Williams v. Moore-Gaunt Co.

Decision Date24 February 1908
Docket Number885.
PartiesWILLIAMS v. MOORE-GAUNT CO.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

The relationship of principal and agent, being confidential and fiduciary in character, demands of the agent the utmost loyalty and good faith to his principal. Any breach of this good faith whereby the principal suffers any disadvantage and the agent reaps any benefit is a fraud of such nature as to preclude the agent from taking or retaining the benefit; also from claiming his commissions.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see cent. Dig. vol. 40, Principal and Agent, §§ 147, 211.]

Fraud voids contracts. Fraud sufficient to destroy the contract may be shown by parol, though the contract be in writing.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 11, Contracts § 420; vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 2007-2017.]

A contract, no matter how solemnly expressed, obtained by an agent from his principal through a violation of the loyalty and good faith imposed by the confidential relation, is void and, is not enforceable in law or in equity.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 40, Principal and Agent, § 147.]

An agent who secretly undertakes to represent both parties to a transaction is not permitted to recover commissions from either of them. This rule applies to real estate agents as well as others.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 8, Brokers, § 49.]

Error from City Court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

Action by the Moore-Gaunt Company against E. A. Williams. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Parol evidence is admissible to show fraud and deceit in the inception of a contract.

The Moore-Gaunt Company, real estate agents, sued Mrs. Williams upon the following contract: "I hereby accept the above offer of H. D. Durr [also set out as an exhibit to the petition] upon the terms and conditions therein named, and guarantee the titles to be perfect, and to deliver same free from legal incumbrance, to the purchaser, and to pay Moore-Gaunt Co., for having negotiated the above sale, a commission on the gross amount, as follows, viz.: 5 per cent on the first two thousand dollars, and 2 1/2 per cent. on the excess over the first two thousand dollars. In event the buyer fails to pay for the property as stipulated above, then the amount paid is forfeited and is to be kept by Moore-Gaunt Co., as part compensation for services rendered by them in the trade. This Sept. 29th, 1906. [Signed] Mrs. Eppie A. Williams, Owner." They alleged that Durr offered to consummate the trade, was ready and willing to purchase on the terms named, but that Mrs. Williams refused to comply with her contract to convey, and that she was therefore due them the commissions specified in the contract. She offered the following plea, which on demurrer by the plaintiff was stricken by the court: "(1) Defendant says that she was the owner of the residence known as 173 Oak street, which was occupied by defendant and her minor children as a home. (2) On or about the 18th day of September, plaintiff, who was unknown to defendant, called upon her and represented to her that she ought to sell her home; that he was in the real estate business, and knew all about real estate matters, and could get her a fancy price for the property if she would just leave it to him. (3) Defendant's husband had but recently died. She was possessed of but little means; was earning no money from any position, and her minor children were a source of expense to her in her efforts to obtain for them support and education. (4) Defendant declined to sell her home, stating that it would leave her and her children without a home, but plaintiff strongly urged and insisted that defendant was in debt, and that, if she could obtain a fancy price for her home, she could pay herself out of debt, and have something to live on. (5) Finally, having no mature person upon whose experience she could rely for advice, and being overpersuaded by the urgent insistence of plaintiff, she asked him what price she ought to accept for the place, and plaintiff advised defendant that she could not get more than $2,500 for the property, and that it was a fancy price for the place, and she ought to sell it at that price without delay, in which advice defendant finally acquiesced. (6) Subsequently Mr. H. D. Durr, who was unknown to defendant, called upon her, and asked leave to inspect the property with a view to its purchase, but defendant stated to him that she did not desire or intend to sell the place, and the said H. D. Durr left, stating that the place was too small for his purpose anyhow. In the course of the conversation defendant stated to the said H. D. Durr that she would under no circumstances sell the place if she had to abandon it as a home, and that she would only consider an offer on the express condition that she could continue to occupy it as a tenant. (7) After this conversation, plaintiff again called on defendant, urging her to renew her offer of sale, and stating that he could, without difficulty, induce the said H. D. Durr to rent the place to defendant, so that she could still occupy it as a home by paying rent to him. (8) Defendant in the meantime, having obtained reliable advice to the effect that the property was worth much more than the amount offered to her, and that the proposed plan of selling the property for $2,500 and renting the place from the purchaser at the rate suggested would result in a great loss to her, notified plaintiff that she would not sell the place, and that any negotiations looking to its sale must be declared off. (9) Plaintiff then exhibited to defendant a printed contract, which appeared on its face to have been executed on September 29, 1906, the date on which the following transactions occurred, which contract appeared to have been signed by H. D. Durr as purchaser of the property referred to, and alleging that the said Durr had on that date paid the plaintiff the sum of $25 as part payment to bind the trade. Said date, however, being subsequent to the revocation of defendant's agreement to allow the sale of said place by or through plaintiff, defendant, therefore, declined to sign the attached printed blank, which plaintiff urged her to sign, stating that she did not desire or intend to sell her home. (10) Plaintiff then stated to defendant that unless she signed the attached blank or acceptance, which was a part of the printed contract signed by the said H. D. Durr, but which had not been signed by defendant, she would lose her place, and that the said Durr would take her into court, and force her to make him a deed, because said plaintiff had accepted $25 as part of the purchase price, and that, unless said acceptance was signed, the court would force her to make a deed to the said H. D. Durr, and that defendant would then, in that event, have to pay plaintiff the real estate commissions involved in the transaction, but that if defendant would sign the attached acceptance, it would put her in a position where the plaintiff could get his commissions out of the said H. D. Durr, under plaintiff's contract with Durr, and that the defendant would thereby be relieved of any payment to plaintiff in the way of commissions, and that the plaintiff could, and would, satisfy the said H. D. Durr by selling him another piece of property equally as good, and the defendant could therefore retain her home without being involved in any cost or expense. (11) Plaintiff represented to the defendant that he was very familiar with all matters connected with real estate trades; that he was her agent in the matter; that she had no experience in such transactions, and that she ought to rely upon his advice to save her property and to avoid expense for commissions; and that, if she would act on his advice, instead of asking the advice of others, he would save her place, and be relieved of any expense of commissions. (12) Defendant being a woman, and having recently lost her husband, and being distressed with the care of her small children, and being in debt, and being wholly inexperienced in such matters, all of which facts were known to plaintiff, and not then being aware that plaintiff was in fact, acting in a dual capacity as agent, also, for the said H. D. Durr, and believing that plaintiff was acting, as he asserted, in her behalf, and for her interests to save her home, and to relieve her from commissions, signed said blank form of acceptance tendered by plaintiff. (13) Defendant says that plaintiff thereupon partially performed his undertaking with defendant, and induced the said H. D. Durr not to insist upon taking defendant's property at the low price he had offered, but to purchase other property elsewhere, and said H. D. Durr accordingly abandoned said contract of purchase. (14) Nevertheless plaintiff then demanded and still demands, contrary to his promise, representations, and agreement with this defendant, that she pay the plaintiff the amount of commissions that would have been due if said contract of purchase had been carried out between the parties. (15) Defendant says that said conduct on the part of plaintiff was intended and operated to induce her to sign said acceptance, under the belief that it would absolve defendant from liability, instead of operating to create an obligation on her part towards defendant, and at the time when plaintiff...

