Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1908
• Citation: 48 So. 209,56 Fla. 735
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

48 So. 209

56 Fla. 735

WILLIAMS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

December 8, 1908

Headnotes Filed Jan. 29, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; Minor S. Jones, Judge.

Action by H. S. Williams against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Before liability in damages for a negligent act or omission can arise, it is necessary that a causal relation, such as the law recognizes as being sufficient, should exist between the damage complained of and the act alleged to have occasioned the damage. If such a relation does not exist, the damage is said to be remote, and cannot be recovered. If such a relation does exist, then the damage is said to be a proximate result of the wrongful act to which it is attributed, and, conversely, the wrongful act is said to be the proximate cause of the damage.

Only such damages may be recovered as were contemplated or might reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties to the contract of carriage. If the owner of the goods would charge the carrier with any special damages he must have communicated to the carrier all the facts and circumstances of the case which do not ordinarily attend the carriage or the peculiar character and value of the property carried, for otherwise such peculiar circumstances cannot be contemplated by the carrier.

In an action against a railroad company for damages caused by the failure of the company to deliver within a reasonable time orange boxes intrusted to the defendant to transport for hire, the plaintiff cannot recover the loss and damage in the enforced idleness of persons employed to pack and ship his oranges on his orange groves, where the defendant was not informed that men had been employed to pick the oranges, or the time within which the oranges were to be picked, and the contract of carriage did not fix any specific time for the transportation and delivery of the boxes.

In an action against a railroad company for damages caused by its failure to transport and deliver orange boxes within a reasonable time, the allegations of the declaration 'that by reason of the premises the plaintiff incurred loss and damage in being unable to pack and ship part of his oranges for the Christmas market,' are not stated with such certainty as to show the liability of the defendant therefor.

The freezing of plaintiff's oranges on the trees is not so direct, natural, and proximate a result of the failure of a railroad company to deliver to the plaintiff within a reasonable time orange boxes intrusted to the defendant company to transport for hire as to make such company liable therefor by reason of such delay, where the contract of carriage did not fix any specific time for the transportation and delivery of the boxes, and the defendant company was not informed that the plaintiff would leave the oranges on the trees, exposed to the dangers of the cold, until the boxes were delivered.

Allegations in the declaration of the plaintiff's loss or damage may not be so wholly irrelevant as to be amenable to a motion to strike, and yet subject to compulsory amendment under the statute.

When the allegations of the declaration show the legal right of the plaintiff has been invaded, he may recover at least nominal damages, and a demurrer thereto should be overruled.

'Proximate cause' is that which naturally leads to or produces or contributes directly to produce a result such as might be expected by any reasonable and prudent man as likely to directly and naturally follow or flow out of the performance or nonperformance of an act.

COUNSEL

Hudson & Boggs and L. C. Massey, for plaintiff in error.

Sparkman & Carter, for defendant in error. The plaintiff in error, on the 19th day of October, 1906, filed in the circuit court for Orange county a declaration against the defendant in error; the first count thereof being as follows:

'For that the plaintiff on or about December 7, 1904, purchased from the Oxford Crate Company, doing business at Crystal River in the state of Florida, one car load of orange boxes, to wit, 2,500 boxes, to be shipped forthwith, and on or about the 7th day of December, 1904, the said Oxford Crate Company delivered the said goods to the defendant who was then and there a common carrier of goods for hire at Crystal River aforesaid, a station on the defendant's railway, for transportation and delivery to the plaintiff at Rock Ledge, state aforesaid, a station on the railway line of the Florida East Coast Railway Company; and the defendant then and there agreed and undertook to transport the said goods from Crystal River aforesaid to Rock Ledge aforesaid, and to deliver them to the plaintiff at Rock Ledge aforesaid within a reasonable time, for reward to the defendant in that behalf; yet the defendant failed to deliver the said goods within a reasonable time, and carelessly and negligently did not deliver them to the plaintiff until the expiration of a long and unreasonable time, a period of at least 30 days, when the usual and reasonable time for said transportation was 5 days, and by reason of the premises the plaintiff incurred loss and damage in the enforced idleness of persons employed to pack and ship his oranges on his orange groves at Rock Ledge aforesaid, and also in being unable to pack and ship part of his oranges for the Christmas market, and also in the freezing of a large part of his orange crop, to wit, 1,200 boxes of oranges which were frozen on the trees, to wit, on January 24, 1905, and which would have been packed and shipped but for the negligence of the defendant aforesaid. And that plaintiff says that he used all due diligence to secure the orange boxes, but without avail, and that the defendant well knew the purpose, namely, the packing and shipping of the oranges then on the trees in the plaintiff's groves, for which said orange boxes were to be used, and well knew the danger in which plaintiff's oranges were from cold, and the necessity of guarding them against such danger by packing and shipping them without delay.'

The second count differs from the first in alleging the negligence of the defendant to consist in unreasonable delay in delivering the said goods to the connecting carrier. The plaintiff claimed $5,000 damages.

The defendant demurred to each count in the declaration, and stated the substantial matters of law to be argued as follows:

(1) That neither count in said declaration states any cause of action.

(2) That said declaration in each count thereof is vague and uncertain.

(3) That the damage claimed by said plaintiff, if any, was caused by an act of God, and not by the negligence of the defendant.

(4) Because said declaration does not show in either count that the defendant was informed of any immediate necessity for moving said orange crates, nor had it agreed to carry the same within any specified time.

Afterwards the defendant filed a statement of additional substantial matters of law to be argued, as follows:

(1) Because neither the said declaration now neither count thereof states a cause of action against said defendant.

(2) Neither count of said declaration charges sufficient facts to bring home to the defendant the probability of a freeze destroying the orange crop.

(3) Neither count in said declaration charges sufficient facts brought home to the notice of the defendant to make it liable for any damage suffered by the plaintiff on account of the idleness of his employés, or any loss on account of the oranges not reaching the Christmas market.

The defendant filed, also, the following motion to strike certain portions of counts in the declaration:

'Now comes the defendant in the aboveentitled cause and moves the court to strike out from the first count in the declaration filed in said cause the following language, to wit: 'And by reason of the premises the plaintiff incurred loss and damage in the enforced idleness of persons employed by him to pack and ship his oranges on his orange grove at Rock Ledge aforesaid.' 'And also in being unable to pack and ship part of his oranges for the Christmas market.' For the reason that said allegations are immaterial and irrelevant and not the natural result of the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant.

'Second. Because said declaration does not show that the defendant was informed of the employment of the persons to pick said oranges, nor that the plaintiff intended said oranges for the Christmas market.

'And the defendant also moves the court to strike out from said declaration in the first count thereof the following language: 'And also in the freezing of a large part of his crop, to wit, 1,200 boxes of oranges which were frozen on the trees on the 24th day of January, 1905, and which would have been picked and packed and shipped but for the negligence of the defendant aforesaid.' Because the freezing of said oranges was not the proximate result of defendant's negligence and was not caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant at all, but by an act of God.

'And the defendant also moves the court to strike out from the second count of said declaration the following language, to wit: 'And by reason of the premises the plaintiff incurred loss and damage in the enforced idleness of persons employed to pack and ship his oranges on his grove at Rock Ledge aforesaid, and also in being unable to pack and ship part of his oranges for the Christmas market.' For the reason that it is not shown in said declaration that the defendant was informed either of the employment of persons to pick said oranges or of the plaitniff's intent to ship said oranges for...