Wilder v. Hall

• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06-079-GFVT.
• Citation: 501 F.Supp.2d 887
• Parties: Claude WILDER & Charles Holbrook, Plaintiffs, v. Danl L. HALL, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

501 F.Supp.2d 887

Claude WILDER & Charles Holbrook, Plaintiffs, v. Danl L. HALL, et. al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06-079-GFVT.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division,

March 30, 2007.

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William Lewis Collins, Whitesburg, KY, Ned Pillersdorf, Pillersdorf, Derossett & Lane, Prestonsburg, KY, for Plaintiffs.

Bryan Howard Beauman, Stephen Lewis Barker, Sturgill, Turner, Barker & Moloney PLLC, Lexington, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge.

Before the Court are two. Motions to Dismiss filed by two of the three named Defendants, State Representative Howard Cornett ("Cornett") [R. 9] and the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet ("the Cabinet"). [R. 11]. Cornett argues that the claims against him must be dismissed because his actions are constitutionally protected [R. 9]. The Cabinet argues that it is immune to suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. [R. 1].¹ The Court agrees and will grant both motions.

I.

In the Spring of 2005, William Smallwood ("Smallwood") was promoted to the position of Superintendent II in the Cabinet. [R. 1].1 While Wilder and Holbrook are registered Democrats, Smallwood is a registered Republican. [Id. at 2]. Allegedly, Cornett, a Republican member of the Kentucky House of Representatives from Letcher County, Kentucky,² persuaded Hall to promote Smallwood since he was the only registered Republican working locally for the Cabinet. [Id.]. This recommendation was in direct conflict with a recommendation made to Cornett by Letcher County. Judge Executive Carroll Smith ("Judge Executive Smith"), also a Republican. [Id. at 4.]. Judge Executive Smith allegedly recommended that Wilder, his brother-in-law, receive the promotion based on his experience with the Cabinet. [Id.]. Judge Executive Smith and Cornett were also in a dispute over legislation pending in the Kentucky Legislature. [Id.]. Wilder and Holbrook allege that Cornett's recommendation diverged from Judge Executive Smith because of this dispute. [Id.]

Ultimately, after Cornett's recommendation, Smallwood was promoted, [Id. at 3], even though Wilder and Holbrook claim that they had more experience. [Id. at 2]. Wilder had twenty-seven years experience; Holbrook had sixteen years of experience; and Smallwood had six years of experience. [Id.] Further, they contend that Smallwood did not even participate in the Superintendent II interviews, and, thus, Hall's contention that he hired Smallwood based on those interviews is false. [Id.].

Specifically, Wilder and Holbrook claim that Hall "awarded the [Superintendent II] position to William Smallwood based on improper political considerations," which were motivated "by the political influence exerted on him by the Defendant Howard Cornett." [Id.]. This influence was in the form of Cornett's recommendation of Smallwood and was in order "to promote an unconstitutional political agenda" and was accomplished through an alleged conspiracy by Cornett, Hall, and other unknown Cabinet employees in which all parties supplanted objective hiring criteria for impermissible political considerations, including political party identification and the dispute with Judge Executive Smith. [Id. at 3-4]. These actions, in toto, are alleged to have led to the violations of Holbrook and Wilder's rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, specifically their freedom of speech, freedom of association, and due process rights. [Id.].

II.

When examining a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), "this Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 398-99 (6th Cir.2006). This Court must "`take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true' and if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief, then ... dismissal is proper." Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Forest v. U.S. Postal Serv., 97 F.3d 137, 139 (6th Cir.1996)).<sup>3</sup> "[A] plaintiffs complaint will not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it contains `either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Uttilla v City of Memphis, 40 F.Supp.2d 968, 970 (W.D.Tenn.1999) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988)). "Under the liberal notice pleading rules, a complaint need only put a party on notice of the claim being asserted against it to satisfy the federal rule requirement of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted." Am. Postal Workers Union v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir.2004). Generally, there is no heightened pleading requirement for claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

A.

The Cabinet argues that the statute of limitations ran prior to the filing of the Complaint [R. 11], and Cornett has adopted this argument. [R. 13]. In a section 1983 action, a federal court will borrow the personal torts limitations period from the state in which the claim arose. See Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 & n. 1 (6th Cir.1997). When computing a limitations period, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) controls. Id. "A statute of limitations that would run on a Saturday or Sunday would not bar a complaint filed the following Monday...." Id. at 398 n. 2. It is undisputed that the limitations period expired on either April 15, 2006, a Saturday, or April 16, a Sunday. [See R. 11, p. 6]. The Complaint was filed the following Monday, April 17. This action was timely filed.

B.

Wilder and Holbrook have asserted a section 1983 claim against Cornett. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to, be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Cornett has moved to dismiss the claims against him. In deciding whether to grant this Motion, three questions must be considered. First, what is the constitutional right that Wilder and Holbrook seek to invoke? Second, since under section 1983 only "state actors" can be held accountable for constitutional violations, does Cornett, as a private party, qualify? Finally, to what extent do Cornett's own constitutional rights deserve deference?

1.

In order to assert a claim under section 1983, there must be a "deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Simescu v. Emmet County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991)). Wilder and Holbrook allege that their rights were violated by an impermissible political affiliation consideration.

In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), the Supreme Court examined a practice by the Governor of Illinois in which, in certain circumstances, state employment was limited to Republicans. The Governor's Office considered several factors in determining whether a particular person should receive a position, including whether the person voted in Republican primaries, supported the Republican party, was supported by local Republican officials, and promised future support to the party. Id. at 66, 110 S.Ct. 2729. The Court held that this system violated the constitutional rights of those denied employment. Id. at 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729. The Court stated that "promotions, transfers and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees." Id. The Rutan decision rests the public employees' rights on the First Amendment: "The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate." Id. Political affiliation may only be considered when "the government has a vital interest in doing so." Id. at 78, 110 S.Ct. 2729. The government may permissibly consider an applicant's political affiliation if the employment position is inherently political in nature. Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 212.

Whether a position is inherently political is a fact-based inquiry that asks two questions: what are "(1) the inherent duties of the position in question' and (2) the `duties that the new holder of that positron will perform,' as envisioned by the newly elected official.... " Id. (quoting Blair v. Meade, 76 F.3d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1996)). In making the allegation that Cornett's recommendation helped "promote an unconstitutional political agenda," [R. 1 at 3], Wilder and Holbrook placed all parties on notice that they claim that the Superintendent II position was not inherently political. Whether or not the facts would ultimately support that determination is a decision best left for after discovery. Therefore, for the purposes of Cornett's Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds a sufficient allegation that Smallwood was not promoted to a political position. Consequently, consideration of political affiliation could have caused a constitutional deprivation to Wilder and Cornett.

2.

Also, under section 1983, a party who deprives another of a right established by the United States Constitution must be acting under the color of state law. See Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir.2003). Generally, a ...