Mullinax v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: A19A1900,A19A1899,A19A1901
• Citation: 354 Ga.App. 186,840 S.E.2d 666
• Parties: MULLINAX et al v. PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION. Mullinax et al v. Rising, Inc. Mullinax et al v. Hall.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

354 Ga.App. 186

840 S.E.2d 666

MULLINAX et al

v.PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION.

Mullinax et al

v.Rising, Inc.

Mullinax et al

v.Hall.

A19A1899

A19A1900

A19A1901

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 9, 2020

Anna Green Cross, Peter Andrew Law, Darren Summerville, Elizabeth Anne Rose Rose, Atlanta, Maxwell Kent Thelen, for Appellant.

Jason Digges Darneille, John Timothy Wooten, Atlanta, for Appellee in A19A1899.

Jacob Edward Daly, Atlanta, for Appellee in A19A1900.

Derek Anthony Mendicino, Conyers, for Appellee in A19A1901.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

James Mullinax, a truck driver, was killed after he was run over by a forklift on a farm while chickens were being caught and loaded for transport to a processing facility. The decedent’s wife filed suit against Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, the chicken manufacturing company; Rising, Inc., the company that contracted with Pilgrim’s to catch and load the chickens for transport; and Garren Benton Hall, the owner of the farm on which the accident occurred. Mullinax appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Pilgrim’s, Rising, and Hall. We determine that (1) the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Pilgrim’s because Pilgrim’s was the decedent’s statutory employer and was therefore immune from tort liability; (2) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Rising because a jury could conclude that Rising was negligent in leaving the forklift running, constituting at least one proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries; and (3) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Hall because a fact issue exists regarding whether Hall, as the premises owner, breached his duty of care to the decedent. Therefore, in Case No. A19A1899, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Pilgrim’s, but in Case Nos. A19A1900 and A19A1901, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Rising and Hall, respectively.

"Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." (Citation omitted.) Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Atkins , 310 Ga. App. 423, 713 S.E.2d 483 (2011).

As part of its operation to grow and process chickens for sale, Pilgrim’s contracts with various entities and persons to perform some of the necessary work. At the time of the accident, Pilgrim’s contracted with Garren Benton Hall to raise Pilgrim’s birds on his farm. Pilgrim’s also contracted with Rising, to catch the chickens at designated farms and load them into cages. Finally, Pilgrim’s contracted with Mountain Milk Hauling, Inc. to transport the grown birds from farms to a designated location.

The decedent was a truck driver who worked for Mountain Milk. On an early morning in September 2015, while it was still dark, the decedent was at Hall’s farm during a chicken catch. One of Rising’s forklift operators, Alejandro Camacho, was also working on the farm during the chicken catch. Camacho started a forklift and then went to use the bathroom, leaving the key in the ignition. A Mountain Milk employee, Thomas Sewell, who had been standing and talking with the decedent, observed the parked forklift and decided to use it to remove cages from the chicken house and load them onto the decedent’s truck. Initially, while Sewell was loading the truck, he was able to see the decedent standing beside the truck. Eventually, however, while he reversed the forklift from the chicken house, he ran over the decedent. Sewell was not authorized to use the forklift and had been disciplined prior to the incident for operating the forklift without authorization.

A Workers’ Compensation claim was filed against the decedent’s employer, Mountain Milk, on the decedent’s behalf. Mullinax, individually and in her capacities as the decedent’s surviving spouse and the administratrix of the decedent’s estate, also filed these tort actions against Pilgrim’s, Rising, and Hall, asserting numerous allegations of negligence. All three defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Pilgrim’s contended that it was the decedent’s statutory employer, and thus any claims against Pilgrim’s Pride were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Rising argued that it did not owe the decedent an y legal duty of care, including any duty to prevent unauthorized and untrained persons from operating a forklift. Hall claimed that, although he owned the farm, he was only responsible for growing the chickens, he relinquished control of the area during the catch, and he had no responsibilities or duties regarding the chicken catch process.

