Williams v. Davis
| Decision Date | 06 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-30181 |
| Parties | Remingtyn A. Williams, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated; Lauren E. Chustz, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated; Bilal Ali-Bey, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lamar A. Davis, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:21-cv-852
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
While marching across a bridge, protestors were met with non-lethal force exercised by police officers. On behalf of a putative class, three of those protestors now seek to maintain a suit against the superintendent of the Louisiana State Police ("LSP"), whose troopers were allegedly "bystanders" at the event. As we find that these plaintiffs are unable to maintain this suit, we REVERSE and RENDER JUDGMENT in favor of the LSP's superintendent.
In June of 2020, several hundred protestors gathered to cross the Crescent City Connection bridge ("CCC") as part of protests in the wake of George Floyd's death. Among those protestors were the three named plaintiffs in this case Remingtyn Williams, Lauren Chustz, and Bilal Ali-Bey ("Plaintiffs"). These protestors approached a police barricade primarily consisting of New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") officers with support from Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office deputies and equipment. Louisiana State Police troopers were allegedly "bystanders" at the event. Protestors requested permission to pass through the barricade but were denied. At some point, "a small group of agitated demonstrators passed through an opening in the police line." NOPD officers fired tear gas and other non-lethal munitions into the crowd and the crowd dispersed.
The Plaintiffs asserted various claims relating to alleged violations of their constitutional and statutory rights against individual officers and law enforcement agencies. Relevant to this appeal are the claims against Colonel Lamar Davis ("Davis"), Superintendent of the LSP. In summary, the Plaintiffs sued Davis alleging Monell and supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 685 (1978), violations of various Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions, and violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Davis filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, stating in part that he was protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and that the Plaintiffs lack standing to proceed against him.
The district court granted the motion as to the Monell claims and the Title VI claim but denied it as to the § 1983 claims and the state law claims. The court did not address the state law claims in detail as it found it unnecessary to do so given its findings on the federal claims. Evaluation of the § 1983 claims began with an inquiry into standing, which concluded: The court also concluded that the Plaintiffs adequately pleaded § 1983 claims to fit within the relevant exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity as they "sued Col. Davis in his official capacity, 'allege[] ongoing violations of federal law by LSP,' and seek prospective relief." Davis promptly filed a notice of interlocutory appeal seeking review of the denial of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
"This court reviews denials of Eleventh Amendment immunity de novo." McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002)). We likewise review questions concerning standing de novo. Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2022).
"This court has a continuing obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary." United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Bass v. Denney, 171 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1999)). Orders denying Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity are reviewable under the "collateral order doctrine." P.R. Aqueduct &Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
Less clear, however, is whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court's finding of standing. The Supreme Court has held that reviewable issues under the collateral order doctrine are those which "'[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'" P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 144 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly considered whether standing is one such issue: "In contrast to the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, we have held that a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss on justiciability grounds is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine." Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, then, the "only" way the court can review a district court's finding of standing on interlocutory appeal is via the "pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine." Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1335 (emphasis in original).
This comports nicely with the nature of the collateral order doctrine. Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot effectively be reviewed "on appeal from a final judgment," P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 144 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468), because as immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) () (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985)). Standing, however, can and often is reviewed on appeal without such loss, in part because the question of standing is often "intertwined" with that of the merits. See Barrett Comput. Servs., Inc. v. PDA, Inc., 884 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1989). This makes questions of standing inappropriate for collateral review. If we are to address standing on the merits, therefore, it must be by the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction may only be exercised in one of two "carefully circumscribed" circumstances: "(1) If the pendent decision is 'inextricably intertwined' with the decision over which the appellate court otherwise has jurisdiction, pendent appellate jurisdiction may lie, or (2) if 'review of the former decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter.'" Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)).
This court has previously exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to address justiciability issues such as standing. In Hospitality House, Inc. v. Gilbert, it was held: "where ... we have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, we may first determine whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying case." 298 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2002). As standing indisputably goes to whether or not a court has subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2022), this panel can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to address standing issues. In fact, while reviewing a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the panel in Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson determined that through the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction it had jurisdiction over justiciability issues such as standing. 13 F.4th 434, 446 (5th Cir. 2021).
Exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is not mandatory - as appellees point out, the Supreme Court carefully noted that "no one contest[ed] th[e] decision" to review standing on appeal in Whole Woman's Health. Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S.Ct. 522, 537 (2021). Though that is not the case here, this court's jurisprudence nonetheless permits this panel to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction. For one, "our Article III standing analysis and Ex parte Young analysis 'significant[ly] overlap.'" City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., 851 F.3d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 2017)). In fact, "our caselaw shows that a finding of standing tends toward a finding that the Young exception applies to the state official(s) in question." Id. Additionally, "[w]e . . . address standing ... when there exists a significant question about it." K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 122 (5th Cir. 2010). The K.P. court even addressed standing before proceeding to an Ex parte Young analysis even though "neither party ... raised the issue of standing." Id.
Appellees recommend against exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction in this case for two main reasons. First, they note that as not all defendants are participating in this appeal, ruling on standing will "prematurely...
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