Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc.
Decision Date | 24 February 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 7121SC3,7121SC3 |
Citation | 179 S.E.2d 319,10 N.C.App. 384 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Eugene K. WILLIAMS v. RUTHERFORD FREIGHT LINES, INC., a corporation, and Lester L. Wofford, anindividual. James M. WILLARD v. RUTHERFORD FREIGHT LINES, INC., a corporation, and Lester L. Wofford, anindividual. |
White, Crumpler & Pfefferkorn, by James G. White, Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., Joe P. McCollum, Jr., William G. Pfefferkorn, and Michael J. Lewis, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff appellants.
Blakeney, Alexander & Machen, by Ernest W. Machen, Jr., and J. W. Alexander, Jr., Charlotte, for defendant Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc.
Childs & Patrick, by Bailey Patrick, Jr., Charlotte, for defendant Lester L. Wofford.
Where false statements are actionable only Per quod, some special damage must be pleaded and proved. 5 Strong, N.C. Index 2d Libel and Slander, § 4, p. 207, and cases therein cited. 'When items or special damages are claimed each shall be averred.' G.S. § 1A--1, Rule 9(g). Special damage, as that term is used in the law of defamation means pecuniary loss, as distinguished from humiliation. Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124; Scott v. Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1; Payne v. Thomas, 176 N.C. 401, 97 S.E. 212; 1 McIntosh, N.C. Practice & Procedure 2d, § 991, p. 541.
The original complaints filed herein contained no allegations of special damage. Plaintiffs say that none are necessary, contending that defendants' alleged statements are actionable Per se. If defamatory words are actionable Per se, malice and damage are conclusively presumed and do not have to be alleged or proved. Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55; Oates v. Trust Co., 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869.
Where the injurious character of words appear on their face as a matter of general acceptance they are actionable Per se. 5 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Supra. Decisions in this State generally limit false statements which may be classified as actionable Per se to those which charge plaintiff with a crime or offense involving moral turpitude, impeach his trade or profession, or impute to him a loathsome disease. .
Plaintiffs argue that the language allegedly used by defendants is actionable Per se in that it charges them with a crime, and also tends to prejudice them in their occupations as truck drivers and Union leaders. We disagree. It is true that Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines a gangster, among other things, as 'a member of a gang of criminals.' However, the law contemplates that in order to be actionable Per se a false statement must impute that a person is guilty of a punishable offense. Ringgold v. Land, 212 N.C. 369, 371, 193 S.E. 267, 268. See also Penner v. Elliott, Supra; Deese v. Collins, 191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92; Payne v. Thomas, Supra; Beane v. Weiman Co., Inc., 5 N.C.App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236.
In charging plaintiffs with being 'gangsters', defendants were not charging them with a specific crime for which they could be indicted and punished. The language, especially under the circumstances here alleged, was nothing more than vituperation or name calling arising out of a dispute over a labor grievance. This is not sufficient to permit recovery, absent a showing of special damage. As was stated in Bouligny, Inc. v. Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 173, 154 S.E.2d 344, 356, '(e)ven where the plaintiff is an individual, some thickness of skin is required of him by the law in the realm of labor disputes, just as in battles in the political arena.'
Neither do we think the language actionable Per se as an impeachment of plaintiffs' business or occupation. With respect to this category of defamatory statements, Dean Prosser states: 'The statement must be made with reference to a matter of significance and importance for that purpose, rather than a more general reflection upon the plaintiff's character or qualities, where such special significance is lacking.' Prosser, Law of Torts 3rd, 776.
Plaintiff relies on Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466. There, a competitor allegedly stated falsely to one of plaintiff's customers that plaintiff, a sewing machine salesman, would not give a good machine and that a police captain could tell the customer all about the shady deals the plaintiff had pulled. The statement was held to be actionable Per se. However, that statement, unlike the alleged characterization of plaintiffs here, tended to degrade defendant's business rival by charging him with dishonorable conduct in his business. The opinion in the case expressly notes this distinction:
The trial judge also held that the alleged damages arose out of a labor dispute; that all parties were subject to the National Labor Relations Act; and consequently, even if the allegations charged slander Per se, plaintiffs could have no right of recovery, in the absence of allegation and proof of special damages. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582; Bouligny, Inc. v. Steelworkers, Supra. Since we hold the allegations actionable Per quod, it is unnecessary that we pass on this theory of the cases.
Plaintiffs further contend that even if the alleged statements are not actionable Per se, special damages have been alleged in their supplementary pleadings and amended complaints. It is clear that many of the damages alleged in the later pleadings are not 'special' within the meaning of that term as used in the law of defamation, in that emotional distress and mental suffering are not alone sufficient to establish a basis for relief in cases which are actionable only Per quod. Penner v. Elliott, Supra; Scott v. Harrison, Supra; McCormack on Damages, § 114, p. 419; 3 Restatement of Torts, § 575. Among cases from other jurisdictions which are particularly pertinent on this point are Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842; Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292; Arturi v. Tiebie, 73 N.J.Super. 217, 179 A.2d 539.
We assume, for purposes of this decision, that allegations by Williams that he lost a Union election on 20 November 1963, and as a result thereof lost his employment on 10 December 1963, and allegations by Willard that he lost his employment in July, 1965, constitute allegations of special damages. However, all of these events took place more than six months before they were pleaded by way of amended complaints. Defendants pleaded G.S. § 1--55 which at the time provided that actions for slander must be brought within six months. The trial court held that defendants' plea of the statute of limitations barred the claims since no special damage occurred within six months prior to the filing of the amended complaints in which special damages were, for the first time, alleged. The court also held that since neither plaintiff suffered special damage prior to the filing of the original complaints on 26 April 1963, no right to recover could be established.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that their amendments relate back to the date of the original complaints because an injured party is entitled to recover for all damages, past, present and future. This is true in the ordinary tort case, but where, as here, it is essential that some special damage must occur before a claim is actionable, at least some special damage must have occurred by the time the action is instituted.
In Crawford v. Barnes, 118 N.C. 912, 24 S.E. 670, the special damage relied upon...
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