Williams v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 20 February 2020
• Docket Number: 2019-SC-000012-DG
• Citation: 594 S.W.3d 189
• Parties: Tracie WILLIAMS, Appellant v. Katelin HAWKINS, Administratrix of the Estate of Charlotte Hawkins, Appellee
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

594 S.W.3d 189

Tracie WILLIAMS, Appellant

v.Katelin HAWKINS, Administratrix of the Estate of Charlotte Hawkins, Appellee

2019-SC-000012-DG

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

FEBRUARY 20, 2020

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey Thomas Sampson, Louisville, THE SAMPSON LAW FIRM.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Eric Griffin Farris, Shepherdsville, Joseph Michael Mills, BUCKMAN FARRIS & MILLS.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES

Appellant Tracie Williams was injured in a two-vehicle accident with Charlotte Hawkins in March 2015. Despite public records indicating that Charlotte had died in October 2015, Williams did not discover herdeath until one day prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations in March 2017. Because Williams did not name Charlotte Hawkins’s estate in place of Charlotte individually within the two-year limitations period, in either her original action or a second action, the trial court dismissed both complaints. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. Having granted discretionary review and finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 2015, Tracie Williams and Charlotte Hawkins (Charlotte) were involved in an automobile accident in Bullitt County, Kentucky. On July 1, 2015, Williams’s counsel wrote to Charlotte, advising her of Williams’s representation and requesting she forward the letter to her insurance carrier. Jill Benningfield, a Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB) claims adjuster, responded on July 22, 2015, and requested Williams’s counsel direct all further correspondence regarding the claim to her. This communication and subsequent letters identified KFB’s insured as William Hawkins, Charlotte’s husband.

Charlotte passed away from unrelated causes on October 16, 2015. On November 24, 2015, administration of Charlotte’s estate was dispensed with by court order in the probate division of Bullitt District Court. On February 16, 2017, Williams filed her initial complaint against Charlotte in Bullitt Circuit Court.¹ KFB, Charlotte’s insurer, retained counsel to defend the claim. On March 2, 2017, one day prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, Charlotte’s retained counsel learned of her death, and promptly informed Williams’s counsel via email.

In April 2017, without objection, the trial court dismissed the original complaint as a legal nullity because the court could not have jurisdiction over a deceased individual. Meanwhile, Williams’s counsel moved the District Court to reopen Charlotte’s estate, and Katelin Hawkins, Charlotte’s daughter, was appointed as administratrix on May 24, 2017. On May 25, 2017, a new complaint was filed against Katelin Hawkins as the administratrix of the Estate and assigned a different case number (17-0-00492).

The next day, Katelin Hawkins filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely pursuant to the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA). Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 304.39-230(6). Williams argued that the Estate should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because KFB constructively concealed Charlotte’s death. After the parties briefed the issues, the trial court found that the complaint was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations period and granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that despite the assertion that KFB failed to disclose the death, there was no evidence that KFB knew Charlotte had died. Further, the trial court noted that Williams had almost a year and a half to search public records regarding Charlotte Hawkins and discover her death through her obituary and/or probate records.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court, rejecting Williams’s arguments that (1) KFB’s failure to disclose Charlotte’s death estops the Estate from invoking the statute of limitations, and (2) that in the absence of an estate for Charlotte Hawkins it was impossible for Williams to sue the proper party. The Court of Appeals declined to create an equitable remedy to allow Williams’s suit filed after expiration of the two-year statute of limitations period. Williams petitioned this Court for discretionary review, which we granted. As noted, we affirm the Court of Appeals.²

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Williams argues that (1) equitable tolling should apply when the non-existence of an estate for the tortfeasor-defendant prevents a plaintiff from timely filing suit, and (2) an insurer’s failure to disclose the death of its insured estops the Estate from invoking the statute of limitations. As an initial matter, we note that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are distinguishable. Equitable estoppel precludes a defendant, because of his own wrongdoing, from using the statute of limitations as a defense. Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 62 (Ky. 2010). Equitable tolling pauses a limitations period and does not require any wrongdoing, but rather applies when a plaintiff, "despite all due diligence ... is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim." Chung v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We address each argument in turn.

I. Equitable tolling is inapplicable to this case.

Williams argues that she was not afforded the full statutory period to file her complaint and urges this Court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling because the non-existence of an estate prevented her from timely filing suit. When she first learned of Charlotte’s death, there was no estate for her to sue, administration of the estate having been dispensed with in November 2015. While this is factually accurate, the situation was also avoidable.

Before turning to the substantive law of equitable tolling, we note that the Estate argues that Williams failed to make an equitable tolling argument before the trial court, and thus is barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. However, Williams’s memorandum in response to the motion to dismiss references tolling of the statute of limitations period, so the issue was brought to the trial court’s attention, and later both parties briefed the issue in this appeal. Burton v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Ky. 2009). Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed the inequity of a party having no opportunity to file suit before a statute of limitations expires.³ As noted in Williams’s brief, no Kentucky caselaw directly differentiates between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, two distinct doctrines which have been raised in this case.

"Equitable tolling pauses the running of, or tolls, a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action." Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 188 L.Ed.2d 200 (2014). In the federal context, the United States Supreme Court has held that an equitable tolling inquiry "begins with the understanding that Congress legislates against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles" and presumes that equitable tolling applies "if tolling is consistent with the statute." Id. at 10-11, 134 S.Ct. 1224.

The relevant statute in this case is the MVRA, KRS 304.39-230(6). In enacting the MVRA, the legislature specifically enlarged the time period for bringing a tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident to two years from the previous one-year period under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. KRS 413.140(1)(a). The statute is clear in setting limitations, and generously allows an additional year during which a party can bring a suit. Moreover, the MVRA statute begins to run from the date of the injury or "the date of issuance of the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs." KRS 304.39-230(6). Thus, in many cases, although not this one, the limitations period actually extends more than two years past the date of the motor vehicle accident.

Williams relies on Nanny v. Smith, 260 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2008), to support her argument that equitable tolling is applicable. In Nanny, a plaintiff tendered her complaint to the court clerk on October 17, 2003, three days before the applicable statute of limitations expired on October 20, 2003. Id. at 816. However, the clerk did not file the complaint and issue the summons until October 21, 2003, and the trial court eventually dismissed the case because the summons was issued and the complaint was stamped "filed" a day after the statute of limitations expired. Id. On appeal, this Court determined that Nanny was prevented from having the summons issued in time due to circumstances beyond her control. Id. at 817. Nanny did not have the "power nor the duty to ensure that the clerk perform official duties." Id. Under these circumstances, this Court recognized equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 818. Nanny presented unique facts — inaction on the part of court personnel which rendered her action untimely despite her best efforts.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the essential elements of the doctrine of equitable tolling in a civil setting in Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 750, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016). In that case, an Indian tribe sought application of the principles of equitable tolling when it failed to timely present contract claims to a federal contracting officer. Id. at 753. The Supreme Court clarified and reiterated that to be entitled to equitable tolling, a litigant must establish: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing," with those circumstances being beyond the litigant’s control. Id. at 755-56. The Court further explained that (1) and (2) are elements that must be shown, not merely factors to be considered. Id. at 756. Having concluded that the tribe failed to "establish extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of timely filing," the Court...