Williams v. City of Allentown

• Decision Date: 18 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 98-1573.,CIV. A. 98-1573.
• Citation: 25 F.Supp.2d 599
• Parties: Anthony M. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALLENTOWN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

25 F.Supp.2d 599

Anthony M. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALLENTOWN, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 98-1573.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

November 18, 1998.

Anthony M. Williams, Camphill, PA, pro se.

Charles J. Fonzone, Allentown, PA, for City of Allentown.

Leighton Cohen, County of Lehigh, Dept. of Law, Renee L. Cohn, Deputy County Solicitor, Allentown, PA, for Sheriff Rossi, Rick Griffith, Scott Moyer, Nick Hromiak, Jennifer Pastorius, David Carr.

Leighton Cohen, County of Lehigh, Dept. of Law, Allentown, PA, for Bill Williams.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

KATZ, District Judge.

On March 26, 1998, Plaintiff Anthony Williams filed a complaint against fourteen defendants alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ One of these defendants, the City of Allentown, was subsequently dismissed from the suit with prejudice. See Order of May 23, 1998. The remaining defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata as well as by other substantive considerations.

Factual Background

The basis for Mr. Williams' present action is an incident that occurred on October 9, 1996. On that date, according to the complaint,² Mr. Williams was brought in handcuffs and shackles to the courthouse by the Lehigh County Sheriff's Department for a court hearing. Following the hearing, the plaintiff was taken to the courthouse holding facility. Mr. Williams' complaint then states that while he was still shackled, the officers who took him into the holding pen severely beat him with their boots and closed fists. He further alleges that the officers forced his left eye open and sprayed mace into his eyes, nose, and mouth. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-4. As a result of this beating, the plaintiff claims numerous physical injuries, including partial blindness, a fractured nose, lacerations, back pain, limited leg movement, black-outs, and emotional trauma. See id. ¶¶ 5-6.

In addition to the beating itself, Mr. Williams alleges misconduct at the disciplinary hearing following the October 9 incident. See id. ¶¶ 12-14. Mr. Williams now claims that the officer's report regarding the incident was false and that the hearing board conspired with the allegedly wrongdoing officers to violate his rights. See id.³

The primary difficulty with Mr. Williams' complaint in this case is that another case alleging the same facts was dismissed by this court on a motion for summary judgment on May 8, 1997. In that case (docket number 96-6627), which was amended numerous times, Mr. Williams alleged numerous incidents in which his rights were violated. One of those incidents was the same event at issue in the present case. In his 1996 case, Mr. Williams stated that on October 9, 1996, he went to the courthouse for a preliminary hearing regarding an incident that was also at issue in that case. See No. 96-6627, Second Amended Compl. ¶ 1.⁴ He stated that he was placed in the holding pen following the hearing, and that, without provocation, he was beaten with closed fists and kicked while he was handcuffed.⁵ Mr. Williams said that his left eye was forced open and that mace or pepper spray was sprayed in his eyes, nose, and mouth while the officers repeatedly called him a "snitch." Id. ¶ 7. This earlier complaint also described the allegedly negligent treatment of his injuries by the prison hospital staff. See id. ¶¶ 11-18, 24.

The earlier complaints do not seem to include specific allegations regarding the subsequent misconduct hearing, although Mr. Williams does repeatedly accuse defendant McFadden of violating his rights in other misconduct hearings. See, e.g. No. 96-6627, First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 3-5. While the matter is not entirely clear, the court assumes that the allegations of the present complaint are new in this respect.

All aspects of the 1996 case were dismissed by this court on April 8, 1997, upon defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Williams v. Sweeney, No. 96-6627, 1997 WL 177800 (E.D.Pa. Apr.8, 1997). The court did not discuss the October 9 incident in detail when granting summary judgment. However, based upon discovery as well as upon a report presented by the prison pursuant to court order, the court determined that Mr. Williams "attacked the Sheriff's Deputies who were returning him to the LCP from the courthouse where he was attending a court hearing on October 9, 1996" and that he "instigated" this altercation and "suffered no serious injury." See Williams, 1997 WL 177800, *1; see also Ex D. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (report describing October 9, 1996, incident).⁶ The court also rejected Mr. Williams' allegations of physical injury based upon medical reports submitted in discovery. See Williams, 1997 WL 177800, at *3-4. That decision was summarily upheld by the Third Circuit. See 141 F.3d 1156 (3d Cir. 1998).

