State v. Wiggins

• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1D13–2471.,1D13–2471.
• Parties: STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, v. Joseph P. WIGGINS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

151 So.3d 457

STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner

v.Joseph P. WIGGINS, Respondent.

No. 1D13–2471.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 4, 2014.

Kimberly A. Gibbs, Orlando, for Petitioner.

David M. Robbins and Susan Z. Cohen, Jacksonville, for Respondent.

Opinion

MAKAR, J.

The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles seeks review of a circuit court order overturning a hearing officer's administrative order, which had upheld the suspension of Joseph P. Wiggins's driver's license. The narrow but important issue presented is whether the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, erred by concluding that its independent review and assessment of events on a video of the traffic stop trumped the hearing officer's factual findings, which were based on the arresting officer's testimony and report. We hold that it did and grant the petition for certiorari.

I.

In August 2011, Deputy J.C. Saunders initiated a traffic stop of Mr. Wiggins, who was driving his pickup truck down Blanding Boulevard, a main thoroughfare in Clay County, Florida. A camera mounted on the dashboard of the deputy's vehicle recorded the movement of Mr. Wiggins's vehicle from the time the deputy first observed it, while Mr. Wiggins pulled into a gas station parking lot, and for approximately twelve minutes thereafter.

During the stop, Deputy Saunders requested that Mr. Wiggins perform a field sobriety test, but he declined. Deputy Saunders then arrested Mr. Wiggins for DUI and transported him to the county jail where, again, Mr. Wiggins declined to submit to a sobriety test. Due to these refusals, the Department placed an administrative suspension on Mr. Wiggins's driver's license.

Mr. Wiggins requested a formal review hearing to demonstrate that probable cause did not exist for the stop of his vehicle. Deputy Saunders and Robert Burch, the breath test operator, testified at the hearing and the arrest and booking report was admitted in evidence. The video of the stop was entered in evidence and was a focus of a portion of the proceeding, which consisted primarily of Mr. Wiggins's attorney examining Deputy Saunders. Throughout the examination, Deputy Sanders testified while referring to the video. The hearing officer controlled and played the DVD player, starting and stopping the video player as necessary to view the portions related to the deputy's testimony. During this examination, counsel for Mr. Wiggins only once specifically asked Deputy Saunders whether his written report was consistent with what appeared on the video. The deputy confirmed that his entire report as written was supported by the video, pointing out where the vehicle's movement and pattern corresponded to what he said in his report with a few limited exceptions. One was that when he first saw Mr. Wiggins's vehicle and became suspicious about its driving pattern, the vehicle was within his eyesight but beyond the capabilities of the camera to capture (“the video doesn't always show everything I can see as far as at a distance”). Another was when Deputy Saunders voluntarily pointed out (before counsel asked him to do so) that his report erred in one respect by saying that his police cruiser at one point changed lanes first when it was Mr. Wiggins's vehicle that did so. The final was when Deputy Saunders thought Mr. Wiggins put his hands on his truck as he exited to maintain balance, which Mr. Wiggins's counsel noted did not actually happen.

Based upon the testimony and evidentiary record that included the video, the hearing officer made the following findings of fact:

On August 19, 2011, at approximately 2:10 a.m. Deputy J.C. Saunders of the Clay County Sheriff's Office observed a vehicle swerving within the lane, almost striking the right side curb on several occasions, and then braking erratically for no apparent reason. He also paced the vehicle and determined that it was traveling 30 MPH in a 45–MPH zone. Suspecting that the driver might be impaired, Deputy Saunders conducted a traffic stop. Deputy Saunders observed the driver, Mr. Joseph Bryant Wiggins, Sr., to have an extremely strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath, bloodshot, glassy eyes, a flushed face, and his movements were slow and deliberate. Mr. Wiggins admitted to consuming a few drinks when asked about his alcohol consumption. Mr. Wiggins refused to submit to field sobriety exercises and was placed under arrest for DUI. Based on the foregoing, I find that the petitioner was placed under lawful arrest for DUI. At the Clay County Jail, the implied consent warning was read and Mr. Wiggins refused to submit to the breath test.

