Williams v. City of Knoxville

• Citation: 24 McCanless 257,220 Tenn. 257,416 S.W.2d 758
• Parties: , 220 Tenn. 257 John H. WILLIAMS v. CITY OF KNOXVILLE.
• Decision Date: 06 June 1967
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 758

416 S.W.2d 758

24 McCanless 257, 220 Tenn. 257

John H. WILLIAMS v. CITY OF KNOXVILLE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 6, 1967.

Frank L. Flynn, Jr., Knoxville, for appellant.

Robert Crossley, Knoxville, for appellee.

OPINION

BURNETT, Chief Justice.

The appellant, John H. Williams, filed a bill in the Chancery Court seeking to recover from the City of Knoxville the sum of $1,992.78, which he alleges was deducted from his salary as a City Police Officer for the City of Knoxville from the time he became employed in December, 1955, until his voluntary resignation from the City Police Department on October 7, 1965.

In his bill appellant quoted Sections 120 and 127 of the City Charter. Section 120 is, as follows:

'There shall be created by the legislative body of the City of Knoxville a fund to be known as 'The Firemen and Policemen Pension Fund.' All members of the two uniformed departments known as the fire and police departments, and all firemen and policemen who are members of said uniformed departments and who may be detailed to special duty from out of said departments of said city, who desire to take advantage of the pension benefits contained in this act, shall, on their first city payday after said fund is created, and all said members on every following said payday thereafter, pay into the office of the director of finance of said city five per cent (5%) of their monthly salary, so long as they are members of said departments, which amount may be deducted from the salaries each payday and be credited to 'The Firemen and Policemen Fund' by the director of finance. Any member of the fire department or police department who shall fail to agree to said deduction for said purpose shall not be entitled to receive a pension, or any other sum provided for by this act.'

Section 127 of the Charter provides, as follows:

'Any member of the fire and police departments of the City of Knoxville who shall resign or be discharged from the service of either of said departments of said city, shall relinquish all right or claim to the firemen and policemen pension fund.'

To the bill, wherein the above was alleged and the sum above mentioned was sought, the City demurred on the ground that the provisions of the Charter of the City of Knoxville, as quoted in the original bill, show upon their face that the appellant voluntarily relinquished all right to a claim against the City by his resignation. This demurrer was sustained and the present appeal followed.

It is the theory of the appellant, very ably made in his brief, that, since participation in the Pension Fund was not mandatory when he elected to participate in said fund, he entered into a contractual relationship with the City of Knoxville, the terms of which consisted of Sections 119 through 128 of the City Charter, two of these Sections are quoted above. Thus it is, he contends that where a public employee voluntarily participates in a statutory pension system, such as the one in Knoxville, and contributes on a voluntary basis, then when he voluntarily quits his place and the relationship between the parties is no longer in existence he is entitled to the return of the sum he has voluntarily paid into this pension fund.

Appellant further insists that Section 127 of the City Charter is in the nature of a forfeiture statute which should be construed strictly against the City. Counsel very aptly and correctly details the fact that it is a general principle of constitutional construction of statutes that any provisions which relate to forfeitures must be strictly construed against the person enacting the statute and in favor of the one who is made to comply with it. In other words, it is his theory under this provision that to get the benefits of the pension system he voluntarily consented to allow five per cent of his salary to be taken out each payday, but in doing so he was forced to agree to the provisions of Section 127 of the Charter, above quoted, to the effect that if he voluntarily quit he would relinquish all his rights to any sums which he had paid in.

Of course, it has long been the law of this State and in all other jurisdictions, as far as we know, that forfeitures are not favored and when a statute does provide for a forfeiture such statutes are to be strictly construed. These principles are well stated by authorities cited in appellant's brief such as May Co. v. Anderson, 156 Tenn. 216, 300 S.W. 12; 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 4, subsec. b, p. 8; 23 Am.Jur., p. 601, sec. 5, and other authorities which well support this argument.

Counsel for the appellant is frank enough to quote from McQuillen on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 12.146, at pages 619, 620, and 621, as follows:

'Contributions made by an employee to a pension fund are not the property of the contributor or of his estate, and, as a general rule, are not recoverable either by the employee, or by his dependents, especially where the contributor has been discharged for cause. Some courts, however, permit a recovery of contributions made by an employee, and provision therefor may be made by statute or other governing law, provided the law operates prospectively. It is apparent that recovery may be had of decuctions which were made from an employee's salary without authority, and recovery has been allowed where the contributor, without fault on his part, was denied participation in the pension fund. Accumulative leave has been held not subject to payroll deductions for the benefit of a pension system.'

In arriving at our conclusion, after reading this record and considering the matter, we have read a number...