Williams v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 17 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. S005008,S005008
• Citation: 763 P.2d 480,47 Cal.3d 195,252 Cal.Rptr. 817
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 763 P.2d 480 John D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 817

252 Cal.Rptr. 817

47 Cal.3d 195, 763 P.2d 480

John D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S005008.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Nov. 17, 1988.

[763 P.2d 481] James K. Hahn, City Atty., Frederick N. Merkin, Asst. City Atty., Dorothy Berry and Arthur B. Walsh, Deputy City Attys., for defendants and appellants

Mary Ann Healy, Michael P. Stone, and Stone & Healy, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

Cecil Marr, Diane Marchant, Marr & Marchant, Los Angeles, Richard A. Shinee, Helen L. Schwab, Green & Shinee, Encino, Stephen H. Silver, Susan Silver, Silver, Kreisler, Goldwasser & Shaeffer, Santa Monica, and Lawrence J. Friedman, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

ARGUELLES, Justice.

In Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329 (hereafter Lybarger ), we annulled an administrative decision discharging a police officer for insubordination when he refused to answer questions during an internal police department investigation of misconduct. We based our ruling on the fact that the officer had not been properly advised of his rights in accordance with the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (the act) (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.). ¹ We now consider whether that officer's partner, who also was not properly advised of his rights but who chose to answer the questions put to him and was discharged on the basis of the information he provided, is similarly entitled to reinstatement and whether his statements should be excluded from any further administrative disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal so held, reasoning that the trial court had not abused its discretion in fashioning that remedy to redress the instant violation of the act and to deter future violations. We disagree, and reverse. Although we acknowledge the importance of the rights conferred by the act and the need to secure compliance with those provisions, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling the officer's reinstatement, for in the circumstances of this case, the officer was not prejudiced by the failure to advise him properly

and reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy for the wrong.

FACTS

Officer John Williams was a member of the 77th Street Vice Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department, and a partner of Officer Michael Lybarger. In March 1980, as part of an internal investigation into the unit's manner of making arrests for bookmaking, Williams was interrogated by the department's internal affairs division, as were Officer Lybarger and other members of the unit. Officer Lybarger refused to answer any questions and was discharged for insubordination. Williams, however, cooperated with the investigators and answered the questions put to him.

The investigation ultimately revealed that the officers typically arranged their arrests in advance with bookmakers, who cooperated with the officers in return for a promise of immunity from arrest for a subsequent period. In brief, the officers would advise a bookie when they needed to make an arrest at his location. A time for the arrest would be set, and the bookie would arrange--through payment or deceit--for someone with no prior bookmaking arrests to be present at the prearranged time. The person arrested, having a clean record, would not be punished as heavily as the actual bookmaker would have been, and the officers would agree to allow the bookie to operate unmolested for a few months. No monetary or other reward was given to the officers, but they were able by this scheme to maintain a high rate of arrests despite the precautions bookmakers normally take, as the bookie would also cooperate in preserving incriminating evidence.

In the fall of 1980, Williams was temporarily relieved of duty pending a hearing before a disciplinary board. He was found guilty on 27 charges of misconduct, including the improper arrest and imprisonment of 13 individuals, and was dismissed from the police force effective November 3, 1980.

Following his discharge, Williams filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court seeking his reinstatement on the grounds that he was not timely given a "letter of transmittal" concerning the charges against him (see Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774) and that the evidence presented to the disciplinary board was insufficient. In 1986, following our decision in Lybarger, supra, 40 Cal.3d 822, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329, he amended his petition to state as a further ground the failure of the internal affairs investigators to advise him of his rights under the act, as specified in that decision.

The superior court granted the petition and ordered Williams reinstated. While it permitted further disciplinary action to be taken against him, it directed that the statements he made to the investigators in 1980 be excluded from such proceedings as a remedy for the violation of the act and as a means of deterring future violations. The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we granted review to determine the propriety of these remedies for the deprivation of the statutory rights conferred on Williams by the act.

DISCUSSION

The issues in this case arise entirely from the manner in which the internal affairs investigators conducted the interrogation of Williams, prior to and without the benefit of our decision in Lybarger, supra, 40 Cal.3d 822, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329, in which we addressed two separate, but interrelated, points. The second is the more germane to our inquiry here, but the first also bears on our task.

We first held that there was neither a constitutional nor a statutory bar to the imposition of administrative sanctions on a police officer for refusing to answer questions posed in an internal investigation. "As a matter of constitutional law, it is well established that a public employee has no absolute right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions posed by his employer. Instead, his self-incrimination rights are deemed adequately protected by precluding any use of his statements We determined, however, that the officer must be advised of the qualified nature of his right to remain silent before administrative sanctions, such as dismissal for insubordination, could be invoked. Section 3303, subdivision (g) provides: "If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately informed of his constitutional rights." We determined that, in the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, the officer's "constitutional rights" consisted of the basic Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), as modified by the principles of Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, 414 U.S. at pp. 77-79, 94 S.Ct. at pp. 322-323, and Garrity v. New Jersey, supra, 385 U.S. at p. 500, 87 S.Ct. at p. 620. "In other words, [Officer Lybarger] should have been told, among other things, that although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. [Citations.]" (Lybarger, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 829, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329.) ³

at a subsequent criminal proceeding. (See Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973) 414 U.S. 70, 77-79 [94 S.Ct. 316, 322-323, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281, 283]; Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) 385 U.S. [47 Cal.3d 200] 493, 500 [87 S.Ct. 616, 620, 17 L.Ed.2d 562, 567].) [p] Similarly, [Officer Lybarger] had no statutory right to remain silent. Section 3303, subdivision (e), expressly provides that an officer who refuses to respond to questions or submit to interrogation is subject to punitive action by his employer." (Lybarger, supra, 40 [763 P.2d 483] Cal.3d at p. 827, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329.) ²

We noted that Officer Lybarger was properly informed of the consequences of remaining silent, but was not told that any statements he made could not be used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings, and we found the omission critical. "[H]ad [he] understood that his statements during the administrative interview could not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, he might well have elected to cooperate rather than remain silent." (Lybarger, at pp. 829-830, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329.) That is, had he been fully advised of his rights, he might have chosen to answer the investigators' questions; in that he chose not to speak, it was possible to entertain the belief that had he spoken he might have exonerated himself or otherwise explained his conduct in a way that would have led to a decision not to dismiss him from the police force.

The same cannot be said of Williams. It is uncontested that his rights were violated; like Officer Lybarger, Williams was warned only that a refusal to answer the investigators' questions would subject him to discipline and lead to his dismissal and "was never told of the extent of the protection afforded to any statements he might make." (Id. at p. 829, 221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329.) But unlike Officer Lybarger, who remained silent and was discharged for insubordination, Williams answered the investigators' questions and admitted his role in the staged arrests. And because of the nature of the flaw in the warnings Williams was given, he could not have been prejudiced by the failure to advise What then is the consequence of this? The Court of Appeal properly recognized that reinstatement was not necessary to make Williams whole, at least in the customary sense, for the violation of his rights. We would also note that reinstatement was not necessary to further...