Wilder v. Tanouye
| Decision Date | 17 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 12167,12167 |
| Citation | 753 P.2d 816,7 Haw.App. 247 |
| Parties | John P. WILDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry TANOUYE, Unit Team Manager, Tom Browder, Case Worker, Dale Haga, Case Worker, Hollis Maxson, Unit Team Manager, Eric Penarosa, Program Control Administrator, Franklin Y.K. Sunn, in his capacity as Director of the Department of Social Services and Housing, and the State of Hawaii, Defendants- Appellees. |
| Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. HRCP Rule 78 sets forth the procedure whereby oral hearing may be dispensed with and motions determined upon written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
2. Rules of the Circuit Courts (RCC) Rule 8, adopted by the supreme court, allows the circuit court to consider and decide motions on briefs and/or affidavits without oral argument.
3. Where the circuit court entered an order that it would rule on a motion for summary judgment without oral hearing and expressly provided for the submission of memoranda, affidavits, and other evidence by the parties by a certain deadline, the court exercised its discretionary authority under RCC Rule 8 and there was no error.
4. Under HRCP Rule 56(f) a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may submit affidavits setting forth the reasons why he cannot present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. If the stated reasons are sufficient, the court may grant a continuance of the motion to permit affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be had.
5. A request for continuance under HRCP Rule 56(f) must demonstrate how the continuance will enable the party, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The mere recitation of the Rule 56(f) language is insufficient to invoke the court's discretion under that rule.
6. Under HRCP Rule 56(c), a fact is "material" if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. A factual issue that is not necessary to the decision is not material.
7. Prisoners do retain the procedural due process right not to be deprived of a liberty interest without reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. But they retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.
8. The due process clause in itself does not accord procedural due process to a prisoner before he can be placed and retained in administrative segregation.
9. Where the prison rules dealing with administrative segregation contain substantive predicates which give prison officials certain leeway, state that administrative segregation is nonpunitive in nature, and provide for specific procedures without including mandatory words such as "shall," "will," or "must," they do not create a protected liberty interest.
10. Since a holding unit within a community correctional center was not a "facility" within the meaning of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 353-3 (1985) and § 17-200-1 of the administrative rules of the Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH), the directive issued for the holding unit did not constitute "rules" requiring the approval of the director of the DSSH and the governor of the State.
John P. Wilder, pro se.
Glenn S. Grayson, Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.
Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and TANAKA, JJ.
Plaintiff-appellant John P. Wilder (Wilder), a prison inmate, appeals from the summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees (Defendants). Wilder contends that because the record discloses serious procedural errors and genuine issues of material fact, the lower court erred in granting the summary judgment. We affirm.
On September 10, 1984, while incarcerated in the Oahu Community Correctional Center (OCCC), Wilder filed a pro se complaint against four OCCC employees, namely, unit team managers Harry Tanouye (Tanouye) and Hollis Maxson (Maxson) and case workers Tom Browder (Browder) and Dale Haga (Haga). The complaint alleged claims grounded on constitutional torts.
On September 17, 1985, the lower court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss which had been filed on November 1, 1984. Wilder appealed the dismissal. Although characterizing the complaint as "lengthy, prolix and confusing," the supreme court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case. Wilder v. Tanouye, No. 10910 (Haw. July 31, 1986) (mem.).
On November 14, 1986, Wilder filed an amended complaint adding three other defendants, namely, Eric Penarosa (Penarosa), OCCC program control administrator; Franklin Y.K. Sunn, director of the Department of Social Services and Housing (Director); and the State of Hawaii (State). Tanouye, Maxson, Browder, Haga, Penarosa, the Director, and the State are collectively referred to as Defendants in this opinion. The amended complaint alleged that Tanouye, Maxson, Browder, Haga, and Penarosa "acting within the scope and in the course of their employment" violated Wilder's "right to due process of law guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the State of Hawaii" 1 by (1) placing and retaining Wilder in "administrative segregation for an indefinite period of time" and (2) enforcing against Wilder "rules, regulations policies, procedures, memos and directives" which had not been adopted pursuant to law. Record at 249, 252. The complaint also alleged that the Director and the State were liable for negligently hiring and supervising the named OCCC employees and also under "the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 254. Wilder sought a declaratory judgment and damages, both compensatory and punitive.
On November 26, 1986, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Prior to the filing of the motion, Defendants obtained an ex parte order dated November 21, 1986, which stated:
The hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is suspended. The Court will rule on Defendants' motion without oral hearing and based solely upon the records, files and written arguments of the parties.
Parties may submit additional memoranda or evidence in the form of affidavit or other writing within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
On December 9, 1986, Wilder filed a motion for an extension of time to January 9, 1987, to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On December 31, 1986, Wilder filed a "motion for relief" from the November 21, 1986 ex parte order denying oral argument on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On January 8, 1987, Wilder requested a second extension of time to February 8, 1987, to respond to the summary judgment motion. On February 4, 1987, Wilder filed his memorandum of law, affidavit, and exhibits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
No hearing was held on Wilder's December 31, 1986 "motion for relief" or on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On April 7, 1987, the lower court entered its order denying Wilder's December 31, 1986 "motion for relief." On the same day the court also filed its "Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment." Wilder's timely appeal followed.
The issues raised on appeal and our answers are:
I. Whether the lower court erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment without giving Wilder an opportunity to be heard orally. No.
II. Whether the lower court erred in ruling on the summary judgment motion without granting Wilder's request for additional time to complete discovery. No.
III. Whether summary judgment was improperly granted because there were genuine issues of material fact and Defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law regarding Wilder's claims arising from (A) placing and retaining him in administrative segregation and (B) enforcing against him "rules, regulations, policies, procedures, memos and directives" which had not been adopted pursuant to law. No as to both claims.
Wilder contends on appeal that the lower court reversibly erred in granting a summary judgment in Defendants' favor without giving him "an opportunity to be heard orally[.]" In support of this contention Wilder cites Jensen v. Pratt, 53 Haw. 201, 491 P.2d 547 (1971), Clark v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 50 Haw. 169, 434 P.2d 312 (1967), and the "Order Adopting New Procedures for the Motions Calendar of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit" issued on May 11, 1983, and amended on December 22, 1983 (Order Adopting New Procedures), which provides in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The following motions will be given oral hearings, to-wit:
a) motion to dismiss;
b) motion for summary judgment;
* * *
* * *
d) all motions where the party to be noticed is appearing pro se.
We start our analysis by examining the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP). HRCP Rule 56 does not specify that an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment is mandatory. HRCP Rule 78 provides in pertinent part:
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
In Jensen v. Pratt, supra, our supreme court stated that Rule 78 "sets forth the exclusive procedure for dispensing with oral hearings" on summary judgment motions. Id. at 202, 491 P.2d at 548. Because there was "neither a rule nor an order generally dispensing with the requirement of oral hearings on motions for summary judgment[,]" the court held that the failure to hold an oral hearing was reversible error. Id. at 202-03, 491 P.2d at 548. Four years earlier, in Clarke v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra, the court had held that the trial court reversibly erred when it granted summary judgment on its own motion without notice and without a hearing on the matter. 2
Rules of the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawaii (RCC) Rule 8 reads in relevant part: ...
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