Wightman v. Town of Methuen

• Decision Date: 09 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-941,87-941
• Parties: , 48 Ed. Law Rep. 640 Adam WIGHTMAN 1 v. TOWN OF METHUEN.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 1079

526 N.E.2d 1079

26 Mass.App.Ct. 279, 48 Ed. Law Rep. 640

Adam WIGHTMAN ¹ v. TOWN OF METHUEN.

No. 87-941.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Essex.

Argued May 9, 1988.

Decided Aug. 9, 1988.

Kenneth Martin Knee, Boston, for plaintiff.

Maurice J. Lariviere, Jr., Town Counsel, Methuen, for Town of Methuen.

Before GREANEY, C.J., and SMITH and WARNER, JJ.

WARNER, Justice.

In this action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a schoolyard incident, the town of Methuen (town) moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was exempt from liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, § 10(b ), the so-called discretionary function exemption. The motion was allowed, and the plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment for the town. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the essential facts as alleged in the materials before the judge and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (for reasons which will later appear). On the morning of May 3, 1983, the plaintiff, Adam Wightman, a second-grade student, was injured on the grounds of an elementary school. There were two program supervisors in the area as the students awaited the start of the school day. An older boy, also a student, "attacked" the plaintiff by picking him up by his legs and spinning him around in the air. Although the plaintiff repeatedly asked him to stop, the older boy did not do so. The plaintiff was thrown to the ground, injuring his arm. Crying and in pain, the plaintiff went over to the two nearby staff persons. They did not examine his arm, but told him to go to class. His teacher noted the plaintiff's pain and his inability to participate in class and sent him to the nurse's office. There was no nurse on duty at the time; a gym teacher applied first aid, and the plaintiff's family was notified. The plaintiff had suffered multiple fractures of bones in his right arm and required surgery.

1. The plaintiff first claims that there are genuine issues of material fact, see Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), on the question whether school employees failed reasonably to supervise the activities of the students. That claim, even assuming that the plaintiff could prove the facts set out above, is foreclosed by our opinion in Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 457 N.E.2d 294 (1983). "Sizing up the gravity of a school yard feud, deciding how best to defuse it, and maintaining school discipline involve judgment, experience, and the intuition which is the sum of experience. Indeed, the very basis for judicial abstention from interference with the rules, decisions, and acts by which school authorities maintain decorum is that those are matters within their broad discretion." Id. at 216, 457 N.E.2d 294. "Management of student imbroglios, student discipline, and school decorum fall readily within the discretionary function exception to the Tort Claims Act." Id. at 217, 457 N.E.2d 294. Under the Act, the exception applies even where there has been abuse of discretion. G.L. c. 258, § 10(b ).

2. The plaintiff also argues that there is a basis of liability under the Tort Claims Act in the school personnel's failure to seek immediate medical attention for him. Such neglect would not come within the discretionary function exception. See Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 223 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977); Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist., supra at 215-216, 457 N.E.2d 294. That claim fails, however, for the reason, if no other, that the plaintiff did not properly present it. ²

General Laws, c. 258, § 4, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 512, § 15, provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose...." Presentment must be made "in strict compliance with the statute." Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47, 438 N.E.2d 831 (1982). Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 284, 486 N.E.2d 764 (1985). "Presentment ensures that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future." Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., supra at 283, 486 N.E.2d 764.

In relevant part, the presentment letter, dated January 22, 1985, read: "[A] notice is hereby given ... of a claim for ...