Cormier v. Hudson

• Citation: 187 N.E. 625,284 Mass. 231
• Parties: CORMIER et al. v. HUDSON et al.
• Decision Date: 27 October 1933
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

284 Mass. 231

187 N.E. 625

CORMIER et al.

v.HUDSON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Oct. 27, 1933.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Qua, Judge.

Suit by Joseph Cormier and others against Harold G. Hudson and others. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

A. G. Sleeper, of Boston, for appellants.

J. G. Bryer, of Boston, for appellees.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This is a suit in equity to reach and apply the liability of the defendant insurance company (hereafter called the insurer) under the extraterritorial clause of a motor vehicle liability policy issued to the defendant Hudson (hereafter called the defendant), a resident of Cambridge in this commonwealth. The accident out of which this suit arises occurred on October 2, 1930, in New Hampshire while the policy was in full force. Judgments recovered by three of the original plaintiffs injured by the negligence of the defendant in operating his motor vehicle on that occasion have been paid by the insurer. Two judgments were recovered by the plaintiffs now pressing this suit, not for personal injuries to themselves, but for consequential damages for medical expenses and loss of services resulting to them as parents of minor children directly injured by the negligence of the defendant. The issue to be decided is whether these judgments can be enforced against the insurer.

1. The insurer by its policy agreed to indemnify the defendant as the assured, (1) in accordance with the provisions of St. 1925, c. 346 (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 90, §§ 1A, 34A to 34J), ‘against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries * * * arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, control or use upon the ways of’ this commonwealth of his motor vehicle; and also (2) under a clause termed ‘extra-territorial liability coverage’ ‘Against loss from the liability imposed by law upon the Assured for damages on account of bodily injuries * * * suffered by any person or persons * * * from accidents occurring * * * within the limits of the Continental United States of America * * * elsewhere than upon the ways of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by reason of the ownership, operation, maintenance, control or use’ of his motor vehicle.

The first point for consideration is whether the words of the extraterritorial coverage clause in their context bound the insurer to indemnify the defendant against loss for consequential damages to parents arising from bodily injuries sustained by their children. This extraterritorial coverage clause was not made compulsory by any statute. The policy comprehended two distinct kinds of insurance. The first was specifically stated to be the compulsory insurance required by the statute as a condition precedent to the registration of the motor vehicle in this commonwealth. The second was not required by any statute but was a purely voluntary contract of insurance relating to accidents occurring in certain territory outside of this commonwealth. Instead of making separate contracts of insurance, the parties chose to embody both kinds of insurance in one policy. The separate provisions must be construed with respect to particular insurance provided. The circumstance that both kinds of insurance are combined in one policy does not narrow, nor enlarge, nor change the rules of construction which would be applied to the different kinds of insurance if they had been embodied in separate policies. It is to be observed, also, that the decisive words are different as to the two kinds of insurance. The compulsory insurance is against ‘liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries,’ while the extraterritorial insurance is against ‘liability * * * for damages on account of bodily injuries * * * suffered by any person.’ The general rule as to the interpretation of policies of insurance is that they are to be construed most strongly against the insurer, and doubtful language is to be resolved against it except in instances where the form or substance of the policy is prescribed by statute. This rule has its origin in the well known fact that policies of insurance are invariably drawn by the insurer save where the Legislature has intervened. Farber v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 250 Mass. 250, 254, 145 N. E. 535, 36 A. L. R. 806;Wilcox v. Massachusetts Protective Association, Inc., 266 Mass. 230, 235, 165 N. E. 429. The general rule, therefore, applies to the extraterritorial liability coverage of the present policy.

The precise question is whether the words of the policy insuring the defendant against loss from liability ‘for damages on account of bodily injuries' include indemnity for such consequential damages as are here sought to be enforced. In Mulvey v. City of Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 402,14 Ann. Cas. 349, the issue was whether a statute limiting the time for bringing ‘actions of tort for injuries to the person against counties, cities and towns' (St. 1902, c. 406, now G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 260, § 4) applied to an action for consequential damages to a plaintiffsuch as here are in issue. It was there said by Chief Justice Knowlton speaking for the court: ‘The language of the statute is not restricted to actions for injuries to the person of the plaintiff, and we think it is broad enough to include all actions of tort founded on injuries to the person of any one in such relations to the plaintiff that the injury causes him damage. There is nothing in the context to indicate that the words are used in a narrow sense, or that the actions referred to are only those brought by the person receiving the physical impact. The word ‘for’ is used in its ordinary signification of ‘on account of,’ ‘because or by means of,’ or ‘growing out of.’ * * * We have no hesitation in deciding that the present is an action for a personal injury, within the meaning of the statute.' Cappucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653. The same conclusion was reached in Balian v. Ogassin, 277 Mass. 525, 179 N. E. 232, 78 A. L. R. 1021, where it was held that the words ‘actions of tort for injuries suffered by a person’ as now used in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 9, providing that in such actions violation of the statute should not be a defense unless the person injured knew or had reason to know of its violation, applied to an action for consequential damages such as is here sought to be enforced. The phrases ‘bodily injury’ and ‘injury to the person’ in connection with torts of this nature are often used as equivalent terms. Lewis v. Springfield, 261 Mass. 183, 187, 158 N. E. 656. The capacity of being a claimant for damages is not confined, as it was in the statute under consideration in Nestor v. Fall River, 183 Mass. 265, 67 N. E. 248, to those receiving bodily injury by personal impact.

There are instances where statutory words more or less similar to those used in the extraterritorial liability clause of the present policy have been given a narrower construction and held not to embrace actions for such consequential damages. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N. E. 141,17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 570;Williams v. Nelson, 228 Mass. 191, 196, 117 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 538;Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 154, 173 N. E. 524. As was said in Balian v. Ogassin, 277 Mass. at page 534, 179 N. E. 232, 78 A. L. R. 1021, these decisions rest in part upon the context and historical reasons, which are not controlling in the case at bar. They are illustrative of a tendency to interpret with some strictness statutes in direct contravention of the principles of the common law. Although the insurer relies upon Williams v. Nelson, 228 Mass. 191, 117 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 538, that case was decided as interpreting the words of a statute.

It is to be observed that the decisive words used in the compulsory insurance clause differ from those in the extraterritorial insurance clause of the policy. The compulsory insurance is against ‘liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries.’ The extraterritorial insurance is against ‘liability * * * for damages on account of bodily injuries * * * suffered by any person.’ If the same indemnity had been intended, naturally the same words would have been used. It seems plain that the words of the extraterritorial insurance are broader than those of the compulsory insurance. In some contexts ‘for’ may signify ‘on account of,’ yet standing alone the latter...