After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pilgrim’s, Rising, and Hall. First, the trial court determined that Pilgrim’s was the decedent’s statutory employer and that Mullinax’s claims against the company were therefore barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act ( OCGA §§ 34-9-8, 34-9-11 (a) ). Second, with regard to Rising, the trial court determined that (1) there was no genuine factual dispute as to Rising’s inspection of the forklift or its failure to remove unsafe equipment from service; (2) Rising had no duty to control Sewell, the Mountain Milk employee who operated the forklift; and (3) there was no genuine fact issue regarding a causal connection between Camacho’s abandonment of the forklift and the decedent’s damages. Finally, as against Hall, the trial court ruled that Hall was justified in assuming that the decedent would realize the risk involved in traversing the unlit premises and that the decedent had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury. Mullinax appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to all three defendants.

Case No. A19A1899

1. In the first case, Mullinax argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Pilgrim’s on the basis that Pilgrim’s was the decedent’s statutory employer under OCGA § 34-9-8 and that it was therefore immune from tort liability. Mullinax contends that (1) there is a fact issue regarding whether Pilgrim’s exercised control over the farm; and (2) the statute does not apply to Pilgrim’s because it is the owner of the enterprise. Regardless of whether Pilgrim’s Pride exercised control over the farm, however, we determine that Pilgrim’s was the decedent’s statutory employer because (1) Pilgrim’s was a principal contractor; and (2) the injury occurred on or in the premises where Pilgrim’s had undertaken to execute work. Therefore, Mullinax’s claims against Pilgrim’s are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

a. Exclusive remedy and statutory employer provisions.

The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act reads as follows:

The rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude and be in place of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his or her personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, and all other civil liabilities whatsoever at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death[.]

OCGA § 34-9-11 (a). "Therefore, where the Act applies, it provides the employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer and precludes recovery on a tort claim by an injured employee against his employer." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Teasley v. Freeman , 305 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1), 699 S.E.2d 39 (2010). Relatedly, "[t]he statutory employer provision of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, OCGA § 34-9-8, makes principal or intermediate contractors secondarily liable for workers’ compensation benefits for injured employees of a subcontractor." (Citation omitted.) Carr v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. , 317 Ga. App. 733, 734 (2), 733 S.E.2d 1 (2012). "Thus, so long as [Pilgrim’s] was [the decedent’s] statutory employer, it would enjoy immunity from a tort claim." (Citation omitted.) Maguire v. Dominion Dev. Corp. , 241 Ga. App. 715, 717, 527 S.E.2d 575 (1999). Although this tort immunity is an affirmative defense, Zaldivar v. Prickett , 297 Ga. 589, 604 (2), 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015), "[w]hen the facts concerning an affirmative defense are uncontradicted, the matter may be disposed of by summary judgment[.]" (Citation omitted.) Keene v. Herstam , 225 Ga. App. 115, 116 (1), 483 S.E.2d 335 (1997).

b. Pilgrim’s Pride was the decedent’s statutory employer

First, Pilgrim’s was a principal contractor under OCGA § 34-9-8 (a). "[A] ‘principal contractor’ engages subcontractors to assist in the performance of the work or the completion of the project which the ‘principal contractor’ has undertaken to perform for another." (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Yoho v. Ringier of America, Inc. , 263 Ga. 338, 342, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).¹ Therefore, OCGA § 34-9-8 (a) extends "to those who contract to perform certain work, such as the furnishing of goods and services, for another , and then sublet in whole or part such work." (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 339, 434 S.E.2d 57.

Without dispute, the evidence demonstrates that Pilgrim’s contractually retained Mountain Milk to haul chickens in order to fulfill its own contracts with its customers. In other words, "[Pilgrim’s] entered into its contract with [Mountain Milk] in specific furtherance of the contract obligations it anticipated owing to its customers, and [Mountain Milk] assumed responsibilities to [Pilgrim’s] specifically tied to those anticipated obligations." Carr , supra, 317 Ga. App. at at 739 (3) (b), 733 S.E.2d 1. See Patterson v. Bristol Timber Co. , 286 Ga. App. 423, 430 (3), 649 S.E.2d 795 (2007) (appellee was a principal contractor because it had entered into a contract to supply wood chips to a packaging company, and, in order to effectuate that contract, it executed a contract with the plaintiff’s employer to load and transport the...