Williams v. People
| Decision Date | 25 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84SC300,84SC300 |
| Citation | 724 P.2d 1279 |
| Parties | Robert WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, Norman R. Mueller, Denver, for petitioner.
Robert R. Gallagher, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Jr., Dist. Atty., Catherine P. Adkisson, Bruce H. Rabun, Deputy Dist. Attys., Littleton, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion in People v. Williams, 82CA0056, affirming the jury conviction of the defendant, Robert Williams, of first degree murder, 1 conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, 2 and accessory to the crime of murder. 3 We affirm.
The evidence at trial established that in the summer and fall of 1980 the defendant, his girlfriend, Valerie Shaughnessy, Steven Lloyd and the victim actively participated in the illegal purchase, sale and use of narcotic and dangerous drugs. On August 28, 1980, Lloyd was arrested on drug-related charges and placed in the Denver County Jail as the result of a search of his apartment by law enforcement agents. The defendant, who was present during that search, consented to a search of his own residence and, as a result, was also arrested and placed in the Denver County Jail. During their incarceration, Lloyd and the defendant discussed the possibility that someone, perhaps the victim, had informed on them.
On September 12, 1980, the victim was found stabbed to death in Daniels Park, Douglas County, Colorado. When first questioned by law enforcement officials, the defendant, Shaughnessy and Lloyd all stated that the three of them had gone to a movie during the evening of September 11, 1980, and that they had seen the victim before they went to the movie. On October 16 and 17, 1980, however, Shaughnessy made two somewhat inconsistent statements, one oral and one written, to Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) agents. She at that time repudiated her earlier versions of the events of September 11, suggested that in fact Lloyd and the defendant had taken the victim to Daniels Park to acquire drugs during the evening of September 11 and stated that although she did not know what happened at the park, she surmised that someone other than Lloyd or the defendant had killed the victim.
On October 31, 1980, the defendant was arrested and jailed in Phoenix, Arizona, for the murder of the victim. 4 On November 6, 1980, while in jail, he wrote a letter to Lloyd concerning the events of September 11, 1980. That letter indicated that Shaughnessy had stabbed the victim as the result of an argument at Daniels Park and that the defendant and Lloyd had tried to stop her. On November 17, 1980, Lloyd told that version of the events to two CBI agents. However, Lloyd later wrote a letter to the CBI stating that the story he told on November 17 was false; that the defendant, Shaughnessy and Lloyd planned the murder during the day on September 11; and that only Shaughnessy and the defendant actually stabbed the victim that night.
Shaughnessy and Lloyd were subsequently arrested and charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Lloyd agreed to testify for the prosecution at the defendant's trial and in return was permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder. The trials of Shaughnessy and of the defendant were severed. Shaughnessy did not testify at the defendant's trial and ultimately entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder. The two statements given by Shaughnessy to CBI agents describing the events of September 11, 1980, and a third statement she had made to the defendant's attorney were admitted into evidence during the defendant's trial.
At the defendant's trial, Lloyd testified that on September 11, 1980, the defendant called him up and asked him to come over to the defendant's house; that when Lloyd complied, the defendant outlined a plan to kill the victim, who was due to arrive shortly; and that the plan included participation by the defendant, Shaughnessy and Lloyd. Lloyd also testified that this plan was abandoned upon the victim's arrival and that the victim then accompanied the defendant, Shaughnessy and Lloyd to Daniels Park in the belief that some drugs were to be delivered at that location. Lloyd further testified that when they reached the park he grabbed the victim from behind; that Shaughnessy began to stab the victim and accidentally stabbed the defendant in the arm and Lloyd in the finger; that she became frustrated that the victim would not die and gave the knife to the defendant; that the defendant proceeded to stab the victim; and that the three finally dragged the victim into the woods and returned home. Lloyd testified that on the way home they fabricated an alibi that included the assertion that the defendant cut his arm on a fence when the three attempted to sneak into a drive-in theater.
The defendant testified at his trial that no plan existed to kill the victim, that the group of four went to Daniels Park to drink beer and smoke marijuana, that the victim threatened Shaughnessy that he would tell the defendant about a prior sexual relationship between the victim and Shaughnessy, and that in a fit of anger Shaughnessy began stabbing the victim while the defendant and Lloyd attempted to restrain her. The defendant then testified that he and Lloyd stopped Shaughnessy, at which point the victim was still alive, but that Lloyd then began stabbing the victim.
In her October 17, 1980, written statement to the CBI, Shaughnessy stated that on September 11, 1980, the victim visited the house she and the defendant shared; that Lloyd was already there; that the three men left to obtain some drugs; that Lloyd and the defendant returned later that evening without the victim; and that when Shaughnessy asked the defendant about a visible cut on his arm, he replied that he had cut it while climbing a fence. In her November 14, 1980, statement to John Dicke, the defendant's then attorney, Shaughnessy stated that she was present at Daniels Park with the other three on the evening of September 11, 1980, and that she stabbed the victim in the heat of an argument. This statement was consistent with the version of the events discussed in the defendant's November 6, 1980, letter to Lloyd and in a March 7, 1981, letter from the defendant to Shaughnessy. The jury entered verdicts of guilty to the charged offenses of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and also to a lesser non-included offense of accessory to murder.
On appeal, the defendant asserted numerous evidentiary errors, each of which the Court of Appeals rejected. We granted certiorari on the following issues: whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two statements of Lloyd containing references to the defendant's prior criminal conduct; whether the trial court erred in admitting Lloyd's testimony as to the defendant's prior criminal activity; whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of Shaughnessy; and whether the cumulative effect of the above errors denied the defendant a fair trial.
The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted two statements of Lloyd that referred to other criminal activity by the defendant. We disagree.
The defendant first challenges the admission of Lloyd's November 18, 1980, letter to the CBI (Exhibit KK), in which Lloyd admitted that a statement he had made the previous day was false and that he was now telling the truth. The defendant objected to the introduction of Exhibit KK during Lloyd's direct testimony on the ground that it was consistent with Lloyd's trial testimony. The prosecution argued that the letter was admissible as an admission against Lloyd's penal interest. 5 The trial court found that the exhibit was admissible because it was corroborative of Lloyd's testimony and because Lloyd was available for cross-examination to protect the defendant's confrontation right. On appeal, the People concede that the admission of the exhibit was error, but argue that the error was harmless.
Exhibit KK is an out-of-court statement introduced for the truth of the matter asserted therein. It, therefore, is hearsay as defined by CRE 801(c). CRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides that certain prior statements made by a witness are not hearsay if:
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive....
Although Exhibit KK was essentially consistent with Lloyd's trial testimony, it was introduced by the prosecution during Lloyd's direct testimony and was not offered to rebut any charge against Lloyd of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. The letter does not constitute an exception under CRE 801(d)(1)(B), and the trial court erred in admitting it.
Crim.P. 52(a) provides that any error not affecting substantial rights of the defendant shall be disregarded on appeal. Exhibit KK was a pencil-written, six-page letter purportedly setting forth the events of the night of the murder. Although basically consistent with Lloyd's trial testimony in that it placed the responsibility for the victim's death on the defendant and Shaughnessy, the letter differed in some details from that testimony and, therefore, did not greatly enhance Lloyd's credibility. In these circumstances, we do not find the admission of the letter to have been prejudicial to the defendant. 6 Exhibit KK was basically cumulative with reference to Lloyd's trial testimony, which was subject to cross-examination; it did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. See Early v. People, 178 Colo. 167, 496 P.2d 1021 (1972). The trial court's admission of Exhibit KK, though erroneous, was harmless.
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