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • McLane v. Atlanta Market Center Management Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 5 March 1997
    ...the duties of exercising toward each other the utmost good faith. Civil Code, § 4030 [now OCGA § 23-2-58]." Williams v. Moore-Gaunt Co., 3 Ga.App. 756, 759, 60 S.E. 372. Just as the law implies, as a part of the contract by which every agency arises, that the agent agrees to have and exerci......
  • Dawes Min. Co., Inc. v. Callahan
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 8 October 1980
    ...to the principal." 1 EGL 502, Agency, § 92; See, Wolff v. Southern R. Co., 130 Ga. 251, 256, 60 S.E. 569 (1908); Williams v. Moore-Gaunt Co., 3 Ga.App. 756, 60 S.E. 372 (1908). One reason an agent is under a duty to communicate to his principal all pertinent and material facts concerning an......
  • Johnson v. Sherrer
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 8 March 1944
    ... ... A ... Mitchell of Crawfordville, and W. A. Slaton, of Washington, ... for plaintiff in error ...          Osgood ... O. Williams and Hawes Cloud, both of Crawfordville, for ... defendants in error ...          ATKINSON, ... Justice (after stating the foregoing ... Furthermore, in the case at bar the defendant was also ... alleged to be the agent of his brother-in-law. In ... Williams v. Moore-Gaunt Co., 3 Ga.App. 756(1), 60 ... S.E. 372, it was said: 'The relationship of principal and ... agent, being confidential and fiduciary in character, ... ...
  • E.H. Crump Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Millar
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 14 February 1990
    ...the employer and the employee must be examined. The principle is made a part of every contract of agency. Williams v. Moore-Gaunt Co., 3 Ga.App. 756, 759, 60 S.E. 372 (1907). But the general principles do not provide the whole answer in every given The several contracts which, taken togethe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT