Williams v. Coppola, 190286

• Decision Date: 10 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 190286,190286
• Citation: 549 A.2d 1092,41 Conn.Supp. 48
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Mildred WILLIAMS v. John COPPOLA.

Page 1092

549 A.2d 1092

41 Conn.Supp. 48

Mildred WILLIAMS v. John COPPOLA.

No. 190286.

Superior Court of Connecticut Judicial District of New Haven.

Dec. 10, 1986.

Pittman & Swaine, New Haven, for plaintiff.

Robert Avery, Hamden, and Cella & McKeon, North Haven, for defendant.

BERDON, Judge.

Before the court is the motion by the plaintiff, Mildred Williams, to set aside a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, John Coppola, for the reason that the defendant used his peremptory challenges in violation of the state and federal constitutions by striking from the jury panel every black person who was not excused for cause. This civil case was brought by the plaintiff, Mildred Williams, a black person, seeking damages against the defendant, John Coppola, a white person, for injuries she sustained as a result of an automobile accident. The plaintiff and the defendant were the operators of the automobiles involved in a collision which occurred on Dixwell Avenue, in Hamden on February 12, 1979. The defendant denied liability and filed a special defense alleging that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was the cause of the collision.

The plaintiff seeks to set aside the jury verdict and seeks a new trial under the provisions of the state constitution guaranteeing the rights to trial by a jury; art. I, § 19; and to equal protection; art. I, §§ 1 and 20; and under the federal constitutional right to equal protection, the fourteenth amendment. The court concludes that the plaintiff's state constitutional right to a trial by jury ¹ was violated because there was a substantial likelihood the defendant exercised his peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race. In view of this conclusion, the court will not review the plaintiff's remaining constitutional claims. It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff makes a strong showing that her state and federal equal protection rights have been violated. ² See Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F.Supp. 890 (D.Conn.1986).

Before evaluating the constitutional claims the court deems it advisable to put this case in its proper perspective. The plaintiff does not claim and the court does not find that the jury in this trial was biased. Clearly, the issue of liability was a close call and could reasonably have gone either way under the rules of comparative negligence. But that, of course, is not the issue that is before the court. The sole issue is whether the defendant violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff in the manner in which he exercised his peremptory challenges.

On May 29, 1986, the case was first tried to a jury ³ presided over by a state trial referee, Hon. Henry J. DeVita. The jury, in the first trial, was composed of six women, three of whom were black. On June 5, 1986, the state trial referee declared a mistrial because the jurors were hopelessly deadlocked, four in favor of finding liability for the plaintiff and two for the defendant. ⁴

As stated in his brief, counsel for the defendant believed that "[a]ll three (3) black jurors voted in favor of awarding damages to the plaintiff."

Since the defendant came from New Zealand, where he was then employed, to try this case, he was accommodated with a prompt retrial. For the retrial a panel of venirepersons was selected by lot ⁵ on June 12, 1986, and the court, Berdon, J., indoctrinated them at the start of the voir dire. These remarks included the following: "[O]ur state constitution and our state statutes y(3)27 [provide that] each side may excuse up to a certain number of prospective jurors without citing any reason at all to the court. They are called peremptory challenges. So if you are not accepted for this jury do not feel bad. It's probably one of the attorneys on behalf of his or her client exercising that constitutional and statutory right to excuse you without citing any reason to the court." Each party was granted four peremptory challenges because two alternates, in addition to the jury of six, were to be selected. General Statutes §§ 51-241, 51-243.

The first panel of venirepersons consisted of fifteen, four black and eleven white persons. At the outset of the voir dire, the court excused on its motion for cause one of the black venirepersons (together with several others for varying reasons) because he knew and had associated with the plaintiff's husband. The second black juror, upon motion by the plaintiff and the agreement of the defendant, was excused for cause because he was not fully able to comprehend the proceedings. The third and fourth black persons were peremptorily excused by the defendant. By the time the first panel was exhausted, the plaintiff had exercised three peremptory challenges, the defendant had exercised two peremptory challenges by excusing the two black venirepersons, and four white jurors had been accepted.

A second panel of eleven venirepersons, consisting of one black person and ten white persons, was selected by lot. The first person of the second panel called for voir dire, a white person, was accepted as the fifth juror. The second person, a black woman, was examined by the plaintiff's counsel. Her responses to the questions indicated that she worked at a local factory, that she had once been involved in an automobile accident but had not been injured, that she would not have difficulty with the issue of damages if the jury found the defendant liable, that she believed that a person did not necessarily have to have a broken bone to experience pain and that she would not give more credibility to a police officer merely because he was a police officer. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's voir dire examination, counsel for the defendant said "I've no questions." Out of venireperson's presence, the plaintiff accepted her and the defendant struck her by using his third peremptory challenge.

The plaintiff then moved to strike all the jurors chosen and commence the selection of another jury with a new panel, arguing that her federal and state constitutional rights to trial by jury and equal protection of the law were violated because the defendant had used his three peremptory challenges to remove every black venireperson from the two panels. A hearing was held on the plaintiff's motion. Counsel for the defendant conceded that race was a factor, but not the only one, in making his decision to challenge peremptorily the three black venirepersons. Although he claimed there were other reasons, he did not articulate them. Counsel made it quite clear that he was of the opinion that he was not required to give reasons and that if the court did strike the jurors selected and begin another voir dire, he would exercise his client's challenges in any way he saw fit without justifying his decision.

The court reserved decision on the plaintiff's motion. The remaining juror and alternates were selected from the balance of the second panel, which resulted in impaneling an all white jury and alternates. After hearing the evidence, the summation of I

                the attorneys and the court's instructions, the jury on June 24, 1986, retired at 2 p.m. to consider its verdict.   At 3:35 p.m. it returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.   The jurors, in answering interrogatories that had been submitted to them, found that the plaintiff had proven the defendant to be negligent, but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident
                

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY

The right to trial by jury in a civil case is firmly enshrined in the state constitution. Section 19 of article first of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article fourth, provides in part that the "right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate." "Litigants have a constitutional right to have questions of fact decided by a jury." Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 350, 441 A.2d 604 (1982). The right "is fundamental to the American scheme of justice...." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, reh. denied, 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968). It is secured "wherever that right existed when our constitution was adopted in 1818." Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 381, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 142, 50 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 298, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976). The right to trial by jury in a negligence case, such as the present one, existed at common law and therefore is protected by the constitutional right to trial by jury.

Although § 19 does not explicitly guarantee a civil trial by an "impartial" jury as do § 10 of article first of the state constitution and the sixth amendment of the federal constitution for criminal trials, it is clearly implicit. See State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 420, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). "[A]nything less than an impartial jury is the functional equivalent of no jury at all." Miami v. Cornett, 463 So.2d 399, 402 (Fla.App.1985); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 266, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1978).

An essential element of this right to trial by an impartial jury is that the venire be composed of a representative cross section of the community. State v. Nims, 180 Conn. 589, 594-95, 430 A.2d 1306 (1980). In Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84 (1940), Justice Black, writing for a unanimous court, stated the following: "It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government." It is also absolutely clear that the requirement that the pool of jurors for the venire be composed of a cross secti...