Williams v. Heartland Realty Inv'rs

• Decision Date: 01 August 2022
• Docket Number: 21-cv-5730
• Parties: ANDY HOPE WILLIAMS, JR., and VONITA CRUZ, Plaintiffs, v. HEARTLAND REALTY INVESTORS, INC., HEARTLAND WILLOWBROOK, LLC, d/b/a WILLOWBROOK APARTMENT HOMES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

ANDY HOPE WILLIAMS, JR., and VONITA CRUZ, Plaintiffs,
v.
HEARTLAND REALTY INVESTORS, INC., HEARTLAND WILLOWBROOK, LLC, d/b/a WILLOWBROOK APARTMENT HOMES, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-5730

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN United States District Judge

Pro se plaintiffs Andy Williams and Vonita Cruz bring this lawsuit against Heartland Realty Investors, Inc. and Heartland Willowbrook, LLC, d/b/a Willowbrook Apartment Homes (collectively “Heartland”) alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), along with claims under the Fair Housing Act and Illinois state law.^[1] Before the Court is Heartland's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part without prejudice, grants in part with prejudice, and denies defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Court further grants plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this ruling and their Rule 11(b) obligations.

Background

Construing their pro se amended complaint liberally, see Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2021), plaintiffs allege the Heartland entities, which are the owner and property manager of rental property in Willowbrook, Illinois, unlawfully discriminated against them as tenants

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based on their race and national origin. In July 2021, Heartland served plaintiffs a “notice of infraction” for their use of a grill on their patio as prohibited by the parties' lease agreement, even though other Willowbrook tenants used grills on their patios. On August 11, 2021, Heartland posted a non-renewal notice of plaintiffs' lease on their door. Defendants' alleged basis for the nonrenewal of the lease was that plaintiffs had made several domestic calls to the police, along with committing the grill infraction. The lease expired on November 14, 2021, yet plaintiffs did not move out. On January 24, 2022 Heartland filed an eviction complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011). When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint is facially plausible when the plaintiff alleges “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Discussion

Fair Housing Act Claims

In Counts I and II of their amended complaint, plaintiffs bring Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) claims based on their national origin and race. Plaintiffs allege that Williams is “Hebrew Israelite” and Cruz is Puerto Rican. The Court conducted legal research to determine whether being “Hebrew

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Israelite” is a protected class under the FHA and other federal discrimination statutes and has not found any legal authority discussing this issue. Because the Court is granting plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint, plaintiffs must allege how Williams is a member of a protected class for purposes of their discrimination claims.

Turning to plaintiffs' FHA claims, in Count I, they allege defendants threatened, intimidated, or otherwise interfered with their exercise and enjoyment of their protected activities under the Fair Housing Act, including interfering with plaintiffs' right to have a grill and to continue their residency. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617. In Count II, plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which states it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Plaintiffs also contend defendants retaliated against them in violation of the FHA after plaintiffs questioned management about the July 2021 notice of infraction.

Here, defendants argue their conduct was not motivated by racial animus, but by plaintiffs' failure to obey the lease provisions prohibiting the use of grills and that plaintiffs called the police about domestic disputes. In presenting a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), defendants cannot “attempt to refute the complaint or to present a different set of allegations” because “[t]he attack is on the sufficiency of the complaint, and the defendant cannot set or alter the terms of the dispute, but must demonstrate that the plaintiff s claim, as set forth by the complaint, is without legal consequence.” Smith v. Burge, 222 F.Supp.3d 669, 691 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (St. Eve, J.) (citation omitted). Therefore, defendants' version of the facts does not change the Court's Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.

Defendants also maintain plaintiffs have not adequately alleged specific facts supporting their allegations of race and national origin discrimination. In their response brief, plaintiffs point to their allegations that they were the only Hebrew Israelite and Puerto Rican family in the apartment

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complex and that defendants treated other tenants differently in relation to the grill infraction. See Wigginton v. Bank of America Corp., 770 F.3d 521, 522 (7th Cir. 2014) (“It does not take much to allege discrimination, but one essential allegation is ... that someone else has been treated differently.”). Defendants do not address plaintiffs' arguments made in their response brief because defendants did not file a reply brief.

Construing these pro se allegations in plaintiffs' favor, along with allegations that defendants' conduct was harassing and defendants' reason for the grill infraction was factually baseless, plaintiffs have alleged “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, NA, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' FHA claims as alleged in Counts I and II.

Constitutional Claims

Plaintiffs bring two federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3) against the Heartland entities in Counts III and IV. To bring constitutional claims under § 1983, the defendants must have acted under the color of state law. See DiDonato v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 2022). A “defendant acts under the color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State.” Id. at 1159-60 (citation omitted). To clarify, “[b]ecause § 1983 actions may only be maintained against defendants who act under color of state law, the defendants in § 1983 cases are usually government officials.” London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2010). As plaintiffs tacitly admit, defendants are not government officials, but private companies, which may be considered “state actors” for § 1983 purposes under two circumstances: (1) when the state controls or directs the actions of the private company; and (2) when the state delegates a public function to the private company. See Camm v. Faith, 937 F.3d 1096, 1105 (7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs also bring their constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the function of

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which “is to permit recovery from a private actor who has conspired with state actors.” Fairey v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009).

Under both § 1983 and § 1985(3), plaintiffs must allege that defendants are “state actors” or that defendants conspired with “state actors” to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. They have failed to do so. Moreover, despite plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, § 1985(3) does not apply to private activity alone. See Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2007). To clarify, plaintiffs' reliance on Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) is misplaced because the Griffin Court only extended § 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies if...