Williams v. Anderson, 90-2487

• Decision Date: 09 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-2487,90-2487
• Citation: 959 F.2d 1411
• Parties: 3 NDLR P 15 James E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy ANDERSON and S.D. Parwatikar, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1411

959 F.2d 1411

3 NDLR P 15

James E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy ANDERSON and S.D. Parwatikar, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-2487.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 20, 1991.

Decided April 9, 1992.

Stephen C. Mudge, Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, Edwardsville, Ill., Curtis L. Blood, argued, Collinsville, Ill., for James E. Williams.

Karen Michels Caille, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alison E. O'Hara, argued, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Div., Chicago, Ill., for Nancy Anderson and S.D. Parwatikar.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, and FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

While in custody at the Menard Correctional Center in Illinois, James Williams was given an injection of Haldol, an antipsychotic drug, against his will. ¹ Mr. Williams brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. S.D. Parwatikar, the staff psychiatrist who prescribed the drug, and Nancy Anderson, the staff nurse who

                administered it, for alleged violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.   The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.   For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part
                

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

James Williams was placed in the psychiatric unit at Menard Correctional Center on August 5, 1985. On August 7, Mr. Williams was examined by Dr. S.D. Parwatikar, a staff psychiatrist. In his post-examination order, Dr. Parwatikar prescribed an intra-muscular administration of ten milligrams (10 mg) of Haldol to Mr. Williams, "PRN if Pt gets violent." ² In the affidavits submitted in connection with the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dr. Parwatikar asserts that he wrote this order "with due consideration of plaintiff's mental condition and history of violent behavior," "as a means of treating violent outbursts." R.61, R.39.

On the morning of August 12, two correctional officers came to Mr. Williams' cell to take him to the shower. What happened next is in dispute. As noted below, in reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Accordingly, the following version is drawn, unless otherwise noted, from Mr. Williams' description of the events in his deposition. R.61 at 6-8. We acknowledge that the defendants dispute several of Mr. Williams' allegations.

Mr. Williams was standing in his cell, dressed in pants and a shirt, when the officers arrived and told him they were to escort him to the shower. The officers asked Mr. Williams, "What are you doing dressed?" The officers told Mr. Williams that he should remove all of his clothes except his underwear. Mr. Williams responded that nobody told him he would be escorted to a shower or that he was supposed to be ready and waiting in his underwear. One officer then said to the other, "He does not want a shower." The officers then left. As they walked away, Mr. Williams called to them to come back, saying in a defensive manner, "I didn't tell you I didn't want a shower. Why did you lie like that?" One officer returned and said, "Well, okay, go ahead and get ready for shower. We will come back and get you." A few minutes later, both officers returned. One officer said to Mr. Williams, "You think you're tough, don't you?" Mr. Williams responded, "I don't think I am tough." The officer then said, "I am going to see how tough you are when I let you out." Mr. Williams responded, "Man, well, man, I fought bigger people than you." The officer opened the cell and Mr. Williams stepped out. Holding handcuffs in his hands, the officer shoved Mr. Williams against the wall. Mr. Williams grabbed the handcuffs and pulled them away from the officer. The officer pushed Mr. Williams back into his cell and shut the door. Mr. Williams asked the officer to bring his supervisor and said, "I am not giving you these cuffs until he comes." The officers left and returned with a corrections sergeant, who simply said, "Give me the handcuffs." Mr. Williams gave the handcuffs to the sergeant, who then walked away with the two officers.

All parties agree that the two officers reported to Nurse Anderson that Mr. Williams had become violent. According to Nurse Anderson, the officers told her that Mr. Williams had attacked one of them. Nurse Anderson returned with the officers to Mr. Williams' cell and told Mr. Williams, "I am going to give you a shot." Mr. Williams resisted and told Nurse Anderson, "I can't take those shots ... I am allergic to Thorazine." Mr. Williams said this not knowing what type of drug Nurse Anderson intended to give him, but remembering that he had had a severe allergic reaction to forced injections of Thorazine when he was previously in custody. One of the officers told Mr. Williams that if he did not stick his arm out of the cell, "we

                are coming in there."   While Mr. Williams was leaning against the bars, one of the officers reached through the bars, grabbed Mr. Williams' hand, and pulled his arm through the bars.   Mr. Williams struggled momentarily to free his arm, but when he saw Nurse Anderson ready with the shot, he submitted.   In her notes on the event, Nurse Anderson wrote that she administered the drug "with force."   R.23 Ex.  A.  Mr. Williams had an allergic reaction to the injection, including tachycardia and loss of control of his neck muscles
                

B. District Court Proceedings

On September 20, 1988, Mr. Williams filed suit against Nurse Anderson and Dr. Parwatikar, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties consented to trial by a Magistrate Judge. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. On June 16, 1989, and March 30, 1990, the court held hearings on the cross-motions for summary judgment. On May 31, 1990, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. R.68, R.69. On June 29, 1990, Mr. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal.

II ANALYSIS

In the "Request For Relief" section of his pro se complaint, Mr. Williams asked the district court to

[d]eclare that the acts and omissions of the defendants violate plaintiffs' [sic] rights, privileges and immunities secured by the United States Constitution Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; Award compensatory damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00; Order defendants to pay the costs of this suit and reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiff; Grant such other relief as this court deems just and proper.

R.1 at 6. With respect to Mr. Williams' claim for damages, Nurse Anderson and Dr. Parwatikar raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). They contend that their actions did not violate any constitutional right that was "clearly established" at the time of the incident. ³ Although the district court ruled in favor of the defendants for different reasons, we find that this "threshold immunity question" is dispositive of the damages claim and limit our review of this claim to this question. Siegert v. Gilley, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). We then address the rest of Mr. Williams' requested relief.

A. Applicable Standards

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 925 F.2d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.1991). Our task is to determine whether the record reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "A motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate occasion for weighing the evidence; rather, the inquiry is limited to determining if there is a genuine issue for trial." Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir.1990); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We " 'must view the record and all inference drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.' " Lohorn, 913 F.2d at 331 (quoting Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1989)).

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for damages when their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Knowledge of a general right is not sufficient to invoke liability; "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). This test "focuses on the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation." Zook v. Brown, 748 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.1984).

B. Request for Damages

The incident that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred in August 1985. Thus, in assessing the qualified immunity claims, our concern is whether statutes or caselaw existed in August 1985 to establish clearly that a state prisoner held in a psychiatric unit had a right under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment against forced administration of an antipsychotic drug without procedural review of the prescription or personal observation by a medical professional of the immediate need for the drug.

We begin with the relevant Supreme Court caselaw in 1985. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for analyzing prison medical treatment under the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that "deliberate...