn signal before doing so. Wiggins then...

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