Williams v. McIntosh County

• Decision Date: 16 November 1934
• Docket Number: 10378.
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. McINTOSH COUNTY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

177 S.E. 248

179 Ga. 735

WILLIAMS et al. v. McINTOSH COUNTY.

No. 10378.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 16, 1934

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The acts of the county commissioners which the petitioners sought to enjoin were not illegal or ultra vires in view of the provisions of an act entitled an act to authorize the board of county commissioners of all counties in this state falling within prescribed limits, to acquire and hold lands for the purpose of creating public parks, etc., approved March 24, 1933 (Ga. Laws 1933, p. 204), and existing laws which are not challenged.

2. The exception to the constitutionality of the act above referred to is not sufficient to present that question for decision by this court.

Error from Superior Court, McIntosh County; J. T. Grice, Judge.

Suit for injunction by W. E. Williams and and others, citizens and taxpayers of McIntosh County, against McIntosh County. To review a judgment refusing an injunction, plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

Tyson & Tyson, of Darien, for plaintiffs in error.

M. Price, of Ludowici, for defendant in error.

BECK Presiding Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

The court did not err in refusing to grant an injunction. Under the pleadings and the agreed statement of facts, the county commissioners were not seeking to do anything that was ultra vires or that was not authorized by the act of 1933, entitled an act to authorize the board of county commissioners of all counties in this state, falling within the prescribed limits to acquire and hold lands for the purpose of creating public parks, etc., approved March 24, 1933 (Ga. Laws 1933, p. 204). That act reads as follows:

"Section 1. That the Board of County Commissioners or other administrative authority of all the counties in this State having a present population of not less than five thousand seven hundred sixty nor more than five thousand and seven hundred sixty-five, according to the United States census for the year 1930, and without regard to their subsequent variations in population, shall have authority to acquire, own, hold, and administer lands for the purpose of creating public parks, and/or the preservation of historic sites, landmarks, and places, and/or the erection of monuments or memorials and other similar public purposes. And the said county authorities are hereby granted the right of eminent domain to acquire any property suitable for any of the above purposes, and the authority to exercise such right of eminent domain in accordance with the provisions of law now or hereafter existing for the condemnation of property for public purposes."

Section 2. Be it further enacted, that the said county authorities shall have authority to accept donations of money or property for any of the purposes of this Act, and to charge admission fees to such parks and memorials for the purpose of providing funds for the maintenance and upkeep thereof."

The statute just quoted, and existing laws the validity of which are not questioned, entitle the county commissioners to do the acts which are complained of as being illegal. The acceptance of the loan referred to and the issuing of the bonds and the executing of the evidence of indebtedness in accordance with the act of 1933, under the facts agreed to is not the creation of a debt on the part of the county. Similar principles and questions were involved in State v. Regents of University System, 179 Ga. 210, 175 S.E. 567, 573. In that case it was held in substance that loan agreements made by Regents of the University System with federal government, whereby bonds would be issued by the Board of Regents and purchased by the government to provide funds for stated university uses, bonds to be paid exclusively out of matriculation, laboratory, hospital, and athletic fees, are not illegal, since a mere pledge of income would not be a pledge of "property," and could not result in a sale of "property" within the purview of the statute. Cobb's Dig. p. 1084, § 3; Civ. Code 1910, §§ 1282, 1363, 1364, 1379 (9), 1396; Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 20, 21, 24, §§ 45, 48, 61. And in the course of the opinion it was said: "From what has been said it is our opinion that what is intended to be done by the Regents of the University System of Georgia, through its Board of Regents, will not in any manner infringe the Constitution as contended. This conclusion is not contrary to such decisions as Renfroe v. Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81, 78 S.E. 449, 45 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1173; Byars v. Griffin, 168 Ga. 41, 147 S.E. 66. These and similar cases concerned questions of whether stated contracts would create debts within the meaning of the constitutional debt limitations as to counties, municipalities, and other political divisions. If the proposed bonds here under consideration would create a debt at all, it would be a debt against a corporation governed by the Board of Regents, and not against the state. This conclusion is not based upon the terms and conditions of the particular contract. Regardless of the stipulations made, the state of Georgia could never be called upon to pay these bonds, nor would it be under any obligation, moral or otherwise, to levy any tax for the purpose of...