Willey v. Talkington

Decision Date14 April 1958
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 46278,46278,2
Citation312 S.W.2d 77
PartiesW. R. WILLEY and Mary A. Willey, Appellants, v. Hayes A. TALKINGTON and Kitty M. Talkington, and R. E. Wolfe and Mrs. R. E. Wolfe, Respondents
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Wm. G. Zimmerman, Kansas City, for appellants.

David Waldman, Kansas City, for respondents.

BOHLING, Commissioner.

This is a suit by plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. W. R. Willey, for (Count I) the specific performance of an alleged oral contract to purchase certain described land in Jackson County, Missouri, or, in the alternative, for (Count II) $20,000 damages for the breach of said agreement. The suit is against Mr. and Mrs. Hayes A. Talkington, who were the owners of said land and with whom plaintiffs allege they contracted for its purchase, and Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Wolfe, whom plaintiffs allege purchased said land from defendants Talkington with full notice of the rights of the plaintiffs. Separate motions of defendants Talkington and defendants Wolfe to dismiss plaintiffs' petition on the ground the alleged agreement between plaintiffs and defendants Talkington violated the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, was sustained and judgment was entered dismissing plaintiffs' petition and taxing the costs against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment.

The defendants have adopted the 'Statement of the Facts' in plaintiffs' brief, directing attention, however, that said statement fails to mention Count II of the petition. We quote plaintiffs' statement of their case:

'The defendants Talkington were the owners of the property in question, approximately 108 acres on the South edge of Kansas City, in Jackson County, Missouri, and the plaintiffs Willey were in possession of said property under their lease agreement, and had been in possession under yearly oral leases since 1945. That beginning as of March 1, 1948, the plaintiffs Willey rented and occupied said property for 12 months, with the understanding that they would like to purchase the property, and the defendants Talkington agreed that, if they desired to sell or offered the property for sale, they would give the plaintiffs the first opportunity to purchase the property. That each March thereafter, the same agreement was entered into between the parties, and at the beginning of the yearly rental term in March, 1956, the plaintiffs Willey again told defendant owners that they would like to buy the property, and the defendants again agreed that, when they got ready to sell or offered the property for sale, they would give these plaintiffs the first opportunity to buy.

'That in January, 1957, the plaintiffs Willey were informed that Talkingtons were selling the property to the codefendants R. E. Wolfe and wife, and plaintiffs immediately went to Talkingtons and reminded them of their agreement and told Talkingtons that they wanted to buy the property, and offered to buy the same, for the price and under the same terms contracted with the codefendants Wolfe; but Talkingtons refused to sell to them, and on January 30, 1957, had notice served on the plaintiffs Willey to vacate the premises on or before March 1, 1957.

'Plaintiffs thereafter brought this suit to enforce their right to purchase the land under their pre-emption agreement and to have the property conveyed to them, either by the owners Talkington, or the codefendants Wolfe as Trustees for Talkingtons under their contract of purchase.'

Plaintiffs seek the specific performance of an oral covenant of an oral lease to give plaintiffs the first opportunity to purchase the land should defendants Talkington decide to sell. This has been considered a right of pre-emption. Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76, 81.

The alleged agreement is within the Statute of Frauds (Sec. 432.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) prohibiting the maintenance of actions for the sale of land unless the agreement be in writing. The statute, however, does not bar relief in equity where the agreement is oral if the suit falls within certain well established rules, which are stated in Walker v. Bohannan, 243 Mo. 119, 136, 147 S.W. 1024, 1028, and so far as material here read:

'The rules cover many phases; i. e., (1) the alleged oral contract must be clear, explicit, and definite; (2) it must be proven as pleaded; (3) such contract cannot be established by conversations either too ancient on the one hand, or too loose or casual upon the other; * * * (6) and the work constituting performance must be such as is referable solely to the contract sought to be enforced and not such as might be reasonably referable to some other and different contract * * *.'

Forrister v. Sullivan, 231 Mo. 345, 373, 132 S.W. 722, 730, stated specific performance of a parol contract to make a deed conveying real estate 'will not be enforced in specie except on certain high and stringent conditions--each a sine qua non,' and expressed rule '(6)' of Walker v. Bohannan, supra, thus: '(e) Performance must be shown as far as practicable. It must be unequivocal. The acts relied on to show performance must in their nature be referable alone to the very contract sought to be performed; for it is only thereby, because of the benefits arising to the promisee, that his conscience and that of those claiming under him is bound, in a word, the acts relied on to show performance must point unerringly to the contract in suit and to none other. There must be an absence of doubt or equivocation throughout the whole case in pleadings and proof. * * *'

We have stated there should be no further encroachments upon the statute than the rules already establish. Forrister...

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9 cases
  • Zink v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Min. Co., 8210
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 8, 1964
    ...502; State ex rel. Hoyt v. Shain, 338 Mo. 1208, 93 S.W.2d 992; Warren v. A. B. Mayer Mfg. Co., 161 Mo. 112, 61 S.W. 644.8 Willey v. Talkington, Mo., 312 S.W.2d 77; Meegan v. Illinois Surety Co., 195 Mo.App. 423, 193 S.W. 899; Dimick v. Snyder, Mo.App., 34 S.W.2d 1004, 1007; see Jones v. Lin......
  • Forbis v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 1974
    ...this court of appellate jurisdiction the constitutional question must be real and substantial and not merely colorable. Willey v. Talkington, 312 S.W.2d 77 (Mo.1958); Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc., 263 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.1954), transferred, 241 Mo.App. 1029, 271 S.W.2d 71 (1954); Young ......
  • Watkins v. Watkins
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1965
    ...231 Mo. 345, 132 S.W. 722, 730-731; Russell v. Sharp, 192 Mo. 270, 91 S.W. 134; Roberts v. Clevenger, Mo., 225 S.W.2d 728; Willey v. Talkington, Mo., 312 S.W.2d 77, 79; Steere v. Palmer, 359 Mo. 664, 223 S.W.2d 391, 393[2, 3]; Burt v. McKibbin, Mo., 188 S.W. 187, 191; McFall v. Hampe, Mo.Ap......
  • Watkins v. Wattle
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 5, 1977
    ...also: Brooks v. Cooksey, 427 S.W.2d 498, 504(10) (Mo.1968); Jones v. Linder, 247 S.W.2d 817, 819(3-6) (Mo.1952); Willey v. Talkington, 312 S.W.2d 77, 79, 80(12) (Mo.1958); Pointer v. Ward, 429 S.W.2d 269, 272(2, 3) (Mo.1968); Emery v. Brown Shoe Co., 287 S.W.2d 761(2, 3) It follows that § 4......
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