Williams v. Spencer-Hall

• Citation: 113 A.D.3d 759,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00346,979 N.Y.S.2d 157
• Parties: Kathelean WILLIAMS, appellant, v. P. SPENCER–HALL, defendant, Institute for Community Living, et al., respondents.
• Decision Date: 22 January 2014
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

113 A.D.3d 759
979 N.Y.S.2d 157
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00346

Kathelean WILLIAMS, appellant,
v.
P. SPENCER–HALL, defendant,
Institute for Community Living, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Jan. 22, 2014.

[979 N.Y.S.2d 158]

Wade T. Morris, New York, N.Y. (Kenneth J. Gorman, Esq., P.C., of counsel), for appellant.

Harris, King & Fodera, New York, N.Y. (Jose M. Gomez of counsel), for respondents.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated July 10, 2012,

[979 N.Y.S.2d 159]

which denied her motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Institute for Community Living and John Doe.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Institute for Community Living and John Doe is granted.

When the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle ( see Taing v. Drewery, 100 A.D.3d 740, 954 N.Y.S.2d 175; Ortiz v. Hub Truck Rental Corp., 82 A.D.3d 725, 918 N.Y.S.2d 156; Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672, 913 N.Y.S.2d 659; Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458, 688 N.Y.S.2d 194; see alsoVehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ). Drivers have a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident ( see Maragos v. Sakurai, 92 A.D.3d 922, 923, 938 N.Y.S.2d 908; Balducci v. Velasquez, 92 A.D.3d 626, 628, 938 N.Y.S.2d 178; Filippazzo v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 419, 716 N.Y.S.2d 710; Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545). “A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Volpe v. Limoncelli, 74 A.D.3d 795, 795, 902 N.Y.S.2d 152 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726; Martinez v. Martinez, 93 A.D.3d 767, 768, 941 N.Y.S.2d 189; Giangrasso v....