Williams v. Glash, 01-88-01047-CV

• Decision Date: 13 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 01-88-01047-CV,01-88-01047-CV
• Citation: 769 S.W.2d 684
• Parties: Margaret U. WILLIAMS and David E. Williams, Appellants, v. Stephen GLASH, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 684

769 S.W.2d 684

Margaret U. WILLIAMS and David E. Williams, Appellants, v. Stephen GLASH, Appellee.

No. 01-88-01047-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (1st Dist.).

April 13, 1989.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1989.

Timothy A. Beeton and Laurette T. Williams, Simpson, Beeton & Leavenworth, Houston, for appellants.

Michael W. Cooper, Lueders & Boanerges, Houston, for appellee.

Before DUNN, WARREN and HUGHES, JJ.

OPINION

DUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment that was granted in favor of the appellee (the defendant below) in a personal injury suit.

Appellant Margaret Williams was a passenger in her family car, which was being driven by her husband, appellant David Williams, when it was struck from behind by appellee. At the time of the accident, there were no apparent injuries, although there was damage to appellants' car.

Immediately after the accident, Mrs. Williams contacted appellee's insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, to inquire what to do about the damage to her car. Pursuant to the instructions given her, Mrs. Williams took the car to a State Farm facility. Once at the facility, Mrs. Williams was asked to fill out a claim form. She marked "No" to the question about whether anyone had been injured, because she was not yet aware of any injury.

An appraiser for the insurance company appraised the damage to appellants' car at $889.46. A check was issued to appellant, while she was at the facility, in the amount of $889.46. The back of the check contained the following release, which appellants signed when they endorsed the check:

The undersigned payee accepts the amount of this payment in full settlement of all claims for damages to property and for bodily injury, whether known or unknown, which payee claims against any insured under the policy shown on the face hereof, or their respective successors in interest, arising out of an accident which occurred on or about the date shown. This release reserves all rights of the parties released to pursue their legal remedies, if any, against such payee.

Approximately three weeks after the accident, Mrs. Williams began experiencing pain in her head and jaw, which was ultimately diagnosed as "TMJ" (temporal mandibular joint). Her doctor's opinion was that the problem was caused by the accident. Appellants filed suit against appellee to recover for Mrs. Williams' injuries.

The appellee filed for summary judgment based upon appellants' release of all claims from the accident. Appellants responded that, among other things, the release was only for the damage to property and that a release of claims for personal injuries was not contemplated by the parties. The trial court granted the summary judgment.

Appellants bring four points of error, claiming that (1) there is a fact question as to whether a release of claims for personal injuries was contemplated by the parties, (2) there is an ambiguity on the face of the release, (3) there is no consideration for the release, and (4) the enforcement of the release offends public policy. We affirm.

First of all, we find no ambiguity in the language of the release. It clearly and simply states that appellants released appellee for any and all claims, property damage and bodily injury, whether the claims were known or unknown at the time. Secondly, we find that the consideration for the release was an immediate settlement of her property damage claim. Although a consideration may be small, if it is valuable and legal, it is not sufficient grounds for setting aside a release. Slade v. Phelps 446 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1969, no writ).

A release encompasses the contractual element of mutual intent. Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex.1973). The intent of the parties must be determined by the objective standard of what the parties said and did, not by their alleged subjective state of mind. McClellan v. Boehmer, 700 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).

We cannot escape the clear, simple terms of this release. Berry v. Guyer, 482 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even though no one at State Farm explained the effect of the release to appellants, the location of the release on the back of the draft and appellants' signature below the release make obvious the fact that appellants saw the release. McClellan v. Boehmer, 700 S.W.2d at 692. As a general rule, a written release cannot be avoided on the ground that the releasor was ignorant of, or mistaken about, the contents of the release, or failed to read the same before signing it. Tobbon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Appellants find significance in the insurance code number "200-1" on the face of the check. The record establishes that State Farm uses "200-1" to indicate a property claim. The company uses a different code for personal injury claims. Appellants, relying on Lawson v. Ulschmid, 578...