Wilkins v. Vill. of Harrisburg

• Decision Date: 29 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14AP–1028.,14AP–1028.
• Citation: 56 N.E.3d 320
• Parties: Paula J. WILKINS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF HARRISBURG et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

56 N.E.3d 320

Paula J. WILKINS, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.The VILLAGE OF HARRISBURG et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14AP–1028.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Dec. 29, 2015.

Paula J. Wilkins, pro se.

Kopech & O'Grady LLC, and Michael P. O'Grady, Solicitor, for appellee The Village of Harrisburg.

Plank Law Firm, LPA, and David Watkins, for appellee Larry Taylor.

DORRIAN

, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Paula J. Wilkins (“appellant”), appeals pro se from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas which granted the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants-appellees. Because the trial court erred, we reverse that judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Appellant owns property located at 8048 Harrisburg Pike, which is commonly known as State Route 3 and/or U.S. Route 62 (“Harrisburg Pike” or “Route 62.”).

Appellant's property is not located within the Village of Harrisburg. Directly across Harrisburg Pike from appellant's property lies property owned by Larry Taylor. Taylor's property is located at 8087 Harrisburg Pike and consists of several parcels totaling 26.2150 acres. In 2002, the Franklin County Commissioners approved an application for annexation of 23.775 acres of the 26.2150 acres of Taylor's property to the Village of Harrisburg.

{¶ 3} In 2010, the Village of Harrisburg passed two ordinances which involved the rezoning of Taylor's property from rural agricultural zoning to a community service II zoning district. (Complaint, ¶ 30.) In 2012, appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, sanctions, and civil damages. The complaint named as defendants the Village of Harrisburg, several Village of Harrisburg Council members in their official and individual capacities, the Harrisburg Fiscal Officer in her official and individual capacity, several former members of the Harrisburg Council in their individual capacity, the Village of Harrisburg mayor in her individual capacity (collectively, “the Village defendants”), Larry Taylor (“Taylor”), and the Ohio Attorney General. Appellant's complaint challenged the two ordinances.

{¶ 4} The trial court granted the Ohio Attorney General's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, Taylor and the Village defendants each filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court referred these motions to a magistrate. The magistrate held a non-evidentiary hearing, and the Village defendants waived all of their arguments regarding the motion to dismiss, other than the argument that appellant did not have standing to challenge the ordinances.

{¶ 5} Upon the suggestion of the Village of Harrisburg, after the hearing, the trial court converted the motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment “on the issue of whether the property owned by Plaintiff is adjacent to or across the street from the rezoned property in the Village of Harrisburg at issue in this case. Specifically, the issue is whether there is a swath of land between the rezoned property and Route 62, across the street from the land owned by Plaintiff.” (June 9, 2014 Notice of Conversion of Motions.) The court permitted the parties to submit affidavits addressing this issue. In response, the Village defendants submitted the affidavit of the Harrisburg Mayor and a map of Taylor's property. The magistrate's decision, filed August 19, 2014, granted the motions for summary judgment in favor of Taylor and the Village defendants. Appellant requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and, on October 7, 2014, the magistrate denied the request because his August 19, 2014 decision already contained conclusions of law and the ruling on summary judgment merely determined whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Appellant filed objections, but the trial court overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate's decision on November 14, 2014. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:

1. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS BY ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION IN ITS ENTIRETY.

2. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S FIRST OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION THAT “THERE EXISTS JUSTICIABLE ISSUES OF FACT

THAT PRECLUDES THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT (sic) IN THE INSTANT CASE.”

3. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S SECOND OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION THAT “THE MAGISTRATE IN HIS RULING ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE DECISION OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT IN MOORE V. MIDDLETOWN THAT PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION CHALLENGING THE ZONING ENACTMENT OF AN ADJACENT FOREIGN MUNICIPALITY.”

4. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S THIRD OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION THAT “THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION IS PREJUDICIAL TO PLAINTIFF AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE MAGISTRATE FAILED TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND NARROWED THE ISSUE OF STANDING TO THE SINGULAR ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT A ‘SWATH’ EXISTS BETWEEN THE VILLAGE BOUNDARY AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFF.”

5. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S FOURTH OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION THAT “THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF BY GIVING INAPPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO THE ARGUMENTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DISCOUNTING EACH OF THE ARGUMENTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF THE PLAINTIFF.”

6. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S FIFTH OBJECTION THAT APPELLEE'S AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS FALSE AND/OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND SHOULD BE DISCOUNTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

7. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT OVERRULED APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS WITHOUT PROVIDING EXPLANATION OR REASONING AS TO HOW THAT DECISION WAS MADE BY THE COURT.

8. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT ADOPTED THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION WITHOUT PROVIDING EXPLANATION OR REASONING AS TO HOW THAT DECISION WAS MADE BY THE COURT.

9. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE PROVIDED BRIEFS AND AFFIDAVITS CONTAINING FALSE AND/OR MISLEADING INFORMATION TO THE COURT, BOTH BEFORE AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION.

10. TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT, THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT THAT THE MAGISTRATE MADE CONTRADICTIVE STATEMENTS IN THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION AND THE MAGISTRATE'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, RELATIVE TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING

BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE ON JUNE 6, 2014.

III. Standard of Review

{¶ 7} We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Capella III, LLC v. Wilcox, 190 Ohio App.3d 133, 2010-Ohio-4746, 940 N.E.2d 1026, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.)

, citing Andersen v. Highland House Co., 93 Ohio St.3d 547, 548, 757 N.E.2d 329 (2001). “De novo appellate review means that the court of appeals independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court's decision.” (Internal citations omitted.) Holt v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP–214, 2010-Ohio-6529, 2010 WL 5550693, ¶ 9. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” Capella III at ¶ 16, citing Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 6. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all doubts and construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Pilz v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP–240, 2004-Ohio-4040, 2004 WL 1728609, ¶ 8. See also

Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 482, 485, 696 N.E.2d 1044 (1998) (“Even the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the evidentiary materials, such as affidavits and depositions, must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”). Therefore, we undertake an independent review to determine whether Taylor and the Village defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Furthermore, for purposes of appellate review, a question involving standing is typically a question of law and, as such, it is to be reviewed de novo. LULAC v. Kasich, 10th Dist. No. 10AP–639, 2012-Ohio-947, 2012 WL 760800, ¶ 23, citing Ohio Concrete Constr. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 08AP–905, 2009-Ohio-2400, 2009 WL 1444118, ¶ 9.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Legal Arguments

{¶ 8} For ease of discussion, we are combining related issues in appellant's assignments of error. By her first four assignments of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment.

{¶ 9} Appellant's property is across Route 62 from Taylor's property. However, a strip of Taylor's property, which borders and runs along Route 62, was not annexed into the Village of Harrisburg. This strip of Taylor's property is located between the rezoned part of Taylor's property and appellant's property. Taking into consideration this strip of land, the magistrate found that “Plaintiff is a non-resident of the municipality who does not own property adjacent to, or directly across the street from, the municipality. Accordingly, under Moore [v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977

], Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the Village's zoning decision.” (Aug. 19, 2014 Magistrate's Decision.) Throughout the decision, the magistrate used the terms “adjoining,” “directly across the street,” and “adjacent to” interchangeably. The trial court overruled appellant's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision in its entirety.

{¶ 10} The Village defendants argue that summary...