Williams v. Levally

• Decision Date: 16 October 2017
• Docket Number: 12-CV-8164 (KMK) (LMS)
• Parties: WILLIE M. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT THOMAS LEVALLY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

WILLIE M. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT THOMAS LEVALLY, Respondent.

12-CV-8164 (KMK) (LMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 16, 2017

ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Willie Williams ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition, and later, an amended petition (the "Amended Petition"), for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2004 judgment of conviction in New York state court for attempted murder in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, attempted assault in the second degree, and aggravated criminal contempt. (See Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Am. Pet.") (Dkt. No. 48); see also Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.") (Dkt. 2).)¹

The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith, (see Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge (Dkt No. 7)), who issued a Report and Recommendation (the "R&R"), recommending that the Court deny the Petition, (see Report & Recommendation ("R&R") 15 (Dkt. No. 72)). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the result recommended in the R&R.

I. Discussion

The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth, in part, in the R&R, as well as in a previous R&R and several Orders of the Court. (See R&R 1-3; Report & Recommendation 1-14 (Dkt No. 39); Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 1-2 (Dkt. No. 42); Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration 1-2 (Dkt. No. 55).) The Court will not repeat that background here.

The R&R was issued on September 15, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 72), and Petitioner's objections were therefore due by October 2, 2016, (see id.). On November 3, 2016, Petitioner requested an extension of time in which to submit his objections, (see Dkt. No. 75), and the Court granted a 30 day extension, (see Dkt. No. 76). On November 21, 2016, Petitioner timely filed his objections to the R&R. (See Dkt. No. 77.)

A. Standard of Review

1. Review of a Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation

A district court reviewing a report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party may submit objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The objections must be "specific" and "written," Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and must be made "[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition," id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plus an additional three days when service is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), for a total of seventeen days, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1).

"A district court evaluating a magistrate judge's report may adopt those portions of the report [and recommendation] to which no 'specific, written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Adams v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 855 F. Supp. 2d 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd sub num. Hochstadt v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 547 F. App'x 9 (2d Cir. 2013). However, where a party timely objects to a report and recommendation, as Petitioner has done here, the district court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). "When a [petitioner] simply rehashes the same arguments set forth in [his] original petition, however, such objections do not suffice to invoke de novo review of the [r]eport." Aponte v. Cunningham, No. 08-CV-6748, 2011 WL 1432037, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2011) (italics omitted); see also Hall v. Herbert, Nos. 02-CV-2299, 02-CV-2300, 2004 WL 287115, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) ("[T]o the extent that a parly simply reiterates his original arguments, the [c]ourt reviews the report and recommendation only for clear error.").

Finally, pleadings submitted by pro se litigants are held to a less strict standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) ("Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." (italics omitted)). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Habeas Corpus Review

Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which provides that "[t]he writ may not issue for anyclaim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or was 'based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.'" Epps v. Poole, 687 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). In this context, "it is the habeas applicant's burden to show that the state court applied [federal law] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). "[A]n unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) ("The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.").

Section 2254(d) "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a federal court must deny a habeas petition in some circumstances even if the court would have reached a conclusion different than the one reached by the state court, because "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202-03 (2011) ("Even if the [federal] Court of Appeals might have reached a different conclusion as an initial matter, it was not an unreasonable application of our precedent for the [state court] to conclude that [the petitioner] did not establish prejudice."); Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Although we might not have decided the issue in the way that the [New York State]Appellate Division did—and indeed we are troubled by the outcome we are constrained to reach—we . . . . must defer to the determination made by the state court . . . ." (citation omitted)).

Under AEDPA, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Nelson v. Walker, 121 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1997). A petitioner can rebut this presumption only by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). Finally, only federal law claims are cognizable in habeas proceedings. "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ("The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.").

Moreover, "[b]efore seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . ."). Accordingly, "the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers ofdiscretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).

There are two components to the exhaustion requirement. See McCray v. Bennet, No. 02-CV-839, 2005 WL 3182051, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005) ("A two-step analysis is used to determine whether a claim has been exhausted . . . ."). "First, the petitioner must have fairly presented to an appropriate state court the same federal constitutional claim that he now urges upon the federal courts." Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 282 (2d Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Daye v. Att'y Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc); see also Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). This requirement is satisfied if the claim is presented in a way that is "likely to alert the court to the claim's federal nature," Daye, 696 F.2d at 192, and the state...