Williams v. Meredith

• Decision Date: 25 June 1937
• Docket Number: 158
• Parties: Williams et ux. v. Meredith, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

192 A. 924

326 Pa. 570

Williams et ux. v. Meredith, Appellant

No. 158

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 25, 1937

April 20, 1937, Submitted

Appeal, No. 158, Jan. T., 1937, from decree of C.P Lackawanna Co., Nov. T., 1936, No. 655, in case of Harvey R Williams et ux. v. Alice L. Meredith. Decree reversed.

Petition and rule to set aside service of process.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Order entered discharging rule, opinion by LEWIS, J. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned was order discharging rule.

Decree reversed; service set aside.

Leigh B. Maxwell, for appellant.

D. R Reese, for appellees.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART:

An automobile accident occurred in Wayne County, Pennsylvania, involving plaintiffs, residents of Lackawanna County, and defendant, a resident of New York. Plaintiffs instituted action in Lackawanna County, and service was made by deputization upon the Secretary of Revenue of Pennsylvania, as agent for defendant pursuant to the Act of May 14, 1929, P.L. 1721, Section 1, as amended. The jurisdiction of the court was preliminarily challenged on the ground that the service was invalid since suit had not been commenced in the county where the accident took place. The court below sustained plaintiffs' contention that suit could be brought in any county on the authority of Aversa v. Aubry, 303 Pa. 139.

The long established principle of universal application is that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. This rule has been steadfastly adhered to in the construction of statutes governing the service of process. Recently in Heaney v. Mauch Chunk Boro., 322 Pa. 487, this Court stated at p. 490: "The common law rule in regard to service of process, established by centuries of precedent, has always been accepted as binding in this State. In an action in personam the process must be served personally within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action was commenced, upon the person to be affected thereby. This rule prevails, unless a statute clearly and definitely manifests that a different method as to service has been promulgated by the legislature. We stated in Davidson v.Bright, 267 Pa. 580, that statutes in derogation of the common law must be construed strictly and only such modification of the law will be recognized as the statute clearly and definitely prescribes." In Hughes v. Hughes, 306 Pa. 75, 78, this court said: "It is general law that service statutes are to be construed strictly, and particularly statutes authorizing substituted service or service by publication: 50 C.J. 490; Stamey v. Barkley, 211 Pa. 313; Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 81 Pa. 398."

The interpretation placed upon the Act of 1929 in the Aversa case permits suit to be brought in any county in the State, and service may be made on the Secretary of Revenue as agent for the nonresident defendant. This cannot be reconciled with the settled rules of construction. Its holding was predicated on the fact that no limitation of service was expressed in the act and the theory that general expressions of a service statute control its scope; no attention was paid to common law restrictions and existing statutory regulations; nor was any given to Section 1208 of the Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, as amended, except to hold that it applied only to property damage. The opinion stated: "The act contains no provision limiting the right of suit to the county where the accident occurred, or providing that service of process can be made only by an officer of that county." Section 1208 provides: "All civil actions for damages, arising from the use . . . of any vehicle, may, at the discretion of the plaintiff, be brought . . . in the county wherein the alleged damages were sustained . . . and service of process . . . may be made by the sheriff of the county . . . wherein the defendant . . . resides. . . ." It is not limited to recovery of expenses paid in repairing property damages, for we held in Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, that such interpretation of it was incorrect, and it includes actions for personal injuries arising from the use of motor vehicles.

Appellees' contention that suit may be brought in any county accords plaintiffs an unrestricted choice of venue in automobile cases against nonresidents, with the right to serve defendant by deputization no matter where he may be; while in similar actions against residents service by deputization is only permitted if the suit is instituted in the county where the accident occurred. The Act of May 14, 1929, P.L. 1721, Section 1, as amended, under which this broad power is claimed by appellees, provides: ". . . any nonresident . . . being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle, who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of this Commonwealth . . . shall by such acceptance . . . constitute the Secretary of Revenue . . . his . . . agent for the service of process in any civil suit . . . arising out of . . . any accident or collision occurring within the Commonwealth. . . ."

This Act, however, must be construed in connection with Section 1208 of the Motor Vehicle Code, supra, which controls the venue of such actions apart from the common law. So construed, the Act of 1929, P.L. 1721, conferring the right of service on nonresidents by deputization is limited to the county in which the accident occurred. The nonresident Act is not clear. It names the Secretary as agent to accept service but says nothing as to the venue of the action in auto cases which gives the right of service differing from the common law. The place where process may be served is an important field of the common law which these statutes invade, and the invasion, serving a defendant in a county other than that where the writ issues, must be definitely and clearly set forth in the act. The venue and service must be that permitted by the common law except as changed by statute. Section 1208 of the Motor Vehicle Code which comprehends all automobile accidents changes this requirement if the action is brought in the county where the accident occurs. The...