Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2013
• Docket Number: E055755.
• Citation: 218 Cal.App.4th 73
• Parties: LORING WINN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

218 Cal.App.4th 73

LORING WINN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. E055755.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two.

July 23, 2013.

Loring Winn Williams, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Peter J. Brown and Judith S. Islas for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RICHLI, J. —

Plaintiff and Appellant Loring Winn Williams lost a FEHA (California Fair Employment and Housing Act; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) case in which he sued defendant and respondent Chino Valley Independent Fire District (the District) for employment discrimination (Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. v. Superior Court (Feb. 23 2011, E052123) [nonpub. opn.]). The trial court then granted Williams's motions to tax costs in part and entered an order granting the District costs of $5,368.88. Williams appeals from the order, contending that no costs should have been allowed. The order is appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).

I ISSUE

The issue presented is whether the District, as the prevailing party, must show that Williams's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless in order to recover costs in an action for employment discrimination under FEHA.¹

II PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 25, 2008, Williams filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief for employment discrimination and for a petition for writ of mandate. His third amended complaint was filed on November 17, 2009.

On October 13, 2010, the court partially granted Williams's motion for summary adjudication and denied the District's motion for summary judgment.

The District then filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate in this court. We granted the petition, and Williams's petition for review by our Supreme Court was denied on June 8, 2011.

The trial court followed the writ of mandate by vacating its earlier orders and granting the District's motion for summary judgment. The ensuing judgment awarded the District costs to be determined.

The District then filed its memorandum of costs on appeal, and Williams filed a motion to tax costs. The District also filed a memorandum of costs summary, and Williams filed a second motion to tax costs. Williams argued that no costs should be awarded because his disability discrimination claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

On November 9, 2011, the motions were heard. The first motion was granted in part. The second motion was granted in part and denied in part. After a review of applicable authorities, the trial court rejected Williams's contention that no costs were allowable. Costs totaling $5,368.88 were awarded to the District.

III WILLIAMS'S ARGUMENT

On appeal, Williams renews his argument that no costs should have been awarded because his discrimination claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Williams's argument is based on Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 [54 L.Ed.2d 648, 98 S.Ct. 694] (Christiansburg), as applied in Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383 (Cummings). In Christiansburg, our California Supreme Court interpreted section 706(k) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. No. 88-352 (July 2, 1964) 78 Stat. 241). The section currently provides: "In any action or proceeding under this title [42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person." (42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(k), italics added.)

Specifically, the Supreme Court focused on the question of when attorney fees should be awarded when the defendant is the prevailing party in a title VII action. (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 414.) The court found that different policy considerations and standards apply when attorney fees are requested by a prevailing plaintiff than when attorney fees are requested by a prevailing defendant. (Id. at pp. 417-421.)

The Supreme Court articulated the following standard: "In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 421.)

In Cummings, Division Seven of the Second Appellate District reversed a trial court award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing defendant in an age discrimination case. (Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1383.) The court said: "Attorney fees are allowable as costs to a prevailing party when authorized by statute. [Citations.] Government Code section 12965 authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action brought under [FEHA]. That section provides in pertinent part: [¶] `In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs except where such action is filed by a public agency or a public official, acting in an official capacity.'[²] [¶] The language, purpose and intent of California and federal antidiscrimination acts are virtually identical. Thus, in interpreting FEHA, California courts have adopted the methods and principles developed by federal courts in employment discrimination claims arising under title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 United States Code section 2000e et seq., and under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 United States Code section 621 et seq. [Citations.] A trial court's award of attorney fees and costs under this section is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.]" (Cummings, at pp. 1386-1387.)

Following Christiansburg, the court found that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. It therefore found that the trial court abused its discretion and reversed the award of "costs and fees" to the prevailing defendant. (Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.)

Williams therefore contends that the same standard should apply here, at least in disability discrimination cases. He cites several federal cases in which the courts have applied Christiansburg in FEHA and ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) cases.

In Brown v. Lucky Stores (9th Cir. 2001) 246 F.3d 1182 (Brown), the court considered a claim for dismissal for alcoholism under ADA and FEHA. The court found no ADA or FEHA violation. (Brown, at pp. 1187, fn. 1, 1189.) Regarding costs, the court held that the attorney fee provision of ADA, 42 United States Code section 12205, is governed by Christiansburg. (Brown, at p. 1190.) It concluded: "Because [section] 12205 makes fees and costs parallel, we hold that the Christiansburg test also applies to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA. [Citations.]"³ (Brown, at p. 1190.)

Williams also cites Estate of Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 1042 (Martin). The court cited Brown and noted that "the ADA makes fees and costs parallel and [we] held that, as a result, the Christiansburg standard does apply to costs under the ADA. [Citation.]" (Martin, at p. 1052.) However, because of statutory differences between the cost provisions of ADA and title VII, the court held that the Christiansburg standard does not apply to awards of costs under the Rehabilitation Act. (Martin, at p. 1052.)

Of significance here, the court found that, considering statutory similarities, it was appropriate to use the title VII precedents to apply to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). (Martin, supra, 560 F.3d at p. 1052.) The court stated that the rehabilitation act "text makes an attorney fee award discretionary; if given, it may be made a part of the costs. The text does not suggest that `the costs' are similarly discretionary, but rather that they are a given, to which fees may attach. Accordingly, the wording of the statute supports an inference that the general provision in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — that costs are allowed in the ordinary course to the prevailing party — applies. Rule 54(d)(1) `creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party.' [Citation.]" (560 F.3d at p. 1053.) The case is therefore not helpful to Williams's argument.

IV THE DISTRICT'S ARGUMENT

In response, the District contends that Christiansburg is inapplicable and that it is entitled to recover its "ordinary costs" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b). That subdivision states: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding."

The District relies on Perez v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 671 (Perez); Knight v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 121 (Knight); and Baker v. Mulholland Security & Patrol, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 776 (Baker).

In Perez, a nurse at a correctional facility sued the County of Santa Clara for racial discrimination and retaliation under FEHA. (Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 673.) After she lost the suit, the county filed a cost bill, which did not include attorney fees. (Id. at p. 679.) The trial court applied Christiansburg and denied the request.

The Sixth District reversed the trial court and remanded for a cost determination. (Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 673.) In discussing Cummings, the court first addressed the statutes and concluded that Government Code section 12965 did not state an exception to the general rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b) quoted above. (Perez, at p. 679.)

Perez agreed with Cummings that ...