Williams v. Payne

• Decision Date: 20 March 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 61436
• Citation: 346 N.W.2d 564,131 Mich.App. 403
• Parties: Abraham WILLIAMS and Hattie Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clifford Edward PAYNE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 564

346 N.W.2d 564

131 Mich.App. 403

Abraham WILLIAMS and Hattie Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clifford Edward PAYNE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 61436.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 18, 1983.

Decided Jan. 3, 1984.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1984.

Released for Publication March 20, 1984.

Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr & Heaphy, P.C. by C.F. Boyle, Jr., Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mitchell & Leons, P.C. by Robert I. Morrison, and Gromek, Bendure & Thomas, Detroit (James G. Gross, Detroit, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and GRIBBS and HOEHN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves a tort action for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs, Abraham and Hattie Williams, sued the defendant, Clifford Edward Payne, for negligence. Mrs. Williams alleged serious impairment of body function; Mr. Williams alleged serious impairment of body function and permanent serious disfigurement. ¹ At the close of proofs, the plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the serious impairment issue. The trial judge stated that he felt the plaintiffs' proofs were sufficient to meet the threshold injury requirement of M.C.L. Sec. 500.3135; M.S.A. Sec. 24.13135, but he sent the issue to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs appeal, raising two issues. ² We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

I. THRESHOLD INJURIES UNDER SECTION 3135

A. History

The no-fault act was intended in part to reduce excessive litigation of automobile accident cases while assuring that insurers make adequate and prompt payment for certain losses. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 579, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). The Legislature also intended, though, to retain some tort remedies "to allow the catastrophically injured victim * * * compensation in addition to that provided by * * * the act". Workman v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exchange, 404 Mich. 477, 509, 274 N.W.2d 373 (1979). This case has been brought under Sec. 3135 of the no-fault act, which states:

"A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement." M.C.L. Sec. 500.3135(1); M.S.A. Sec. 24.13135(1).

The question of whether "serious impairment of body function" and "permanent serious disfigurement" are issues of fact or law leads to the dispute in our case. In 1973 the Michigan Supreme Court declared in an advisory opinion that those phrases "are within the province of the trier of fact". Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich. 441, 481, 208 N.W.2d 469 (1973). Decisions of the Court of Appeals applied this standard, ³ and the trial court here applied it as the law of this case. On December 23, 1982, however, the Supreme Court declared the phrases to be matters of statutory interpretation--questions of law for the court:

"We believe several considerations are instructive in determining whether the threshold requirement of 'serious impairment of body function' is primarily a phrase presenting a fact question for the trier of fact, or a phrase requiring judicial definition as a matter of law. First, it is not a term commonly used, for which juries would have a clear sense of the intended meaning. Hence, the phrase differs from 'intoxication', as used in the dramshop act, see Rizzo v Kretschmer [389 Mich. 363, 207 N.W.2d 316 (1973) ]. It also differs from more specific requirements that could have been enumerated as threshold requirements for the no fault act, e.g., broken bones, dismemberment, etc.

"Second, and important especially in conjunction with the first factor, one of the important reasons behind the no fault act was to reduce litigation in automobile accident cases. Considering that the phrase involved is unspecific and one concerning which reasonable minds can usually differ regarding specific applications, if the interpretation of the phrase is a matter to be left to the trier of fact, a trial would in most instances be required to determine whether the threshold requirements have been met. Such a consequence would certainly be contrary to the legislative intent in creating the threshold requirements.

"Third, we cannot believe that the Legislature, when limiting the continued existence of traditional tort liability to certain specified exceptions, intended that the limits which they created would vary according to the specific jury impaneled or the specific part of the state in which a case was to be tried. Although the requirement of serious impairment of body function lacks specificity, uniformity in its application is to some extent attainable through statutory construction by the appellate courts. Unlike traditional tort litigation where differing views among differing juries are generally acceptable, the question whether tort immunity attaches is not a question which we believe the Legislature intended to leave as primarily a question for the trier of fact.

