Wiley v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.
| Citation | 430 So.2d 1016 |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-229,82-229 |
| Parties | 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 5170 Gerald W. WILEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US) |
Dubuisson & Dubuisson, James G. Dubuisson, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.
Carol J. Aymond, Bunkie, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, DOUCET and YELVERTON, JJ.
This is a retaliatory discharge--conflicts of law--case involving an injured railway worker seeking to invoke state anti-discrimination laws.
Can a railroad employee, discharged for filing (and subsequently settling) a claim under the F.E.L.A., maintain a suit for wrongful discharge pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1361. That is the issue presented for our consideration. As far as we are aware, this is the first reported case wherein application of the aforesaid wrongful discharge provision of our workmens compensation laws has been asserted.
The trial judge summarized the facts giving rise to this suit as follows:
Your services are needed at this time; therefore, you are requested to contact this office prior to December 1, 1980.
If for any reason you are unable to do so, please furnish medical evidence of your inability to do so. If you have not marked up in the allotted time, or given evidence to why you cannot you will be considered absent without proper authority and in violation of proper instructions."
At the instigation of defendant, plaintiff was re-employed by the railroad in December of 1980 and thereafter continued to work for the railroad until he was discharged by letter dated May 1, 1981 which read as follows:
"Please refer to your letter of March 13, 1980 wherein you relinquished all employment rights with Missouri Pacific Railroad, and agreed to release all claim for back wages, lost time, etc. This letter was signed as a final settlement growing out of a personal injury sustained by you at Luling, Louisiana on May 9, 1979.
We are advised that you were erroneously allowed to return to work.
This letter is to advise you that you cannot be permitted to work for Missouri Pacific Railroad again in any capacity, due to your final settlement dated March 13, 1980."
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, Gerald W. Wiley, awarding $21,421.40, representing one year's earnings plus attorney's fees in the sum of $3,500.00, pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1361. From that judgment defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company has appealed, specifying the following alleged errors: 1
"1.
'The trial judge erred in holding that R.S. 23:1361 applied to a previous assertion of a claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
2.
The trial judge erred in holding that plaintiff was discharged from his employment because of having asserted a previous claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
3.
The trial judge erred in not holding that the provisions of R.S. 23:1361 are unconstitutional if applied to previous claims asserted under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on the ground that such provisions would constitute state legislation in a field of law pre-empted by laws passed by the Congress of the United States of America.
4.
The trial Judge erred in failing to hold that the provisions of R.S. 23:1361 would be unconstitutional if applied to previous assertion of claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on the ground that the Act would then be broader than its title."
The historical development of the employment relationship, leading up to the wrongful discharge action, was succinctly summarized in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 (1981), as follows:
"The law of the employment relationship has been, and perhaps still is, in the process of continuing evolution. The old law of master and servant, which held sway through the eighteenth century and to some extent beyond, viewed the relationship as primarily one of status rather than of contract. While agreement gave rise to the relationship and might establish certain of its terms, it was "custom and public policy, not the will of the parties, [which] defined the implicit framework of mutual rights and obligations." (Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (1969) p. 123.)
The essence of the relationship as so defined drew its contours from the model of the household--in which, typically, the servant worked, the master had general authority to discipline the servant, and it was the servant's duty to obey. (Id., at pp. 124-125.) At the same time, the master had certain responsibilities for the servant's general welfare. (Id., at p. 128.) The relationship was thus in a sense paternalistic. And it was not terminable at will; rather, there existed a presumption (in the absence of contrary agreement) that employment was for a period of one year. (Id., at p. 125.)
With the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century the law of master and servant underwent a gradual remodeling, primarily at the hands of the judiciary. Primary emphasis came to be placed, through contract doctrine, upon the freedom of the parties to define their own relationship. "The emphasis shifted from obligation to freedom of choice." (Id., at p. 131.) The terms of the contract were to be sought in voluntary agreement, express or implied, the employee being presumed to have assented to the rules and working conditions established by the employer. (Ibid.)
In light of the generally superior bargaining power of the employer, "the employment contract became [by the end of the nineteenth century] a very special sort of contract--in large part a device for guaranteeing to management unilateral power to make rules and exercise discretion." (Ibid.) And management's unilateral power extended, generally, to the term of the relationship as well. The new emphasis brought with it a gradual weakening of the traditional presumption that a general hiring (i.e., one without a specific term) was for a year, and its replacement by the converse presumption that "a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will." (Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant (1877) § 134, fn. 49.) 3 In California, this presumption is reflected in Labor Code section 2922, which provides:
The recognized inequality in bargaining power between employer and individual employee undergirded the rise of the labor unions and the institutionalization of collective bargaining.4 And through collective bargaining, unions have placed limitations on the employer's unilateral right of termination. Under most union contracts, employees can only be dismissed for "just cause," and disputes over what constitutes cause for dismissal are typically decided by arbitrators chosen by the parties.5 Collective bargaining agreements, however, cover only a small fraction of the nation's work force,6 and employees who either do not or (as in the case of managerial employees such as Mr. Pugh) cannot form unions 7 are left without that protection.
In recent years, there have been established by statute a variety of limitations upon the employer's power of dismissal. Employers are precluded, for example, from terminating employees for a variety of reasons, including union membership or activities, race, sex, age or political affiliation.8 Legislatures in this country have so far refrained, however, from adopting statutes, such as those which exist in most other industrialized countries,9 which would provide more generalized protection to employees against unjust dismissal. And while public employees may enjoy job security through civil service rules 10 and due process,11 the legal principles which give rise to these protections are not directly applicable to employees in private industry.12" (Footnotes omitted).
Thus, under the traditional rule, an employer could discharge a long-term employee for no cause, bad cause, or any cause whatsoever, without regard to his years of satisfactory performance, or the substantial opportunities he may have foregone to remain in the employer's service. As a result thereof the employee without recourse often suffered the cost and inconvenience of searching for a new job (if available), moving expenses and the costs of relocating a family, and emotional distress from embarrassment and loss of status. Until recently the "at will" doctrine was considered so well established that courts applied the rule without inquiring into its logic.
Both legislatures and courts have limited the "employment at will" doctrine in recent years to protect participants in union activity 2, workmen's compensation claimants 3, employees serving on jury duty 4, veterans 5, debtors 6, and informants 7, and prohibit employment practices that discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin 8, or age 9.
Factors which courts have considered in finding rights to job security include special or separate consideration given by the employee for the position, the common law of...
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... ... In Wiley v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 430 So.2d 1016 (La.App. 3d Cir.1982), writ denied, 431 So.2d 1055 ... ...
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...the parish perhaps could not have fired Guillory without cause in the middle of his employment term, Wiley v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 430 So.2d 1016 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), writ denied, 431 So.2d 1055, it could dismiss him without justification at the end of his year. Finally, Guillo......
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