Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 33607-3-II.,33607-3-II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Terry L. WILLIAMS and Janis E. Williams, husband and wife, Respondents, v. ATHLETIC FIELD, INC., a Washington corporation, Appellant. |
Kirk Richard Wines, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Klaus Otto Snyder, Snyder Law Firm LLC, Sumner, WA, for Respondents.
¶ 1 Athletic Field, Inc., appeals a trial court order releasing its mechanics' lien as frivolous and awarding attorney fees and costs to the property owners, Terry and Janis Williams. The trial court found the lien invalid because a lien filing service employee signed the notice of lien's attestation clause. Athletic argues that the trial court erred in construing the statute as requiring that either the claimant or the claimant's attorney sign the attestation clause. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The Williamses are the owners and developers of a parcel of land in Sumner. Their development project required site preparation work estimated to cost $419,925, followed by construction of a commercial warehouse. In spring 2004, they verbally contracted with Athletic Field, Inc., to complete either some portion or all of the site preparation work (the parties dispute the scope of the agreement). They later made three payments to Athletic totaling approximately $155,000 for work completed. But they were dissatisfied with the pace of Athletic's performance. In October 2004, Athletic's owner, Craig Starren, asked the Williamses to sign a written contract. Instead, the Williamses ordered Athletic to discontinue work and vacate the site.
¶ 3 The parties dispute the amount of site preparation work that Athletic completed. Athletic claims it finished 90 percent of the total work, plus additional work not included in the initial plan. The Williamses claim that Athletic did less than one-third of the planned work and was overpaid by tens of thousands of dollars for the work it did perform.
¶ 4 On December 6, 2004, Athletic filed a lien against the Williamses' property for $276,825 or roughly the difference between the payment it had already received and the estimated value of the entire site preparation, plus additional work Athletic claims it performed at the Williamses' request. The notice of claim of lien included an attestation clause signed by Rebecca Southern, an employee of LienData USA, Inc., a lien filing service. The clause identifies Athletic as the claimant and LienData as the agent for claimant. The attestation clause reads:
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE
¶ 5 The Williamses moved for an order to show cause why relief should not be granted under RCW 60.04.081, the frivolous lien statute. They claimed that the lien was invalid because neither Athletic nor its attorney signed the attestation clause. They further noted the absence of a written contract and stated that they had paid Athletic for all the work it performed and, in fact, had overpaid Athletic.
¶ 6 In support of their show cause motion, the Williamses filed declarations by Terry Williams and Norman Hubbard, an Athletic employee who acted as the site project manager. Hubbard stated that he was a general contractor on the project, that he brought Athletic in to perform only a portion of the work, that his own company performed a substantial portion of the work, and that the Williamses paid Athletic all amounts due.
¶ 7 In opposing the motion, Athletic contested the Williamses' interpretation of the statute, arguing that, according to RCW 60.04.081, any authorized agent may sign the attestation clause. Athletic argued that the lien's validity could not be resolved in the context of a show cause proceeding because it involved disputed factual issues about the amount of work performed and monies due that required a trial on the merits.
¶ 8 In support of its opposition, Athletic filed Starren's declaration stating that his verbal agreement with the Williamses was for performing the entire site preparation work and that Athletic had completed 90 percent of the work. Starren also stated that Hubbard was his full-time employee, not a general contractor, and that any work he performed is attributable to Athletic because Athletic provided all the labor, services, and equipment. He also stated that he performed additional work at the Williamses' request worth $50,000.
¶ 9 In reply, the Williamses submitted additional declarations by Hubbard and Terry Williams rebutting Athletic's allegations. Williams stated that the additional work allegedly worth $50,000 was a fill project costing far less and that he actually did Athletic a favor by permitting it to use the site as a dumping ground for the "dirty dirt"1 it accumulated at other projects. Hubbard again asserted that his own company performed most of the work.
