Williams v. Baird
| Citation | 735 N.W.2d 383,273 Neb. 977 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. S-06-889.,S-06-889. |
| Parties | Clyde A. WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. Sheila BAIRD, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Vicki L. Adams, Lincoln, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Clyde A. Williams brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Sheila Baird, a DHHS employee. Baird motioned for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity from suit, but the district court denied Baird's motion. She appealed. The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed her appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.1 We granted Baird's petition for further review to address whether the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is final for the purpose of immediate appellate review.
Baird has been employed as a caseworker for DHHS since 1991. In February 2004, Baird was assigned to investigate claims of physical neglect of Williams' three stepdaughters, ages 11, 8, and 6, by their natural mother, Janette Williams, and also physical abuse of those children by their stepfather, Williams. The allegations arose from reports from a teacher at the children's school. On March 2, Baird first interviewed the children, then met with Janette. A deputy with the Howard County sheriff's office was present during these interviews. After interviewing Janette, Baird and the deputy interviewed Williams. During that interview, Williams was defensive and asked whether he needed an attorney.
Based upon statements made by Janette and the children, as well as Williams' defensive attitude during his interview, Baird removed the children from the home shared by Janette and Williams. At that time, Williams was also placed under arrest. The reasons for Williams' arrest are not entirely clear from the record; however, during his deposition, Williams testified that he thought he was arrested for viewing pornography on the Internet and for showing the children pornography on the Internet. Williams was released the following day, and no charges were filed against him in connection with the allegations of abuse. However, the safety plan entered into by Janette and Baird required that in order for the children to be returned to Janette, Williams had to move out of the family home. In accordance with this plan, Janette obtained a protection order against Williams.
Though Janette later retracted her statements, in the affidavit to obtain the protection order, she stated that she did not want Williams to have contact with the children due to several recent "red flags," including allegations that Williams had yelled at the children and spanked the children. Janette also noted that the children had admitted to DHHS they were afraid of Williams and that there was evidence that Williams had been viewing pornography on the family computer. Finally, Janette indicated in the affidavit that she suspected sexual abuse of both the 11-year-old and 6-year-old, though she does not explicitly accuse Williams of that abuse. Approximately 2 months after the issuance of the protection order, Janette had the order withdrawn. Williams returned to the home in late April 2004.
Williams then brought this action against DHHS and Baird under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Williams generally alleged violations of his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 3 and 5, of the Nebraska Constitution. Williams also alleged he was denied the quiet use and enjoyment of his home, property, and effects without due process of law under both the U.S. and the Nebraska Constitutions. In their answers, DHHS and Baird asserted several affirmative defenses, including a claim that Baird was entitled to qualified immunity.
Eventually, Williams voluntarily dismissed his action against DHHS, leaving the action pending against Baird. Baird filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Baird's claim of qualified immunity, noting that there were genuine issues of material facts, "including whether any reasonable person could believe in good faith that there was probable cause to arrest [Williams] or on an objective basis, whether officers of reasonable competence could disagree whether or not probable cause existed to arrest [Williams]." Baird appealed. The Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal on its own motion, concluding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment was not a final order.2 We granted Baird's petition for further review.
Baird assigns that the district court erred in (1) implicitly finding that Williams had a clearly established right to be free from illegal seizures within the context of this case, (2) finding there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there was probable cause to arrest Williams, and (3) failing to find that Williams failed to establish a violation of the right to familial integrity.
As an initial matter, this court is presented with the question of whether this case presents a final, appealable order under our final order jurisprudence or, alternatively, is reviewable under our collateral order doctrine.
A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.3
Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.4 For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.5
An order is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered.6 We note that the order denying Baird's motion for summary judgment did not determine the action or prevent a judgment, as the denial allowed Williams' action against Baird to proceed. In addition, the order was not made on summary application in an action after judgment was rendered. The initial question presented in this case is whether the district court's order was made during a special proceeding.
A special proceeding includes every special statutory remedy which is not in itself an action.7 A judgment rendered by the district court that is merely a step or proceeding within the overall action is not a special proceeding.8 Generally, a "special proceeding" entails civil statutory remedies not encompassed in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.9 Examples of special proceedings include juvenile court proceedings,10 probate actions,11 and workers' compensation cases.12
In Baird's petition for further review, she contends first that the nature of her qualified immunity means that "the use of the motion for summary judgment for asserting qualified immunity essentially initiates a `special proceeding' in the federal courts."13 Baird also contends this court has previously held in Currie v. Chief School Bus Serv.14 that the summary judgment process can be a special proceeding.
In Currie, this court noted that "the fact that the summary judgment process is encompassed in chapter 25 . . . does not preclude this court from finding the summary judgment process to be a special proceeding."15 However, we later distinguished Currie and concluded that situations involving partial motions for summary judgment were not special proceedings.16
It has been the repeated conclusion of this court that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order for purposes of § 25-1902.17 Moreover, in considering the summary judgment process in light of the definition of a special proceeding, it becomes obvious that a summary judgment proceeding is not itself an action, but, rather, is merely a step in the overall action. As such, a summary judgment proceeding is not a special proceeding.
As the district court's order was not made in a special proceeding, we are not presented with a final order under § 25-1902.
Generally, in the absence of a final order from which an appeal may be taken, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.18 However, we must determine whether the collateral order doctrine might operate to vest this court with the jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
This court most recently explained the collateral order doctrine in Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. Perry.19 In that case, we noted that this court had previously adopted the collateral order doctrine,20 an exception to the final order rule which was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.21 We noted with approval the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine and held that for an order to fall within the doctrine, it must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.22
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically concluded that under the...
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...but Plaintiffs have not alleged that McCann had the authority to effect an arrest or the resulting confinement. Williams v. Baird, 273 Neb. 977, 988, 735 N.W.2d 383 (Neb.2007) (father failed to state § 1983 claim against Department of Health and Human Services caseworker where father allege......
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...Neb. 676, 772 N.W.2d 872 (2009). 40See Webb, supra note 7. 41See Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch., supra note 30. Compare Williams v. Baird, 273 Neb. 977, 735 N.W.2d 383 (2007). 42See, e.g., In re Estate of Rose, 273 Neb. 490, 730 N.W.2d 391 (2007). 43Wells, supra note 22, 363 Md. at 249, 768 A.......
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