Wilkinson v. State

• Citation: 743 N.E.2d 1267
• Decision Date: 15 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 29A02-0004-CR-228.,29A02-0004-CR-228.
• Parties: James Michael WILKINSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

743 N.E.2d 1267

James Michael WILKINSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 29A02-0004-CR-228.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 15, 2001.

Andrew M. Barker, Noblesville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

MATTINGLY, Judge.

James Michael Wilkinson appeals his conviction after a jury trial of driving while suspended for life as an habitual traffic violator. He raises four issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence obtained pursuant to a police officer's random computer check of the license plate numbers of cars parked at a convenience store;

2. Whether the prosecutor improperly prejudiced the jury by listing in opening argument the prior convictions necessary to support a lifetime license suspension;

3. Whether Wilkinson was properly notified that his driving privileges had been suspended for life; and

4. Whether Wilkinson's trial counsel was ineffective for failing object to certain evidence or to renew certain objections.

We affirm.¹

FACTS

A Fishers police officer saw Wilkinson's truck pull into a convenience store parking lot late one afternoon. The officer testified that he had an in-car computer that could run checks of license plate numbers, driver's license numbers, vehicle identification numbers, and other information. The officer typically ran license plate numbers at random throughout his shift. He had no particular reason to run the check of Wilkinson's license plate. The officer testified it was a standard procedure of the Fishers Police Department to run license plate checks at random.

The computer check revealed the truck was registered to Wilkinson and that Wilkinson was an habitual traffic violator (HTV). It also provided a physical description of Wilkinson. Wilkinson left the store, entered the truck, and drove away. The officer, after noting the driver fit Wilkinson's description, stopped Wilkinson and arrested him. The officer did not see Wilkinson commit a traffic violation.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

1. Random License Plate Checks

Wilkinson argues evidence obtained as a result of the police officer's random checks of license plate numbers should have been suppressed because it resulted from a random search carried out without any reasonable and articulable suspicion that Wilkinson might have violated the law. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and on review we will disturb a trial court's ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Sparkman v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we do not reweigh the evidence, but determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), reh'g denied. We look to the totality of the circumstances and consider all uncontroverted evidence together with conflicting evidence that supports the trial court's decision. Id. Where the basis for the ruling on a motion to suppress is unclear, we will uphold the trial court if a reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's decision. Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind.1998). We will affirm the judgment of the trial court if it is sustainable on any legal grounds apparent in the record. Alford v. State, 699 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind.1998).

Wilkinson offers no authority in direct support of his position that the "search" in the form of the computer check of his license plate number was improper. Instead, he notes that the Indiana Constitution, in some circumstances, gives greater protections than does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because our courts employ a "reasonableness" analysis:

[T]his court enunciated a separate and distinct method of analysis for claims of search and seizure violations of the state constitution. Rather than employ federal concepts like the warrant requirement and probable cause requirement, we require instead that the State bear the burden of showing that, in the totality of the circumstances, the intrusion was reasonable.

Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999). Wilkinson asserts the computer search of license plate numbers violates that standard because it allows "police officers to pick the targets of their investigations on their own without regard to observed violations of the law.... This unbridled discretion allows officers to determine the course of their investigation on the appearance of a vehicle, the appearance of a driver, or the location of a vehicle, all without articulable or reasonable suspicion." (Br. of the Appellant at 8.) He asserts the procedure could therefore lead to pretextual stops.

We share Wilkinson's concern that this procedure could lead to pretextual stops, and we question whether random checks of license plates in convenience store parking lots represent an efficient use of the limited resources of law enforcement agencies. Regardless, we must decline to hold the random license plate check was a "search."

Neither party directs us to Indiana authority directly addressing a random computer check of license plate numbers. However, we have held, without explicitly addressing whether the random check was a search, that a traffic stop was justified by a computer check indicating the plate was not on the car to which it was registered. Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied 726 N.E.2d 303 (Ind.1999). The Smith decision did not indicate whether the officer had a reason for initiating the computer check, nor did it otherwise explain the circumstances surrounding the check. Instead, it addressed only the validity of the subsequent traffic stop:

Upon conducting a computer check, [the officer] had reasonable suspicion to believe that Smith's vehicle had a mismatched license plate, and as such, could be stolen or retagged. [The officer's] traffic stop was valid and comported with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 342.

Decisions from other states that have addressed this question appear to find consistently that a suspicionless check of license plate numbers is not an improper search. See, e.g., People v. Brand, 71 Ill.App.3d 698,

28 Ill.Dec. 83, 390 N.E.2d 65 (1979). Brand was driving twenty miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was forty-five. There was no posted minimum speed limit, and the officer did not see Brand committing a violation. The officer made a radio inquiry concerning the license plates and was told the plates were registered for a car the model year of which was unknown. The officer testified that was "unusual." Id.

71 Ill.App.3d 698, 28 Ill.Dec. 83, 390 N.E.2d at 66. The officer stopped Brand and found his license was suspended.

The court determined Brand was not subjected to an improper search:

A search connotes prying into hidden places to observe items which are concealed; there is no search attendant to viewing an object which is open to view. In the present case, all the police officer did was view the defendant's car license plate, which was in plain sight; he then checked the registration of the plates to determine if it was proper. Since it is unlawful to operate a vehicle on the roadway without proper registration, the officer's conduct was not inappropriate in this regard.

Id. 71 Ill.App.3d 698, 28 Ill.Dec. 83, 390 N.E.2d at 67 (citations omitted). While the license plate check was not improper, the court went on to find the police improperly stopped Brand because Brand's reduced rate of speed did not provide reasonable suspicion Brand was violating any law. In the case before us, by contrast, the check revealed a clear violation of law and gave rise to more than just a suspicion that something was "unusual."

Similarly, in State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 723 A.2d 35 (1998) the court determined a random computer check of the license plate numbers of passing cars was not a "search." The court reasoned that because license plate information was publicly displayed and a state statute authorized use of vehicular license information for law enforcement purposes, drivers' privacy rights were not implicated and no articulable suspicion of criminal conduct was required. There, as here, the police stopped the driver based on the physical description, received via computer check, of the registered owner of the car. The stop was held valid and did not constitute an unreasonable seizure because the officer reasonably believed there was a "general match" between the appearance of the driver and the description received via the computer check. Id. at 41, 723 A.2d 35.

Like the officer in Donis, the officer in the case before us had reasonable suspicion to stop Wilkinson by virtue of the evidence obtained through the computer check indicating Wilkinson was driving the car. The computer check returned a description of Wilkinson that the officer characterized as "a physical description of what's on your driver's license, such as height, weight, hair and eye color." (R. at 163.) The officer testified that he had a clear view of the person who drove the truck away from the convenience store and that the driver of the car "closely matched the height and weight and hair color."² Id. at 164. A stop is valid if there is an objectively justifiable reason for it, "whether or not the police officer would have otherwise made the stop but for ulterior suspicions or motives." Smith, 713 N.E.2d at 342. The officer had information to the effect that Wilkinson, the driver to whom the truck was registered, presently had a suspended license.

Our courts have generally found that when there is evidence a crime has taken place, police may stop an individual who fits the description of the violator. See, e.g., Samaniego v. State, 553 N.E.2d 120 (Ind.1...