Williams v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 13 September 1917
• Citation: 228 Mass. 191,117 N.E. 189
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. NELSON et al. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

228 Mass. 191

117 N.E. 189

WILLIAMS

v.NELSON et al. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 13, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Charles F. Jenney, Judge.

Petitions by Rose Williams against James E. Nelson and the United Fidelity Company of Baltimore, Md., and by Barnett Williams against the same defendants. From decrees for plaintiffs, the last-named defendant appeals. Affirmed as to Rose Williams, and reversed as to Barnett Williams.

H. V. Cunningham and Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham, all of Boston, for appellant.

Hannigan & Fox and C. R. Cabot, all of Boston, for appellees.

RUGG, C. J.

These are suits in equity under St. 1914, c. 464. That act in terms permits a judgment creditor of one insured by contract of casualty insurance against loss or damage on account of bodily injury or death by accident of any person arising from causes for which the insured is responsible, such judgment having been recovered for a cause covered by the contract of insurance, to proceed in equity against the insured and the insurer to reach and apply the insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment.

1. The statute has been assailed as contrary to the Constitution. But that contention has been held untenable in Lorando v. Gethro, 117 N. E. 185, just decided, and need not be discussed further. This case upon that point is governed by the authority of that decision.

2. The superior court has jurisdiction of the suits. That court has general chancery jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction by the express terms of R. L. c. 159, § 3, of special equitable suits by creditors to reach and apply property of a debtor which cannot be reached to be attached or taken on execution in actions at law. Creditors' bills brought by those who have obtained judgments to enforce their collection is a well-recognized branch of equity. Rioux v. Cronin, 222 Mass. 131, 137, 109 N. E. 898. Suits under the present statute are sufficiently similar to these two classes of cases, of which the superior court plainly has jurisdiction, to be also within its jurisdiction. When an existing method of relief in equity already within the jurisdiction of the superior court is enlarged or modified, without creating a new branch of equity, it is cognizable still by that court. The instant statute is a simple amplification of relief under the well-known equitable process of creditor's bill or equitable attachment.

The exclusive jurisdiction in equity conferred upon the Supreme Judicial Court by R. L. c. 159, § 2, is confined to matters not within the general principles of chancery jurisprudence, cognizable under statutes which do not expressly provide that the superior court also shall have jurisdiction. It does not govern the present proceedings. Cases like Baldwin v. Wilbraham, 140 Mass. 459, 4 N. E. 829, and Langmaid v. Reed, 159 Mass. 409, 34 N. E. 593, which related to newly created special statutory subjects of equity not known to general chancery jurisprudence, are not relevant.

[4] 3. The policy by which the judgment debtor was insured contained this clause:

‘B. This policy does not cover loss from liability for, or any suit based on, injuries or death caused by any sutomobile (1) while driven or manipulated by any person under the age fixed by law or under the age of sixteen years in any event. * * *’

The judgments here in question were recovered for injuries caused to the female plaintiff by being hit by an automobile of the insured. The finding of the judge in this respect is that, although prior to the accident which caused the injuries to the female plaintiff, hereafter called the plaintiff, a son of the pricipal defendant under sixteen years of age had been driving the automobile, yet just before the automobile struck the plaintiff, the father ‘suddenly leaned over to the left and took the wheel from his son telling him to get out of the way.’ Apparently at this moment the automobile was thought by the father to be in a position of some danger either as being on the wrong side of the road or as likely to be driven off the road. The further finding is that:

‘The son shrunk back in the seat, and the father thereafter guided the course of the automobile and entirely controlled its operation so far as possible so to do in the position in which he was, and the son thereafter did nothing except cept to blow the horn. The automobile crossed both street railway tracks, passed in front of the street car, and then, turning to the right, proceeded between the...