Mr. Williams is now apparently attempting to litigate each individual incident that was previously alleged to be part of a continuing series of abuses. This court has already dismissed one such attempt primarily on the grounds of res judicata. See Williams v. Lehigh County Dep't of Corrections, No. 98-1879, 1998 WL 634893 (E.D.Pa. Sept.15, 1998). Because there are no meaningful differences in the claims in the 1996 and present cases, the same result is necessary in this case.

Discussion⁷

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, "prohibits reexamination not only of matters actually decided in the prior case, but also those that the parties might have, but did not assert in that action." Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1993). For a party to invoke res judicata in defense of an action against it, that party must show that there has been "(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action." United States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.1984); see also Board of Trustees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir.1992) (same). "All facts, allegations, and legal theories which support a particular claim, as well as all possible remedies and defenses, must be presented in one action or are lost." 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 131.01(3d ed. 1998). Mr. Williams' present action meets each of the three aspects of the test, and his suit is accordingly barred.

First, Mr. Williams' previous claim was subject to a final adjudication on the merits. "It is well established that a grant of summary judgment is a final adjudication." Greenberg v. Potomac Health Systems, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 328, 330 (E.D.Pa.1994); see also Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 463 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (E.D.Pa.1979); Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir.1973). As noted in the factual description, it is true that Mr. Williams' 1996 case before this court included allegations of many other incidents besides that of October 9, 1996. However, the October 9, 1996, incident was clearly considered and incorporated into the court's decision to grant summary judgment in that case. The minimal new details in the present action are insufficient to create a new cause of action.

Second, there is again identity of parties sufficient to bar relitigation of the plaintiff's claim. "For claim preclusion to apply, there must either be privity or an otherwise `close or particular relationship' between the parties." Greenberg, 869 F.Supp. at 330, quoting Avins v. Moll, 610 F.Supp. 308, 316 (E.D.Pa.1984). A plaintiff may not bring a cause of action, lose, and then bring essentially the same cause of action against identical or closely related parties without encountering res judicata. See Avins, 610 F.Supp. at 316; Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir.1950).

Each of the parties named in the present case are either identical to or in privity with those named in the previous case. Sergeant McFadden was sued in his individual and official capacities in the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint based on the October 9, 1996 incident. See No. 96-6627, First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants Griffith, Moyer, Hromiak, Pastorius, Carr, Andrews, and Maley were also sued in their individual and official capacities in that same amended complaint for their actions regarding October 9, 1996, see id. ¶ 13, as was the Sheriff's Department. See id. ¶ 14; see also No. 96-6627, Fourth Amended Compl. ¶ 8 (stating correct name of Lehigh County Sheriff Department). Deputy Sheriff Bill Williams was added to the 1996 suit in his official and individual capacity in the plaintiff's "amended complaint" that was filed on February 22, 1996. See No. 96-6627, Amended Compl. of February 22, 1997 ¶ 3-5 (Docket No. 57). Timothy Laws was sued in his official and individual capacity as "John Doe" in plaintiff's original complaint in the first case and was specifically named in the amended complaint of February 15, 1997. See No. 96-6627, Fourth Amended Compl. ¶ 11. The Sheriff of Lehigh County was sued in the Fourth Amended Complaint as an official policymaker in his individual and official capacity. See id. ¶ 7.⁸ Finally, Lehigh County itself was also sued in the 1996 case. See No. 96-6627, Amended Compl. of February 22, 1997 ¶ 10.

The only individuals named in the present suit who were not named specifically in the first action were Lehigh County employees Captain James Bloom and Sergeant Robin Watson. According to Mr. Williams' complaint in this case, Captain Bloom and Sergeant Watson (along with Lieutenant McFadden) conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights by, respectively, drafting a report accusing Mr. Williams of misconduct, approving the report, and conducting a hearing finding Mr. Williams guilty of misconduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. However, as noted in the court's order of September 15, 1998, "government officials sued in their official capacities for actions taken in the course of their duties are considered in privity with the...