Based on these factual findings, the hearing officer held that probable cause existed to believe that Mr. Wiggins was driving under the influence; that Mr. Wiggins refused to submit to a urine, blood, or breath-alcohol test after being requested to do so; and that Mr. Wiggins was told that his refusal to submit to a sobriety test would result in suspension of his license. The administrative order thereby affirmed the suspension of Mr. Wiggins's driver's license.

Mr. Wiggins then filed a petition for certiorari in circuit court, seeking review of the hearing officer's order, claiming it departed from the essential requirements of law and was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Specifically, he argued that the arrest and booking report statements directly conflicted with events on the video of the traffic stop. The circuit court, after independently reviewing the video, held that the administrative order was flawed because the video contradicted portions of the officer's testimony and report.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court compared and contrasted some—but not all—of the information in the arrest/booking report with events on the video. For example, the report stated that “the vehicle was drifting and weaving in its own lane traveling at 30 mph in a 45 mph zone, the passenger side tires crossed over the fog line and nearly struck the raised curb before swerving back into the lane.” The court disagreed with this characterization, finding that the “video clearly refutes this evidence; in the video the vehicle does not drift and weave within its own lane. Furthermore, the passenger side tires do no not cross over the fog line nor do they come close to striking the raised curb.” The report also claimed that “after coming to flashing yellow lights at the intersection ... [Mr. Wiggins] braked for no reason and then accelerate [sic].” Contrarily, the trial court found that the video showed Mr. Wiggins “did brake slightly when coming to the flashing yellow lights” but that he slowly accelerated after passing the lights, compared to the report, which stated he “braked for no reason and then accelerated.” The court acknowledged that Mr. Wiggins momentarily braked, but disagreed that Mr. Wiggins swerved to the right and almost hit the curb as he passed through an intersection. Finally, the report claimed that Mr. Wiggins “drifted into a turn lane” and “[w]hile making a wide left turn he had to realign his truck as he straightened out.” Disagreeing once again, the trial court reviewed the video and concluded that Mr. Wiggins deliberately changed lanes and the turn into the intersection was normal.

The trial court conceded that Deputy Saunders's testimony coupled with the report supported the factual findings of the hearing officer. Nonetheless, it held that “this testimonial evidence is flatly contradict [sic] by the objective evidence on the videotape.” It concluded that in “[v]iewing the entire record evidence, neither the testimony of Deputy Saunders nor the arrest and booking report constitutes competent substantial evidence on which the hearing officer could rely.” Acknowledging that it could not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer, it supported its approach by relying on Julian v. Julian, 188 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), for the proposition that “where the evidence is objective and there is not a determination of credibility, the reviewing court is in the exact same position as the hearing officer.” Apparently believing it was “in the exact same position as the hearing officer” as to the evidence, the trial court concluded that it “was unreasonable as a matter of law for the hearing officer to accept Deputy Saunders [sic] report and testimony after this evidence was shown to be erroneous and flatly contradicted by the objective images of the videotape.” As a result, the trial court's order overturned the hearing officer's order and the administrative suspension of Mr. Wiggins's driver's license, as well.

II.

Review of the circuit court's order entails second tier certiorari review, by which two limited questions are posed:

whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995) ; Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Trimble, 821 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). This level of review is narrower than a circuit court's first tier certiorari review, which reviews an administrative agency's decision for three components: (1) whether procedural due process was accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of law were observed, and (3) whether the factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla.1989).

At issue in this case is only whether the circuit court applied the correct law. The Department argues it did not, pointing out that the trial court's only job was to determine whether the hearing officer's findings of fact were supported by competent substantial evidence as announced in Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 794 So.2d 1270, 1275–76 (Fla.2001) and prior similar precedents. By conducting what amounted to a de novo...