Wilkie v. Randolph Trust Co.

Citation55 N.E.2d 466,316 Mass. 267
PartiesRUTH W. WILKIE v. RANDOLPH TRUST COMPANY (and a companion case [1]).
Decision Date01 June 1944
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

May 8, 1942.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., QUA, DOLAN & RONAN, JJ.

Negligence, Invited person.

The facts, that one obtained the key to a vacant house from a real estate agency with which it had been listed for sale, inspected the property and returned the key to the agency; and that afterwards on the same day, the agency then being closed and the key not available, he again went to the property to inspect it and was injured there through a defect in a porch railing, required a conclusion that at the time of his injury he was not an invitee of the owner of the property.

TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the District Court of East Norfolk dated May 18, 1940.

Upon removal to the Superior Court, the actions were heard by an auditor whose findings were to be final, and judgments for the defendant were ordered on his report by Hurley, J. The plaintiffs alleged exceptions.

J. D. Goodman, for the plaintiffs.

E. J. Campbell, (E.

Olsson with him,) for the defendant.

RONAN, J. The defendant listed for sale with a real estate agency certain premises located in Braintree. There was also a sign in one of the front windows which read "For Sale. Brooks, Real Estate, Randolph." Brooks was a caretaker of the defendant's properties. The plaintiffs were interested in purchasing a house in Braintree. They called at the office of the real estate agency on a Sunday afternoon in August, 1939 inquired concerning houses for sale in Braintree, received the keys to several houses which were for sale, including the key to the defendant's house, inspected these properties and then returned the keys. There was no evidence as to what took place or what was said when the plaintiffs left the keys. The plaintiffs were considering the purchase of the defendant's premises, and with a relative whose advice they sought they again went to the agency at 6:30 P.M. to get the key but the office was closed. They again went to the property. They inspected the garage which was open but the house was locked. While the female plaintiff was standing against the railing of the back door platform, the railing gave way and she was injured. She sued for personal injury and her husband for consequential damages. The plaintiffs excepted to the ordering of judgments for the defendant upon the report of an auditor whose findings of fact were final.

In addition to the facts already recited, the auditor found that the invitation to the plaintiffs to visit and inspect the premises which was implied by the delivery of the key to them could not be extended to a second visit after the key had been returned and without consultation with anyone representing the defendant, and ruled that the female plaintiff was not upon the premises at the time of the accident at the invitation of the defendant. He found for the defendant.

The report of the auditor is to be treated as a case stated and his conclusions which were reached entirely by way of inference from his subsidiary findings are reviewable by the trial court and by this court. Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572 . Galante v. Brockton, 305 Mass. 480 . Mahoney v. C & R Construction Co. 311 Mass. 558 . Hanifin v. C & R Construction Co. 313 Mass. 651 .

The burden was upon the plaintiffs to prove that at the time of the accident the female plaintiff was lawfully upon the defendant's premises by virtue of either an express or an implied invitation of the real estate agency, which the auditor found was authorized to extend an invitation in behalf of the defendant. Doubtless, the plaintiffs while the key remained in their possession were invited to go upon the defendant's premises for the purpose of inspecting the house, and the defendant was under an obligation to exercise due care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use of those whom it induced to enter and inspect them with the view of becoming purchasers. Marston v.

Reynolds, 211 Mass. 590 . Sleeper v. Park, 232 Mass. 292 . Serota v. Salmansohn, 256 Mass. 224 . Lord v. Lowell Institution for Savings, 304 Mass. 212. But an invitation has its limitations, and in order to entitle one to the protection of an invitation he must show that he was acting within the scope of the invitation when he was injured. Holbrook v. Aldrich, 168 Mass. 15 . Graham v. Pocasset Manuf. Co. 220 Mass. 195 . Murphy v. Huntley, 251 Mass. 555 . Davis v. Bean, 298 Mass. 135 . Urban v. Central Massachusetts Electric Co. 301 Mass. 519 .

There is nothing to indicate that the real estate agency could not rightly understand that whatever...

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