Williams v. State

Decision Date11 February 1908
Docket Number10779
Citation77 Ohio St. 468,83 N.E. 802
PartiesWilliams v. The State Of Ohio.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

False representation as to value - Will sustain conviction - For obtaining money by false pretense, when - Whether representation is opinion or statement - Question for jury.

1. When one makes a representation of value as an existing fact knowing it to be false and intending it to influence another to part with money or property and the other party relying upon such representation is thereby induced to part with money or property to the one making the false representation of value, such facts are sufficient to sustain a conviction for obtaining money or property by false pretense.

2. Whether the representation of value is intended to be merely an expression of opinion or whether it was made as a statement of an existing fact which the speaker intends to be an inducement to the other party and which he knows to be false, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for obtaining money and property by certain false pretenses, to- wit: that certain real estate situate in Benton township Pike county, being one hundred and ten acres in quantity, was then and there of the value of $11,000, and that one Martha M. Williams, then and there believing said representation of value to be true, and relying and acting upon that belief was induced to and did purchase from the plaintiff in error, the said real estate, and accepted his deed therefor, and gave to him and one Neal Overholser in payment therefor, money and property to the amount and value of $7,700, whereas, in fact, the said real estate was not then and there of the value of $11,000, and was of the value not to exceed three dollars per acre, that is, $330 in all; and that the plaintiff in error then and there knew that the value of said real estate did not exceed the sum of $330, and knew at the time he so falsely represented the value of said real estate that the same was false. To this indictment the plaintiff in error filed a motion to quash and also a demurrer, which were both overruled; and the case coming on for trial, at the close of the evidence introduced by the state, a motion was made by the defendant to instruct the jury to return a verdict of acquittal, which was overruled; and the court thereupon charged the jury, among other things, as follows: "But where the buyer relies entirely upon the representations of the seller and the seller knows that the properety he is describing is of such small value as to be practically worthless, and nevertheless represents it to be worth a specified sum of great amount, and the discrepancy between the real and the represented value is so enormous as to shock the conscience; when the representation is so grossly untrue that it could not be made upon any possible foundation of belief; and when it appears that the seller was plainly seeking by means of such statement to obtain the property of the buyer and practically return no equivalent therefor, the court takes the responsibility of saying to you that you have the right, if your judgment of evidence so convinces you, to regard such representations as one of fact rather than mere opinion." The jury found the defendant guilty and judgment was rendered accordingly, which judgment was affirmed by the circuit court, and this proceeding in error is to reverse that judgment.

Mr. E. Thompson and Mr. Charles H. Kumler, for plaintiff in error, cited and commented upon the following authorities:

Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280; Smith v. Patterson, 33 Ohio St. 70; State v. Webb, 26 Ia. 262; People v. Gibbs, 98 Cal. 661; State v. Paul, 69 Maine, 215; Commonwealth v. Wood, 142 Mass. 459; Leigh & Caves' Crown Cases, 425; Bates v. State, 124 Wis. 612.

Mr. Robert R. Nevin, prosecuting attorney; Mr. E. G. Denlinger and Mr. Harry N. Routzohn, assistants, for defendant in error, cited and commented upon the following authorities:

State v. Paul, 69 Me. 215; State v. Webb, 26 Ia. 262; Wharton on Criminal Law, Section 2102; Bishop on Criminal Law, Vol. 2, Section 454; Commonwealth v. Stone, 4 Metc., 43; People v. Jordan, 66 Cal. 10; Savings Bank Co. v. Miller et al., 14 C. D., 198; Simar et al. v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298; Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280; Smith v. Patterson, 33 Ohio St. 70; State v. Thaden, 43 Minn., 325; Hughes on Criminal Law, Section 604; Underhill on Criminal Law, Section 414; Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. St., 405; Hochheimer's Criminal Law, 354; People v. Bryant, 119 Cal. 598.

DAVIS J.

A statement of value may be given either as an opinion or as a statement of fact. All the authorities agree that if a statement of value is given as an opinion merely it cannot be regarded as a foundation for an indictment. But if the statement is made as an existing fact, when the accused knows it to be false and intends it to be an inducement to the other party, and it is so understood and relied upon by the other party, then it becomes a false representation of a material fact for which the...

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