Wiggins v. State, No. S15A1729.

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
• Citation: 782 S.E.2d 31,298 Ga. 366
• Parties: WIGGINS v. The STATE.
• Decision Date: 19 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. S15A1729.

298 Ga. 366
782 S.E.2d 31

WIGGINS
v.
The STATE.

No. S15A1729.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 19, 2016.

782 S.E.2d 33

Long Dai Vo, Atlanta, for appellant.

Julia Anne Fessenden Slater, Dist. Atty., Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Scott O. Teague, Department of Law, Atlanta, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

298 Ga. 366

Following a bench trial, appellant Ulysses Wiggins was found guilty of the malice murder and felony murder of Catherine Walker, the aggravated assaults of Valorice Caples and Carolyn Senior, and other related crimes. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus an additional 25 years in prison.¹ Because we conclude the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing to determine whether

298 Ga. 367

appellant's request to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made, we reverse his convictions.

1. The evidence presented at trial authorized the trial court to find that appellant had been living with Caples and her nephew, Octavious Short, for several years. The day before the crimes, Caples moved out of their shared apartment because of appellant's abusive behavior. On the day of the crimes, as Caples was getting into a car with Senior, appellant grabbed Caples and pulled her out of the car. Appellant, Caples, and Senior then argued on the street until Short and others intervened. Several teens who helped break up the altercation then chased appellant back to his apartment where he retrieved a gun and started shooting. Soon thereafter, appellant confronted Caples again, threatening to kill her, but this altercation, like the first, was broken up. As Caples and Senior retreated to safety, appellant continued to run around the apartment complex, eventually encountering Walker, whom he fatally shot as she stood outside her apartment.

Construed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, we find the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant contends the trial court's implicit denial, without inquiry or hearing, of his pre-trial request to represent himself was error. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII. We agree.

The record shows that appellant was represented at trial by Mr. Pete Quezada who, three months before trial, suffered a heart attack. Believing that Mr. Quezada blamed him for causing the heart attack, on September 2, 2010, appellant sent a letter to the trial court explaining his situation and stating:

What I am asking for is a chance to come before the court. I am more than ready to

782 S.E.2d 34

defend myself.... I cannot allow Mr. Quezada to represent me. Please let me know what steps I need to take to get this case to trial.

The trial court forwarded appellant's correspondence to Mr. Quezada and included with it a letter suggesting that "[g]iven the nature of [appellant's] letter, it may be prudent to set this matter down for a hearing in front of [the court] at your earliest convenience." A month later, with no hearing having been held, appellant sent a letter to the Muscogee County Superior Court clerk asking "what [he] needed to do to get this hearing before [the judge]." The judge's law clerk

298 Ga. 368

responded to this letter, informing appellant that if he desired "to obtain any kind of legal relief," he had to "go through the proper channels" and that a copy of appellant's "informal request to dismiss attorney Quezada from this case" had been forwarded to the prosecuting attorney and Mr. Quezada, "for their review and consideration." No further action was taken by the trial court regarding appellant's request to proceed pro se, leaving counsel in the case. After a one day bench trial, appellant was found guilty of all charges.

Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819–820(III)(A), 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. XII, XIV ; Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 502, 238 S.E.2d 52 (1977) ("A state may not force a lawyer upon an appellant when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. [Cit.]"). If a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the "traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel" and understands the "disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–836, 95 S.Ct. 2525. See ...