Williams v. Chick-Fil-a, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. A05A0105.,A05A0105.
• Citation: 617 S.E.2d 153,274 Ga. App. 169
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. CHICK-FIL-A, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

274 Ga. App. 169

617 S.E.2d 153

WILLIAMS et al. v. CHICK-FIL-A, INC. et al.

No. A05A0105.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 6, 2005.

James M. Thompson, Larry I. Smith, Thompson & Smith, Augusta, for appellants.

Hunton & Williams, Ashley F. Cummings, Matthew J. Calvert, Atlanta, Hicks, Casey & Barber, William T. Casey, Jr., Marietta, for appellees.

ELLINGTON, Judge.

William J. Williams appeals from the Fulton County State Court's grant of summary judgment to Chick-fil-A, Inc. (hereinafter, "the corporation") in this wrongful death action. The cause of action arose from a collision between a car driven by Sheneta Garnett and a truck owned by the corporation and driven by Chick-fil-A restaurant operator Michael Matthew Brown. Williams brought the suit in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Sheneta Garnett and as guardian ad litem for Garnett's minor child. Williams contends the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that there was no agency relationship between the corporation and Brown at the time of the collision and, therefore, the corporation was not entitled to summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

On motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the opposing party is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. The movant has this burden even as to issues upon which the opposing party would have the trial burden.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Buchanan v. Canada Dry Corp., 138 Ga.App. 588, 590, 226 S.E.2d 613 (1976). Our review of the trial court's order is de novo. Schlotzsky's v. Hyde, 245 Ga.App. 888, 538 S.E.2d 561 (2000).

So viewed, the evidence showed that, in June 1996, Brown signed an "Independent Contractor's Agreement" to sublease and operate a Chick-fil-A fast food restaurant in Hiram, Georgia. Brown successfully operated the restaurant and, in February 1999, the corporation recognized Brown for outstanding financial performance during 1998. Through its "Symbol of Success" program, the corporation rewarded Brown by presenting him with the use of a 1999 Ford F-250 truck for one year, with the possibility that Brown could keep the truck longer if his sales remained high. The truck's doors were painted with signs promoting Chick-fil-A restaurants, and these signs were intended to benefit both the corporation and Brown's restaurant. The corporation owned and held title to the truck, paid for some operating costs, and provided insurance coverage for the truck during the first year. The corporation, however, did not retain the right to restrict or otherwise control Brown's operation of the truck.

On December 21, 1999, Brown was driving the truck home from a friend's house when he ran a stop sign and collided with a car driven by Garnett. Garnett died as a result of the collision, and the administrator of her estate filed a wrongful death suit against Brown. The estate also sued the corporation,¹ alleging that it was vicariously liable for Brown's negligence. After conducting a hearing on the corporation's motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion, finding as a matter of law that there was no joint venture, employee/employer relationship, or agency relationship between Brown and the corporation as to the operation of the restaurant or the truck.

On appeal, Williams contends that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that no joint venture or agency relationship existed between Brown and the corporation at the time of the collision. A joint venture arises "where two or more parties combine their property or labor, or both, in a joint undertaking for profit, with rights of mutual control (provided the arrangement does not establish a partnership), so as to render all joint venturers liable for the negligence of the other." (Citation omitted.) Kissun v. Humana, 267 Ga. 419, 420, 479 S.E.2d 751 (1997). The right to exercise mutual control is a crucial part of a joint venture. See Rossi v. Oxley, 269 Ga. 82, 83(1), (2), 495 S.E.2d 39 (1998) (holding that there was no joint venture as a matter of law between physicians who agreed to be "on-call" for one another at a hospital in the absence of evidence that the physicians controlled each other's professional judgment in the treatment of patients). For a joint venture to exist, "[t]here must be not only a joint interest in the purpose of the enterprise . . . but also an equal right, express or implied, to direct and control the conduct of one another in the activity causing the injury (in this case the operation of the automobile)." (Citations omitted.) Cullen v. Timm, 184 Ga.App. 80, 82(1), 360 S.E.2d 745 (1987). "The general principles of agency law apply where defendants are joint venturers." (Citations omitted.) Kissun v. Humana, 267 Ga. at 420, 479 S.E.2d 751.

Generally, when a plaintiff has sued a business for injuries resulting from a third party's negligence, Georgia's courts have held that the business is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when there is no evidence that the business exercised control over the tortfeasor or his employer.² Our courts have also held that the business is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when there is no evidence that the tortfeasor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the negligence.³ Absent such evidence, the fact that the business might have received some incidental advertising benefit from signs on a vehicle negligently driven by the tortfeasor would not authorize a jury to find the business liable for the driver's negligence. ⁴

In this case, the evidence showed that Brown operated the Chick-fil-A restaurant as an independent contractor, and there was no evidence to show that the corporation had the authority to control the operation of either the restaurant or the truck. Further, the undisputed evidence showed that, at the time of Brown's collision with Garnett, Brown was operating the truck on a purely personal mission. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err in...