Wigginton v. Rule
| Decision Date | 16 July 1918 |
| Citation | 205 S.W. 168,275 Mo. 412 |
| Parties | ED. B. WIGGINTON et al. v. E. B. RULE et al., Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pike Circuit Court. -- Hon. Edgar B. Woolfolk, Judge.
Affirmed.
Robert A. May, J. E. Pew, Frank J. Duvall and Hostetter & Haley for appellants.
(1) The court erred in refusing proponents' instruction directing the jury to find in favor of the will. The testimony showed without contradiction that the testator transacted his business before and after the making of the will in an intelligent, rational and normal manner; that on the day he made the will he understood the business in which he was then engaged; knew the persons who were the natural objects of his bounty, and understood his relations to them; knew what property he owned and of what it consisted and knew what disposition he desired to make of it. The provisions of the will itself are so fair, sane and reasonable that they constitute the strongest possible proof that they emanated from a mind possessing all the elements of testamentary capacity. Therefore the court should have instructed peremptorily to find in favor of the will. Bounds v Johnson, 192 S.W. 972; Winn v. Grier, 217 Mo 420; Hamon v. Hamon, 180 Mo. 685; Cash v Lust, 142 Mo. 630; Sayre v. Princeton, 192 Mo. 95; Gibony v. Foster, 230 Mo. 106; Weston v. Hanson, 212 Mo. 248; Southworth v. Southworth, 173 Mo. 59; McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, 138 Mo. 197; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 175; Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1; Hughes v. Rader, 183 Mo. 630; Turner v. Anderson, 260 Mo. 1; Conner v. Skaggs, 213 Mo. 334; Riley v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 355; Techenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 539; Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 530; Story v. Story, 188 Mo. 127. (2) The court erred in instructing the jury as to the alleged "insane delusion." The testimony falls far short of establishing the fact that the belief of the testator in the existence of improper relations between his son-in-law and the girl was in point of fact an "insane delusion" within the meaning of the law. "No belief that has any evidence for its basis, is in law an insane delusion." Stull v. Stull, 96 N.W. 202; Conner v. Skaggs, 213 Mo. 348; Sayre v. Trustees Princeton University, 192 Mo. 126; Fulton v. Freeland, 219 Mo. 518. To invalidate a will it must be produced by the monomania under which the testator was laboring. Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 329. The alleged insane delusion in the instant case was directed against the son-in-law; he was not one of the natural objects of the testator's bounty; he would not have inherited anything had the testator died without a will; there is no testimony that the testator ever at any time intended to will to the son-in-law any property. Therefore it is idle to contend that the will was the offspring of the delusion, conceding it to have been a delusion. Merrill v. Rush, 33 N.J.Eq. 537; Stockhouse v. Horton, 15 N.J.Eq. 202. (3) The admission of postcards, written by testator on the day of and immediately prior to his death, was erroneous and very prejudicial. A declaration of a testator, whether oral or in writing, made after the execution of the will and having no connection with the will or its provisions, and containing as the exhibits complained of in the case at bar, prejudicial matters to the effect that the testator had mistreated and wronged his granddaughter and was remorseful because of such wrong and mistreatment, is highly prejudicial, and is clearly error. McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 267. (4) It was error to permit lay witnesses to testify and give their opinion to the effect that the testator did not have sufficient mind to know the value of his property or to realize his relations toward his children, or to appreciate the obligations to his family, or the relations to his family, because these matters left it for the witness to conclude what were his proper obligations to his family and to his children, and what were the proper relations he should sustain toward them, and was to that extent an invasion of the province of the jury. Declarations of a testator are proper to be given in evidence only as they bear upon the condition of his mind and the state of his affections. The purpose which they subserve is to furnish an insight into the actual condition of the testator's mind at the very time of the execution of the will. The more remote they are from the date of the execution of the will the less value is ascribed to them. They are never received as evidence of the truth of the things contained in such declarations. This principle was repeatedly violated during the trial. McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 266.
Pearson & Pearson for respondents.
(1) Where there is any evidence of testator's incapacity to make a valid will, whether it be of insanity, partial insanity, or an insane delusion, it is a question of fact, which should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Turner v. Anderson, 260 Mo. 16; Wendling v. Bowdin, 252 Mo. 692; Ten Broeck v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 538; Mowing v. Norman, 204 Mo. 193. (2) If a delusion existed in testator's mind, and dominated him in making his will, as the jury found there was, and did, then testator was incapable, on that account, of making a valid will. Holton v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 412; Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 667; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 319. (3) In order that a testator may comprehend the relations which he holds towards those who have claims upon him, no insane delusion should influence his will; unreasonable prejudice against relatives is not ordinarily a ground for invalidating a will, but it may be set aside where the testator's aversion is the result of an insane delusion, and his conduct cannot be explained on any other ground. Buford v. Gruber, 223 Mo. 250; Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 668. (4) Whenever a person conceives something extravagant, which has in fact no existence whatever, and he is incapable of being reasoned out of this false belief, it constitutes insanity; and if this delusion relates to his property, he is incapable of making a will. Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 323; Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 667; Buford v. Gruber, 223 Mo. 250; Holton v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 421. (5) Where there is any evidence, that the will is the direct offspring of partial insanity, or an insane delusion, under which the testator was laboring at the time of executing the same, and from which he could not extricate himself, the case should be submitted to the jury, although testator's general capacity be unimpaired. Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 668; Buford v. Gruber, 223 Mo. 251. (6) The opinion of witnesses, as to testator's mental capacity is the very best evidence that can be adduced before a jury. It approaches to knowledge, and is such knowledge as is proper evidence for the jury. Appleby v. Brock, 76 Mo. 316; Sharp v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 100; State v. Speyer, 194 Mo. 468; Huffman, 217 Mo. 230.
This is a suit to set aside, on the ground of testamentary incapacity, the will of Calvin Wigginton, deceased. Trial was had before a jury in the circuit court of Pike County, which resulted in a verdict and judgment setting aside the will. Thereupon the executor and the nieces of testator, who are made defendants in this case, duly perfected an appeal to this court.
The main contention of appellants is that there was not sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of testamentary incapacity. For that reason it will be necessary to set forth the facts with considerable detail.
It will be unnecessary to detail the evidence offered by the proponents of the will, since no issue on this appeal is based thereon. In that behalf it is sufficient to say that proponents introduced substantial evidence tending to show that testator was of sound mind at the time the will was made, and that the will was duly executed and witnessed as required by law.
Calvin Wigginton (who for the sake of brevity will be hereinafter referred to as testator) was seventy-eight years of age when he executed his will on August 8, 1914. Eighteen days later he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a pistol at a lumberyard in Clarksville, Missouri.
At the time of his death it is stated that he was possessed of real and personal property of the value of about thirty thousand dollars. He left surviving him only two children, a son, Ed. B. Wigginton, and an insane daughter, Ada V. Goodman, wife of Edwin Goodman. These two children are the plaintiffs in this suit; the insane daughter appearing by her guardian, Edwin Goodman.
The will, after providing for the payment of debts and funeral expenses and after stating that testator had already provided for his son, Ed. B. Wigginton, during his lifetime, disposed of testator's property as follows:
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