¶ 10 After hearing argument on the motion, a pro tempore superior court commissioner entered an order releasing the lien and awarding attorney fees and costs to the Williamses for an amount to be determined at a motion for revision hearing held by a superior court judge. The order states that the lien did not comply with RCW 60.04.091 because it "was not signed, under penalty of perjury, by the Claimant (or an officer of the Claimant corporation) or by an attorney for the Claimant." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 136. The order further states that the Williamses met their initial burden to show that the lien was frivolous and without reasonable cause and that Athletic failed to present a prima facie case to the contrary, but the commissioner provided no explanation for this determination.2
¶ 11 In its motion for revision by the superior court, Athletic filed several declarations rebutting the Williamses' assertions made in reply to the motion. The court granted the Williamses' motion to strike Athletic's additional pleadings and denied Athletic's motion to revise the commissioner's ruling. The court entered an order awarding the Williamses approximately $10,000 in attorney fees and costs. Athletic appeals.
¶ 12 We first address whether the notice of claim of lien recorded here complied with the statutory requirements. Athletic contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that RCW 60.04.091 requires either the claimant or the claimant's attorney sign the attestation clause and that no other authorized agent may do so.
¶ 13 We review statutory construction issues de novo. LRS Elec. Controls, Inc. v. Hamre Constr. Inc., 153 Wash.2d 731, 738, 107 P.3d 721 (2005). We give effect to the plain meaning of a statute as an expression of legislative intent. State v. Thompson, 151 Wash.2d 793, 801, 92 P.3d 228 (2004).
¶ 14 We strictly construe lien statutes because they are in derogation of the common law. Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wash.2d 215, 219-20, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972). A lien claimant must clearly demonstrate satisfaction of all the statutory lien claim requirements. Dean, 81 Wash.2d at 220, 500 P.2d 1244.
¶ 15 Under RCW 60.04.091, a lien claimant must file a notice of claim of lien within 90 days after the claimant ceased to supply services or materials to a subject property. Subsection (1) sets forth the required content of the lien claim. Subsection (2) provides that the lien claim must be notarized and RCW 60.04.091 (emphasis added).
¶ 16 A sample attestation clause follows, stating in part:
I am the claimant (or attorney of the claimant, or administrator, representative, or agent of the trustees of an employee benefit plan) above named; I have read or heard the foregoing claim, read and know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true and correct and that the claim of lien is not frivolous and is made with reasonable cause, and is not clearly excessive under penalty of perjury.
RCW 60.04.091(2) (emphasis added).
¶ 17 Athletic argues that the attestation clause for a lien claim may be signed by any authorized agent of the claimant, not just the claimant or the claimant's attorney. The Williamses respond that the sample attestation clause narrows the range of persons "authorized to act on his or her behalf" to the claimant, a responsible corporate officer, or the claimant's attorney.
¶ 18 A lien claim is invalid if it does not substantially comply with RCW 60.04.091. See Lumberman's of Wash., Inc. v. Barnhardt, 89 Wash.App. 283, 289, 949 P.2d 382 (1997). In 1991, the legislature amended the statute to require that a claimant attest to the lien's validity under penalty of perjury. Lumberman's, 89 Wash.App. at 287-88, 949 P.2d 382. In the absence of evidence that the claimant (or someone authorized to act on the claimant's behalf) attested to its validity, a lien claim does not substantially comply with RCW 60.04.091. See Flag Constr. Co. v. Olympic Boulevard Partners, 109 Wash.App. 286, 290, 34 P.3d 1250 (2001).
¶ 19 It is clear under our case law that a lien claim is invalid absent evidence that the claimant attested to its validity. See Lumberman's, Inc., 89 Wash.App. 283, 949 P.2d 382 (); Flag Constr., 109 Wash.App. 286, 34 P.3d 1250 (); compare with Fircrest Supply, Inc. v. Plummer, 30 Wash.App. 384, 634 P.2d 891 (1981) (...
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