"The responsibility of effectuating the legislative will is primarily a matter of law for the court and not properly left to determination by a jury. Cf., Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co., 411 Mich 502; 309 NW2d 163 (1981). Therefore, we conclude that the meaning of 'serious impairment of body function' is a matter to be determined by statutory construction. We hold that when there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function shall be decided as a matter of law by the court. Likewise, if there is a factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requirement of MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 has been met." Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich. 483, 501-502, 330 N.W.2d 22 (1982) (emphasis added).

It is the Cassidy rule which we are bound to apply here.

B. Serious Impairment of Body Function

At this stage in its legal evolution, "serious impairment of body function" must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Cassidy v. McGovern, 415 Mich. 503, 330 N.W.2d 22. A few standards have developed, though, which will assist the courts. First, "impairment of body function" actually means "impairment of important body functions". Cassidy v. McGovern, 415 Mich. 504, 330 N.W.2d 22. Second, by its own terms, the statute requires that any impairment be "serious". M.C.L. Sec. 500.3135(1); M.S.A. Sec. 24.13135(1), McKendrick v. Petrucci, 71 Mich.App. 200, 210, 247 N.W.2d 349 (1976). Third, the section applies only to "objectively manifested injuries". Cassidy v. McGovern, 415 Mich. 505, 330 N.W.2d 22.

The general character of Mrs. Williams' injuries is not seriously disputed. Her sole claim at trial was of an injury to the base of her right thumb. It was not fractured and no other medical abnormalities were found. Mrs. Williams experienced pain, though, and this pain was variously diagnosed as a sprained ligament and as tendonitis. The pain radiated through her wrist and into her arm. The pain made it difficult for her to perform household duties, but she testified that there were no specific chores which she could not do. On these facts, we conclude that Mrs. Williams' injuries did not seriously impair any important body functions.

Additionally, Mrs. Williams' soft tissue injuries were not subject to medical measurement. ⁴ Thus, they are not "objectively manifested" in a scientific or medical context. The symptoms of her injuries, however, have found objective manifestation : pain makes certain activities difficult. The Cassidy opinion did not expressly designate which standard of manifestation to employ, objective medical measurements of injury or a patient's complaints of pain substantiated only by the patient's limited activities. We conclude that Mrs. Williams' injuries are not "objectively manifested" within the meaning of Cassidy. Medically unsubstantiated pain will always be present in a tort action for pain and suffering. The Legislature could not intend so low a threshold for avoiding the no-fault act's proscription against tort actions. General pain and suffering is not sufficient to meet the threshold. Cassidy v. McGovern, 415 Mich. 505, 330 N.W.2d 22. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Cassidy, the "serious impairment of body function" standard

"should be considered in conjunction with the other threshold requirements for a tort action for non-economic loss, namely, death and permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. The Legislature clearly did not intend to erect two significant obstacles to a tort action for non-economic loss and one quite insignificant obstacle." 415 Mich. 503, 330 N.W.2d 22.

Additionally, the Cassidy decision spoke of "objectively manifested injuries," not symptoms. Mrs. Williams' injuries do not meet the "objectively manifested" requirement.

We hold, then, that the Legislature did not intend to allow tort actions based on the type of injuries suffered by Mrs. Williams. Mrs. Williams is left to her remedies under the no-fault act.

We reach the same conclusion on Mr. Williams' "serious impairment" issue. Mr. Williams complained of pain in his left shoulder, back and legs. No medical abnormalities were found, but one examining physician did note a slight limitation of movement in the shoulder. Another doctor testified that Mr. Williams also experienced limited movement of the hips and neck. The second doctor also testified that Mr. Williams' hands were in pain, but Mr. Williams denied this affliction. Mr. Williams testified that he was transferred to another job because he had some difficulty when lifting his left hand over...