Williams v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 22 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-ALJ-21-0289-AP
• Parties: Kenneth Michael Williams, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina

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Kenneth Michael Williams, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

No. 21-ALJ-21-0289-AP

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

June 22, 2022

ORDER

SHIRLEY C. ROBINSON, Administrative Law Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE^[1]

This matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) in its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to subsection l-23-660(B). S.C. Code Ann. §§ l-23-660(B) (Supp. 2021). Kenneth Michael Williams (Appellant) seeks judicial review of a final decision rendered by the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicle Hearings (OMVH) denying a request for a reduction of Appellant's habitual offender suspension. Upon careful consideration of the Record on Appeal (Record), arguments advanced in the parties' briefs, and the applicable law the Court affirms the OMVH's Final Order and Decision.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was convicted of three "separate and distinct offenses" within a three-year period: (1) a conviction on March 17, 2015, for leaving the scene of an accident with bodily injury violation on February 6, 2015;^[2] (2) a conviction on January 16, 2016, for a driving under suspension violation on November 29, 2015; and (3) a conviction on December 13 2017, for a driving under suspension violation on November 17, 2017.

By letter dated December 18, 2017, Appellant was advised that he had been declared a habitual offender and his license was suspended for a five-year period from January 17, 2018 through January 17, 2023. On January 31, 2018, and while serving the habitual offender suspension, Appellant was charged with driving under suspension; on May 4, 2018, Appellant was convicted of this offense. On September 26, 2019, and also while serving the habitual offender suspension, Appellant was charged again with driving under suspension; on October 9, 2019, Appellant was convicted of this offense.

On February 23, 2021, Appellant completed a habitual offender reduction request form. On the form, Appellant indicated he had driven a motor vehicle during the habitual offender suspension period. By letter dated March 10, 2021, the Department advised Appellant he did not meet the statutory requirements for a reduction on the basis he had driven a motor vehicle while under suspension. On March 19, 2021, Appellant requested a contested case hearing before the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles (OMVH).

On June 10, 2021, the OMVH conducted a contested case hearing. Appellant appeared with counsel. The Department filed certified documents in lieu of appearing. On June 11, 2021, the OMVH issued a Final Order and Decision denying Appellant's request for a reduction of his habitual offender suspension period upon finding an absence of good cause. Specifically, the OMVH hearing officer concluded Appellant had continued to drive despite the imposition of his suspension and has been cited for driving under suspension two more times during the suspension period. The hearing officer further found Appellant had no personal circumstance that was not common to the general population.

On June 21, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the OMVH's Final Order and Decision stating the hearing officer erred in concluding no good cause existed to reduce the suspension. Appellant also took issue with the hearing officer's conclusion that Appellant's excuse for driving under suspension (that Appellant had no one who could give him a ride) was not credible. Appellant also maintained there was nothing in the record to support the hearing officer's conclusion that taxis, Uber, Lyft, and/or public transportation were and had been available to Appellant. On June 28, 2021, the OMVH hearing officer issued an order amending his Final Order and Decision after having granted and denied Appellant's motion in parts. The order on the Motion for Reconsideration reaffirmed no good cause existed for the reduction of the suspension but the hearing officer did amend his order to remove the finding regarding Appellant's credibility as to the availability of lawful transportation.^[3] On July 28, 2021, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The OMVH is authorized by statute to determine contested cases including, inter alia, implied consent proceedings. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2021). Therefore, the OMVH is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (Supp. 2021); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Holtzclaw, 382 S.C. 344, 347, 675 S.E.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[t]he DMVH [subsequently renamed OMVHJ is an agency under the [APA]."). Accordingly, the APA's standard of review governs appeals from its decisions. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380 and l-23-600(D) (Supp. 2021); Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984). When acting in its appellate capacity, the Court's review is generally limited to the Record on Appeal. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4) (Supp. 2021); see also SCALC Rule 36(G) ("The Administrative Law Judge will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record."). Additionally, subsection 1-23-380(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021) provides the standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions. See S.C. Code Ann. § l-23-600(E) (Supp. 2021) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in section 1-23-380). Pursuant to this standard:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § l-23-380(5)(a)-(f) (Supp. 2021).

The South Carolina Supreme Court has observed that "[s]ubstantial evidence is not a mere scintilla; rather, it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency." Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Commission of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010) (citation omitted). See also Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

Nevertheless, this Court owes no particular deference to the fact finder when matters of law are at issue. See Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 413 S.C. 561, 569, 776 S.E.2d 397, 402 (Ct. App. 2015) ("This court [Court of Appeals] reviews questions of law de novo.") (quoting Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 573, 730 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012)). It is axiomatic that the ALC may reverse on errors of law. E.g., Olsen v. S.C. Dep't of Health &Envtl. Control, 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding an appellate court can reverse a lower court's decision "[i]f the findings are affected by error of law, are not supported by substantial evidence, or are characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."). If a decision is affected by an error of law, properly raised by a party, the Court will not hesitate to correct it. See also S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, 397 S.C. 256, 260, 725 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2012).

ISSUES

Whether the OMVH hearing officer violated the South Carolina Constitution or other state law by posing questions to Appellant during the contested case hearing.

Whether the Department's designation of Appellant as a habitual offender was preserved and if so, whether the designation was correct.

Whether Appellant preserved the issue of proper notice from the Department that he was in danger of being designated a habitual offender and from the county treasurer that his license was in danger of suspension for non-payment of property taxes.

Whether the OMVH hearing officer abused his discretion in finding Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause sufficient to reduce his habitual offender suspension.

DISCUSSION

A. The OMHV hearing officer did not violate the State constitution or other statutory provision of law by questioning Appellant

Article I, § 22 of the South Carolina State Constitution provides:

No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi judicial

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